Farmer-Celey v. State Farm Ins. Co., 14–CV–793

• Decision Date: 13 July 2017
• Docket Number: No. 14–CV–793,14–CV–793
• Parties: Evelyn FARMER–CELEY, Appellant, v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY, and Mark Pray, Appellees.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

163 A.3d 761

Evelyn FARMER–CELEY, Appellant,

v. STATE FARM INSURANCE COMPANY,andMark Pray, Appellees.

No. 14–CV–793

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted June 16, 2015

Decided July 13, 2017

Craig D. Miller and Matthew P. Tsun were on the brief for appellant.

O'Neil S. King and Erin A. Hockensmith were on the brief for appellee Mark Pray.

(Hon. Anthony C. Epstein and Hon. Stuart G. Nash, Trial Judges)

Before FISHER and THOMPSON, Associate Judges, and RUIZ, Senior Judge.

RUIZ, Senior Judge:

Appellant Evelyn Farmer–Celey brought a negligence action after she was injured in an automobile accident allegedly caused by appellee Mark Pray, who was insured by State Farm Insurance Company. Pray moved for summary judgment, arguing that appellant's amended complaint, which was filed after the limitations period elapsed, did not relate back to the first, timely complaint. The trial court agreed and dismissed the complaint. We reverse and remand.

I.

Appellant's complaint alleged that on January 1, 2009, at the intersection of Southern Avenue and 13th Place, Southeast, Pray's vehicle struck the vehicle in which appellant was a passenger from behind. As a result of the collision, appellant suffered injuries to her back.

The complaint was filed on December 27, 2011, a few days before the limitations period expired on January 1, 2012. Appellant, who was proceeding pro se and is in forma pauperis , styled the caption of the complaint identifying the defendant as "State Farm Ins. Co. for Mark Pray, et al."¹ It appears Pray was in custody at the time. Appellant asserted in a motion and in an affidavit that she named two defendants in her first pro se complaint but that because she did not know Pray's address, only State Farm's address was noted on the complaint. State Farm represented in a motion to the court that it did not know Pray's address at the time. According to appellant's affidavit and motion, State Farm requested that she forward all documents to it because it is Pray's "authorized agent and legal representative."

On February 21, 2012, State Farm filed a motion to dismiss the claim against it, arguing that in this jurisdiction negligence actions must proceed directly against the tortfeasor, not the insurer, and that "Pray, the alleged tortfeasor, was never named as a defendant." Appellant responded by filing a motion for leave to amend the complaint to correct the ambiguity caused by her "administrative error." The trial court gave leave, on March 12, 2012, and ruled that "with the change in defendant" the amended complaint should be filed by March 23, and a new summons obtained, both of which needed to be served on Pray pursuant to Superior Court Civil Rule 4, because service of the initial complaint on State Farm did not suffice.

On May 9, 2012, appellant filed an amended complaint. The caption identified Pray as a defendant, "c/o Attorney & Legal Representative State Farm Ins. Co."² State Farm was also separately identified as a defendant. The trial court effectuated service³ on both Pray and State Farm.⁴ The amended complaint was left with Pray's mother, at her address in the District of Columbia; after no answer was filed, the trial court entered a default judgment against Pray. Upon learning of the default judgment, Pray successfully moved to vacate and to quash the service of process by arguing that delivery of the pleading at his mother's address was insufficient because he was not residing there as he was then imprisoned in Pennsylvania. It was through this motion that the trial court and appellant first learned where Pray was incarcerated. Pray was then served with the amended complaint at the place of his incarceration.

On August 12, 2013, Pray filed a Rule 12 (b)(6) motion to dismiss, arguing that the amended complaint had added him as a defendant and was filed outside of the statute of limitations period. He claimed that he did not have notice of the initial complaint during the limitations period. Pray did not simultaneously raise a Rule 12 (b)(5) (insufficiency of service of process) motion arguing that the amended complaint was not properly served at the prison.

The trial court denied Pray's motion to dismiss on August 30, 2013, reasoning that it could not conclude, based only on the complaint, that Pray did not have timely notice, but stated that Pray could raise the statute of limitations defense on summary judgment. After completion of discovery, Pray moved for summary judgment on March 24, 2014, arguing that the amended complaint was time-barred. The trial court granted Pray's motion on July 7, 2014, concluding that appellant's amended complaint, filed outside of the limitations period, changed a party by substituting Pray as a defendant for State Farm and did not relate back to the initial complaint because Pray was not served and did not otherwise have sufficient notice of appellant's lawsuit within the limitations period.

II.

Appellant argues that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on the ground that her amended complaint was time-barred because her initial, timely complaint sufficed to name Pray as a defendant. Alternatively, she argues that the amended complaint, which sought only to clarify that Pray was a named defendant and the relationship between Pray and State Farm, related back to her initial complaint.

On appeal, we review the trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo, by the same standard the trial court was obligated to use to evaluate the motion. See Young v. U–Haul Co. , 11 A.3d 247, 249 (D.C. 2011). Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The sufficiency of a complaint is a question of law. See Wilson v. Wilson , 785 A.2d 647, 649–50 (D.C. 2001).

We review the claim on appeal in light of the text and judicial interpretation of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and their application to the complaints filed by the pro se litigant in this case. The formal requirements for a complaint are straightforward, and minimal, with "no technical forms of pleadings or motions ... required." Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8 (e). The caption of the complaint must include the name of the court, the title of the action, and the name of the party on whose behalf the pleading is filed. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 10 (a). The title of the action "shall include the names of all parties." Id . Pleadings must also include the "full residence address, and unless the party is represented by counsel, the ... telephone number, if any" of the party on whose behalf the pleading is filed.

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 10–I (b). There is no requirement that the address or telephone number of the defendant be included in the complaint.

A complaint may be amended once as a matter of course before a responsive pleading is filed, or by leave of court which "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Super. Ct. Civ. R. 15 (a). The rules provide that an amended complaint "relates back to the date of the original pleading" in three circumstances. Id . at (c). If the "amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted," it will relate back if "the claim or defense asserted ... arose out of the [same] conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth in the original [complaint]," id . at (c)(2), and the newly named party "has received such notice of the institution of the action that the party will not be prejudiced in maintaining a defense on the merits, and [ ] knew or should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party." Id . (c)(3)(A)-(B). "There is, therefore, a two-step inquiry courts ordinarily must undertake: did the amendment 'change the party'? and if so, did the amending party satisfy the notice requirements ...?" Pritchett v. Stillwell , 604 A.2d 886, 888 (D.C. 1992).

In applying rules of civil procedure we follow the express injunction that they "shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action," Super. Ct. Civ. R. 1, and that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice." Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8 (f). Thus, "pleadings should be liberally construed in favor of the pleader," Indus. Bank of Wash. v. Allied Consulting Servs. , 571 A.2d 1166, 1167–68 (D.C. 1990) (referring to "inartfully drafted complaint"). It is long established that Rule 15 (c) is to be applied liberally, Pritchett , 604 A.2d at 890 (citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. District of Columbia , 441 A.2d 969, 972 n.4 (D.C. 1982) ), "to further the rule's purpose: to ensure 'that litigation be decided upon the merits rather than upon technical pleading rules.' " Id . (quoting Strother v. District of Columbia , 372 A.2d 1291, 1297 (D.C. 1977) ). Liberal application of Rule 15 is especially relevant when the purpose of an amendment is to clarify the "identity of an existing party and not to add a new one." Id. (citing Keith v. Washington , 401 A.2d 468, 470 (D.C. 1979) ). The liberal application of rules of procedure and construction of pleadings is particularly apt in litigation pursued by a party without legal representation. On matters involving pleadings, timeliness of filings, and service of process "pro se litigants are not always held to the same standards as are applied to lawyers." MacLeod v. Georgetown Univ. Med. Ctr. , 736 A.2d 977, 980 (D.C. 1999).

With these principles in mind, we consider whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based on its application of Rule 15 (c). We conclude that the original complaint named Pray as a defendant and that the amended complaint thus did not change the name of the defendant. Therefore, the...