Farlow v. State
| Decision Date | 05 April 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27374. |
| Citation | 2 S.E.2d 500,59 Ga.App. 881 |
| Parties | FARLOW v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
C G. Battle, of Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.
John A. Boykin, Sol. Gen., and J. Walter Le Craw, both of Atlanta for defendant in error.
Defendant was convicted under an indictment charging him with the possession of burglarious tools as defined in Code, § 26-2701, with the intent to use them in the commission of a crime.
It was shown that he was in possession of the tools named, and it was also shown that such tools were such as were commonly used in safe blowing and other burglaries, and how they were used. It was also shown that defendant had assisted in several other burglaries, in which he had used similar tools and instruments such as cotton, eye dropper, nitroglycerin dynamite caps, fuses and flash light batteries as those found in the possession of the defendant.
Plaintiff in error insists that the court erred in permitting the state, over his objection, to prove the facts and circumstances of other burglaries engaged in by the defendant some time prior to the crime alleged. The gist of the crime as charged in this case is that the defendant possessed the named articles with the intent to use or employ them in the commission of a crime.
After proof of possession it is also necessary to prove the intent with which they are possessed. As was said in Maynard v State, 47 Ga.App. 221, 170 S.E. 265, "Intent being one of the essential elements of the crime charged in an
indictment for larceny after trust, evidence relating to other similar transactions is admissible under the exceptions to the general rule where it tends to prove intent." In Farmer v. State, 100 Ga. 41, 43, 28 S.E. 26, 27 this language is used: "While it is a general rule that, upon the trial of a person for a criminal offense, other and distinct criminal transactions cannot be given in evidence against him, yet, according to the weight of authority, evidence of other representations or transactions may be received, as tending to show motive or intent [italics ours] when the transactions are so connected in time, and similar in their other relations, that the same motive may reasonably be imputed to all." This same opinion quoting from Justice Story, Bottomley v. U.S. , 1 Story, 135 Fed.Cas. No.1,688, says "In all cases where the guilt of the party depends upon the intent, purpose, or ...
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...or circumstances present in cases where the evidence was held sufficient to support a finding of criminal intent. See Farlow v. State, 59 Ga.App. 881, 2 S.E.2d 500; Weeks v. State, 63 Ga.App. 773, 11 S.E.2d 670; Franks v. State, 74 Ga.App. 400, 39 S.E.2d 761; Montgomery v. State, 80 Ga.App.......
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...as a burglary tool under the Georgia law. Georgia Code § 26-2701; McNabb v. State, 1931, 44 Ga.App. 306, 161 S.E. 369; Farlow v. State, 1939, 59 Ga.App. 881, 2 S.E.2d 500. The officer testified, in view of the circumstances to this point, that he thought appellants had committed a burglary ......
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Walker v. State
...'Being a secret operation of the mind, it can only be ascertained by the acts and representations of the party. " Farlow v. State, 59 Ga.App. 881, 883, 2 S.E.2d 500, 502, quoting from Trogdon v. Commonwealth, 31 Grattan (Va.) 862, 872. The license tags being improperly used together with th......
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