Farmer v. Sec'y, Doc
| Decision Date | 06 June 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:09-cv-1128-J-37JBT |
| Parties | CALVIN FARMER, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DOC, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner is proceeding on a Second Amended Petition (Doc. #12) (Second Amended Petition).1 He filed a Memorandum of Law in Support of Second Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. #13). The Second Amended Petition challenges a 2005 state court (Duval County) conviction for armed robbery and resisting an officer with violence. Respondents filed a Response to Order to Show Cause and Answer to Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc.#32) (Response) on December 19, 2011.2 They rely on a previously filed Appendix (Doc. #23).3
Petitioner filed his Response to Respondents' Reply to Show Cause Order Issued by This Honorable Court on Oct. 19, 2011 (Doc. #37). See Order (Doc. #15). Four grounds for habeas relief are raised, and the Court is mindful of its responsibility to address each ground, Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925, 936 (11th Cir. 1992); however, no evidentiary proceedings are required in this Court.4
The Court will analyze Petitioner's claims under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). "By its terms [28 U.S.C.] § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim 'adjudicated on the merits' in state court, subject only to th[re]e exceptions." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784 (2011). The exceptions are: (1) the statecourt's decision was contrary to clearly established federal law; or (2) there was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; or (3) the decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. at 785.
There is a presumption of correctness of state courts' factual findings unless rebutted with clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This presumption applies to the factual determinations of both trial and appellate courts. See Bui v. Haley, 321 F.3d 1304, 1312 (11th Cir. 2003).
Petitioner claims he received the ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In order to prevail on this Sixth Amendment claim, he must satisfy the two-pronged test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), requiring that he show both deficient performance (counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness) and prejudice (there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different).
The first ground of the Second Amended Petition is: "State Habitual Offender Sentence violates due process[.]" Second Amended Petition at 6. In this ground, Petitioner raises a FourteenthAmendment claim asserting he was illegally sentenced under the Florida state habitual offender laws due to the state relying on a prior predicate conviction from the State of Virginia, received by Petitioner's brother. Upon review of the record, prior to trial, the following transpired. A Notice of Intent to Classify Defendant as an Habitual Felony Offender was filed on August 26, 2004. Ex. C at 20. The state intended to rely on two prior felony convictions: (1) grand larceny, on April 4, 2000, in the Circuit Court, County of South Hampton, Virginia, and (2) possession of cocaine, on February 10, 1992, in the Circuit Court, City of Newport News, Virginia. Id. An Amended Notice of Intent to Classify Defendant as a Habitual Felony Offender was filed on March 16, 2005; however, the Amended Notice was withdrawn on that date.5 Id. at 181, 346.
A sentencing hearing was conducted on March 16, 2005. Ex. C at 334-71. Petitioner was represented by Mr. Richard Selinger at sentencing. Id. Once the state withdrew the amended notice of habitual felony offender status, the state announced that it would rely on the original notice. Id. at 346. The court asked defense counsel if the judgments and sentences had been reviewed with Petitioner, id. at 346-47, and Mr. Selinger respondedaffirmatively. Id. at 347. Mr. Selinger said Petitioner was the same individual as that in the judgments and convictions. Id. The court specifically inquired as to whether Petitioner agreed that he is the same individual as referenced in the convictions. Id. Counsel responded:
Yes, sir, and for the record that's for grand larceny that he was convicted on April 4th, 2000, in South Hampton, Virginia, and the second one is for possession of cocaine, conviction date of February 10th, 1992 in Newport News, Virginia, and he will stipulate to both of those.
Id. (emphasis added).
The court then asked Petitioner if he agreed that he is the same person that was sentenced and adjudicated guilty in those two cases. Id. Petitioner said yes. Id. The court encapsulated the nature of the proceedings:
What we are doing at this point is taking up - is holding our separate hearing on the State's original notice of intent to classify the defendant as habitual felony offender. You have stipulated that the packages that relate to those convictions are Mr. Farmer. I need to ask you whether either of you have any evidence that Mr. Farmer has received any relief from either of these two judgments and sentences by way of pardon, post-conviction relief or direct appeal.
Id. at 350. Defense counsel responded in the negative as well as the state. Id.
The court concluded that Petitioner had the two requisite prior felony convictions, with the most recent adjudication fallingwithin the five-year window preceding the date of the instant offense. Id. at 352. Petitioner was designated an habitual felony offender, and sentenced to thirty years on count one, and ten years on count three, to run concurrently. Id. at 369. The Judgment and Sentence were entered on March 16, 2005. Id. at 191-97.
Petitioner now asserts that the prior conviction for possession of cocaine from Newport News, Virginia, dated February 10, 1992, is actually a conviction his brother received from the State of Virginia. The Defendant named in the conviction is "Sean A. Farmer," with a date of birth of December 20, 1969.6 Ex. K at 32. The court, at the sentencing proceeding, noted that, according to the PSI, Petitioner "has used twenty-one some odd names and half a dozen dates of birth and Social Security numbers." Ex. C at 346. Petitioner admitted that he had accumulated aliases in order to avoid prosecution, and said his actual date of birth was October 25, 1972. Id. at 354.
Respondents contend, and this Court agrees, that this ground, claiming an illegal sentence due to the state relying on a predicate conviction of Petitioner's brother, simply involves astate court's interpretation and application of Florida law. See Response at 17-18. Petitioner has presented a state law claim, not a claim of constitutional dimension. As a result, this ground should be dismissed.
Since ground one presents an issue of state law that is not cognizable in this proceeding, this ground cannot provide a basis for habeas corpus relief. In the alternative, Respondents contend that the constitutional claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted. Response at 18.
There are prerequisites to a federal habeas review. Recently, the Supreme Court of the United States discussed the doctrine of procedural default:
Federal habeas courts reviewing the constitutionality of a state prisoner's conviction and sentence are guided by rules designed to ensure that state-court judgments are accorded the finality and respect necessary to preserve the integrity of legal proceedings within our system of federalism. These rules include the doctrine of procedural default, under which a federal court will not review the merits of claims, including constitutional claims, that a state court declined to hear because the prisoner failed to abide by a state procedural rule. See, e.g., Coleman, supra, at 747-748, 111 S.Ct. 2546; Sykes, supra, at 84-85, 97 S.Ct. 2497. A state court's invocation of a procedural rule to deny a prisoner's claims precludes federal review of the claims if, among other requisites, the state procedural rule is a nonfederal ground adequate to support the judgment and the rule is firmly established and consistently followed. See, e.g., Walker v. Martin, 562 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1120, 1127-1128, 179 L.Ed.2d 62 (2011); Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. ----, ----, 130 S.Ct.612, 617-618, 175 L.Ed.2d 417 (2009). The doctrine barring procedurally defaulted claims from being heard is not without exceptions. A prisoner may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law. See Coleman, 501 U.S., at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546.
Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S.Ct. 1309, 1316 (2012).
In addition, the Supreme Court, in addressing the question of exhaustion, explained:
Before seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus, a state prisoner must exhaust available state remedies, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1), thereby giving the State the "'opportunity to pass upon and correct' alleged violations of its prisoners' federal rights." Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365, 115 S.Ct. 887, 130 L.Ed.2d 865 (1995) (per curiam) (quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971) (citation omitted)). To provide the State with the necessary "opportunity," the prisoner must "fairly present" his claim in each appropriate state court (including a state supreme court with powers of discretionary review), thereby alerting that court to the federal nature of the claim. Duncan, supra, at 365-366, 115 S.Ct. 887; O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845, 119 S.Ct. 1728, 144 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999).
Baldwin v. Reese, 541 U.S. 27, 29 (2004) (emphasis added). In Baldwin, the Supreme Court recognized a variety of ways a federal constitutional issue could be fairly presented to the ...
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