Farlow v. Farlow

Decision Date15 March 1912
Citation135 N.W. 1,154 Iowa 647
PartiesF. C. FARLOW, D. L. TUCKER and F. B. TUCKER, Appellees, v. S. F. FARLOW, Appellant
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Wapello District Court.--HON. C. W. VERMILLION, Judge.

ORIGINALLY this was an action in equity to enjoin defendants from cutting trees and committing other trespasses upon a certain ten acres of land in Wapello county. After defendants had answered claiming title to the property, plaintiffs amended their petition, asking that their title to the property be quieted, and that they have a decree for possession thereof. Upon trial to the court, a decree was entered finding that plaintiffs Tucker were and are the owners of the property that neither of the defendants had any right, title, or interest in or to the premises, and enjoining them from cutting or removing any timber therefrom. Save as indicated there was no decree quieting title in plaintiffs, nothing was said about their being entitled to the possession of the property, and no writ of possession was ordered. All parties appeal, but, as defendants first perfected theirs, they will be called appellants.--Affirmed in part, and modified and remanded in part.

On defendant's appeal affirmed. On plaintiff's modified and remanded.

Steck & Steck, for appellants.

Roberts & Webber, Summer & Siberell, and Gillies & Daugherty, for appellees.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

This is an unfortunate controversy primarily between plaintiff F. C Farlow and defendant S. F. Farlow, father and son, over a ten acres of land upon which defendant and his family have been living for the last four or five years. Plaintiff Farlow sold and conveyed the property by warranty deed to his coplaintiffs, F. B. and D. L. Tucker, dated June 3, 1910 possession to be given March 1, 1911, or before that date if defendant should vacate the premises. After the sale, defendant was proceeding to cut and dispose of timber from the lands, and this action for an injunction was commenced July 26, 1910. Defendant answered in August of the same year, and therein pleaded that his father had given him the land in the year 1907, and that he had been in possession thereof ever since the said gift was made. This was denied by plaintiffs, and on April 7, 1911, the Tuckers filed an amendment to their petition, wherein they asked that their title be quieted against the defendant, and that they be decreed to be entitled to the immediate possession of the premises. This amendment was filed after the case had been tried, and the court had orally announced its decision. Plaintiffs also pleaded an estoppel against defendant, growing out of an alleged statement made by the defendant to one M. V. Tucker, who acted as the agent for the plaintiffs Tucker, before the property was purchased, that he wished his father would sell the property in controversy. This statement was denied by defendant Farlow; and his wife, Mattie Farlow, came into the case by a special plea to this alleged estoppel, saying that the property was her homestead, and that her husband could not by any statements made to others affect her homestead rights in the premises. These were the issues in the case, and a decree was entered as already stated. Plaintiffs Tucker appeal because the dercee did not specifically quiet title in them, and find that they were entitled to the immediate possession of the property, and defendant from that part of the decree finding that the title to the property was in plaintiffs Tucker.

The main questions in the case are of fact, and they may shortly be stated as follows: Did the plaintiff Farlow make a present gift of the property in question to his son? And, if so, was this gift executed by the taking of possession and the making of valuable improvements upon the premises?

Upon these propositions, the burden was upon the defendant, and, as stated in the authorities, the testimony to establish such a gift as against the record title must be clear, satisfactory, and, as sometimes said, conclusive. Kelly v. Kelly, 130 N.W. (Iowa), 380 at 381; Boeck v. Milke, 141 Iowa 713 at 717, 118 N.W. 874; Collins v. Collins, 138 Iowa 470 at 472, 114 N.W. 1069; Bevington v. Bevington, 133 Iowa 351, 110 N.W. 840; Sires v. Melvin, 135 Iowa 460, 113 N.W. 106; Williamson v. Williamson, 4 Iowa 279 at 281; Franklin v. Tuckerman, 68 Iowa 572, 27 N.W. 759; Wilson v. Wilson, 99 Iowa 688, 68 N.W. 910; Ellis v. Newell, 120 Iowa 71 at 74, 94 N.W. 463; Stroup v. Bridger, 124 Iowa 401 at 407, 100 N.W. 113.

Again "A gift, to be effectual, must be fully executed; and the question of whether or not there has been a gift in a given case is one of fact, in which the intention of the alleged donor in delivering the property is a very material inquiry." Stroup v. Bridger, supra. In Oliver v. Perry, 131 Iowa 654 at 658, 109 N.W. 183, which was a case much like the one at bar, we said: "But, as he supposed the execution of a deed was essential to the consummation of the conveyance, this was not effected, for he refrained from executing the deed on the ground that, if made, debts might be enforced against the property given. It is not material for what...

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