Farlin v. Jones

• Decision Date: 02 March 2017
• Docket Number: Case No. 4:15cv115/MW/CJK
• Parties: RODERICK M. FARLIN, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida

RODERICK M. FARLIN, Petitioner, v. JULIE L. JONES, Respondent.

Case No. 4:15cv115/MW/CJK

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA TALLAHASSEE DIVISION

March 2, 2017

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, with incorporated memorandum. (Doc. 1). Respondent filed an answer, submitting relevant portions of the state court record. (Doc. 16). Petitioner has not replied, although invited to do so and granted an extension of time. (Docs. 17, 19).¹ The matter is referred to the undersigned magistrate judge for report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 72.2(B). After careful consideration of all issues raised by petitioner, the undersigned concludes that no evidentiary hearing is required for the disposition of this matter. Rule 8(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. The undersigned further concludes that the pleadings and attachments before the courtshow that petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief, and that the petition should be denied.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner, originally charged on May 17, 2010, was charged by second amended information filed in Leon County Circuit Court Case No. 10-CF-1413, with six counts of kidnapping to inflict bodily harm or terrorize (Counts I-VI), one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count VII), one count of domestic battery (Count VIII), one count of violating a domestic violence injunction (Count IX) and one count of violating a pretrial release condition (Count X). (Doc. 16, Ex. A, pp. 11-12).² Following a jury trial, petitioner was found guilty of one count of kidnapping to inflict bodily harm or terrorize (Count I), five counts of false imprisonment (Count II-VI), and one count each of improper exhibition of a dangerous weapon (Count VII), domestic battery (Count VIII), and violating a domestic violence injunction (Count IX).³ (Ex. A, pp. 50-65 (written verdict); Ex. C, pp. 262-263 (trial transcript)).

Petitioner was adjudicated guilty and sentenced to 215.025-month terms of imprisonment on the kidnapping and false imprisonment offenses and to 1-year terms of imprisonment on the remaining offenses, all to run concurrently. (Ex. A, pp. 69-78). On August 20, 2012, the Florida First District Court of Appeal (First DCA) affirmed the judgment, per curiam and without a written opinion. Farlin v. State, 95 So. 3d 218 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) (Table) (copy at Ex. G).

On February 19, 2013, petitioner filed a pro se motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, which he supplemented on March 12, 2013. (Ex. S, pp. 130-193). On June 26, 2013, the state circuit court summarily denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. (Ex. T, pp. 194-364). Petitioner did not appeal.

On May 14, 2013, petitioner filed a pro se motion to correct illegal sentence under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), which he supplemented. (Ex. I, pp. 1-10). The state circuit court denied the motion on October 15, 2013. (Ex. I, pp. 25-223). The First DCA affirmed, per curiam and without a written opinion. Farlin v. State, 132 So. 3d 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (Table) (copy at Ex. J). The mandate issued March 5, 2014. (Ex. K).

On November 26, 2013, petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in the First DCA, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Ex. L). The First DCA summarily denied the petition on the merits on March 13, 2014. Farlin v. State, 133 So. 3d 1211 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (copy at Ex. O).

On June 16, 2014, petitioner filed a second pro se motion for postconviction relief under Rule 3.850. (Ex. P, pp. 1-18). The state circuit court ruled on October 16, 2014, that the motion should be dismissed as an abuse of procedure because it raised claims that could have been included in petitioner's first motion. (Ex. P, pp. 19-20 (citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(h))). The circuit court ruled in the alternative that each claim was either procedurally barred or without merit. (Ex. P, pp. 20-59). The First DCA affirmed on January 27, 2015, per curiam and without a written opinion. Farlin v. State, 156 So. 3d 1077 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (Table) (copy at Ex. Q). The mandate issued February 24, 2015. (Ex. R).

On November 7, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the state circuit court. (Ex. V, pp. 648-654). The circuit court dismissed the petition on November 24, 2014, because it collaterally challenged petitioner's judgment and sentence and, if construed as a motion for postconviction relief under Rule 3.850, was untimely. (Ex. V, p. 656-657). The First DCA affirmed, per curiam and without a written opinion. Farlin v. State, 184 So. 3d 520 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) (Table). The mandate issued February 24, 2016.

On December 29, 2014, petitioner filed a petition for relief in the First DCA, citing Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(g). The First DCA construed the petition as a second habeas corpus petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Ex. Y, Ex. Z). The First DCA denied the petition on April 1, 2015, citing Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(d)(5) and (d)(6)(C).⁴ Farlin v. State, 160 So. 3d 546 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (copy at Ex. AA).

Petitioner filed his federal habeas petition on February 24, 2015. (Doc. 1). The petition raises four claims: (1) the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over petitioner as to Count I because he was not named in that charge; (2) Florida's false imprisonment statute was unconstitutionally applied to him because the evidence was insufficient to convict of that offense; (3) the State committed fraud on the court by violating Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.140(g); and (4) the State failed to properly charge aggravated assault because the information failed to allege all the essential elements of that crime. (Doc. 1). Respondent asserts that all of petitioner's claims fail for one or more of the following reasons: (1) the claim is without merit, (2) the claim is procedurally barred, (3) the claim is not cognizable on federal habeas review. (Doc. 16).

RELEVANT LEGAL PRINCIPLES

Exhaustion and Procedural Default

Before bringing a § 2254 habeas action in federal court, a petitioner must exhaust all available state court remedies for challenging his conviction, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S. Ct. 887, 130 L. Ed. 2d 865 (1995) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S. Ct. 509, 30 L. Ed. 2d 438 (1971) (citation omitted)). The petitioner "must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process." O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S. Ct. 1728, 144 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1999); Picard, 404 U.S. at 277-78. A claim that was not presented to the state court and can no longer be litigated under state procedural rules is considered procedurally defaulted, i.e., procedurally barred from federal review. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 839-40, 848; Hittson v. GDCP Warden, 759 F.3d 1210, 1260 n.56 (11th Cir. 2014) ("Where a return to state court would be futile - because the petitioner's claims would clearly be barred by state procedural rules - a federal court can 'forego the needless judicial ping-pong' and treat unexhausted claims as procedurally defaulted." (quoting Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 736 (11th Cir. 1998))); Chambers v. Thompson, 150 F.3d 1324, 1326-27 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that federal habeas courts should enforce applicable state procedural bars even as to claims that were never presented to the state courts).

A claim is also considered procedurally defaulted if it was presented to the state court but rejected on the independent and adequate state ground of procedural bar or default. Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280, 132 S. Ct. 912, 181 L. Ed. 2d 807 (2012) ("As a rule, a state prisoner's habeas claims may not be entertained by a federal court when (1) a state court [has] declined to address [those] claims because the prisoner had failed to meet a state procedural requirement, and (2) the state judgment rests on independent and adequate state procedural grounds." (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Caniff v. Moore, 269 F.3d 1245, 1247 (11th Cir. 2001) ("[C]laims that have been held to be procedurally defaulted under state law cannot be addressed by federal courts."). The adequacy of a state procedural bar to the assertion of a federal question is itself a federal question. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 122 S. Ct. 877, 151 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2002). The adequacy requirement has been interpreted to mean that the state rule must be "firmly established and regularly followed," Siebert v. Allen, 455 F.3d 1269, 1271 (11th Cir. 2006), that is, not applied in an "arbitrary or unprecedented fashion," Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001), or in a manifestly unfair manner. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424-25, 111 S. Ct. 850, 112 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1991); Upshaw v. Singletary, 70 F.3d 576, 579 (11th Cir. 1995).

A petitioner seeking to overcome a procedural default must "demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S. Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); Tower v. Phillips, 7 F.3d 206, 210 (11th Cir. 1993). "For cause to exist, an external impediment, whether it be governmental interference or the reasonable unavailability of the factual basis for the claim, must have prevented petitioner from raising the claim." McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 497, 111 S. Ct. 1454, 113 L. Ed. 2d 517 (citing Murray v. Carrier, ...