Farmer v. State

• Citation: 770 So.2d 953
• Decision Date: 09 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1998-KA-01758-SCT.,1998-KA-01758-SCT.
• Parties: Christopher FARMER v. STATE of Mississippi.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Mississippi

770 So.2d 953

Christopher FARMER v. STATE of Mississippi.

No. 1998-KA-01758-SCT.

Supreme Court of Mississippi.

November 9, 2000.

Marvin Vining, Jackson, Attorney for Appellant.

Office of the Attorney General by Charles W. Maris, Jr., Attorney for Appellee.

BEFORE BANKS, P.J., WALLER AND DIAZ, JJ.

DIAZ, Justice, for the Court:

¶ 1. Christopher Farmer pled guilty in the Leflore County Circuit Court to aggravated assault and was sentenced to a term of twenty years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections (MDOC). After Farmer sought relief under the Uniform Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Act, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-39-1 et seq. (2000), this Court vacated Farmer's conviction and sentence, finding that his guilty plea was involuntarily given due to inaccurate advice offered by his trial attorney, thus constituting ineffective assistance of counsel. A trial followed in which a jury convicted Farmer of aggravated assault, and he again received a sentence of twenty years in the custody of the MDOC. Farmer appeals the conviction and sentence, contending that a trial judge who hears a guilty plea which is later overturned is not qualified to sit for the subsequent trial where bias is alleged. After an exhaustive review of the record, we find no evidence of bias. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court's judgment.

FACTS

¶ 2. On May 30, 1995, Christopher Farmer pled guilty to the aggravated assault of Michael Bullard. In his "Petition To Enter A Guilty Plea," Farmer admitted the following:

On October 16th, 1994, I was at the Country Music Palace in Vaiden, Mississippi, when I saw Michael Bullard hit a young man that I knew in the head with a beer bottle, myself and two other men followed Mr. Bullard from Vaiden to Greenwood to find out why he had hit our friend, when we got to Greenwood, I got out of the truck and approached Mr. Bullard, I had a pipe in my hand because I didn't know how Mr. Bullard would react when he saw me, at that point in time I told Mr. Bullard that he would have to talk to me about what he had done and he started chasing me, I tripped and fell to the ground with Mr. Bullard on top of me, at which point we started fighting and I hit Mr. Bullard with the pipe, I don't remember how many times I struck him or exactly where I hit him.

Circuit Judge Gray Evans sentenced Farmer to serve a term of twenty years in the custody of the MDOC. Farmer filed a motion for post-conviction relief, alleging that his guilty plea was made involuntarily. He maintained that his attorney incorrectly advised him that if he were to proceed to trial, he would serve at least eighty-five percent of his sentence upon conviction. This Court set aside the guilty plea in an unpublished decision in Farmer v. State, 707 So.2d 1098 (Miss.1998) (table), finding that counsel's erroneous advice denied Farmer effective assistance of counsel.

¶ 3. Prior to trial, Farmer filed a "Motion For Recusal And/Or Transfer Of Venue," in which he sought Judge Evans's recusal. Farmer alleged that:

Judge Evans, who must now sit [sic] this case impartially and adjudicate over disputed facts of this case, has heard Defendant's version of the facts, which had to have been read into the record in order to support a plea of guilty. Were the Defendant not to take the stand in the upcoming trial, which is very likely, Judge Evans would still have in mind Defendant's version of the facts when he rules upon evidence admissibility, sentencing, etc.

Judge Evans denied the motion, refusing to recuse himself or to transfer venue.

¶ 4. Following a trial, the jury convicted Farmer of aggravated assault. Judge Evans again sentenced Farmer to a term of twenty years in the custody of the MDOC.

DISCUSSION

WHETHER A TRIAL JUDGE WHO HEARS A GUILTY PLEA WHICH IS LATER OVERTURNED IS QUALIFIED TO SIT FOR THE SUBSEQUENT TRIAL WHERE BIAS IS ALLEGED IN THE RECORD

¶ 5. Farmer contends that Judge Evans erred in refusing to recuse himself from the trial in this matter. Though he admits that there is no per se rule against a judge presiding at the trial of a matter in which he previously heard a guilty plea, Farmer maintains that where there is evidence of bias in the record, the judge may not properly preside at trial. He relies upon Canon 3(C)(1)(a) of the Mississippi Code of Judicial Conduct which provides as follows, "A judge should disqualify himself in a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: (a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding...." Farmer cites the following as examples of Judge Evans's bias against him:

(1) At the hearing on his Motion for Recusal, Judge Evans claimed he "vaguely" remembered the facts of the case, yet when he sentenced Farmer following trial, he "recalled in great detail particular statements" made by Farmer.

(2) Judge Evans "delayed" the trial of his own accord until November 2, 1998, election day. Farmer claims that this is "highly suggestive of bias due to political motives and the attempt to garner votes."

(3) Judge Evans shares a court administrator with the prosecutor. Moreover, the administrator is the sheriff's wife.

(4) Farmer's counsel was not allowed to cross-examine the victim as vigorously as he could have.

(5) Judge Evans refused to allow Farmer to introduce evidence of the victim's blood alcohol content on the night of the assault. Farmer claims this was done out of sympathy for the victim.

(6) During the sentencing hearing, Judge Evans improperly allowed into evidence hearsay testimony harmful to Farmer.

(7) Judge Evans sentenced Farmer to the maximum sentence despite "voluminous" evidence of his rehabilitation.

¶ 6. "A judge is required to disqualify himself if a reasonable person, knowing all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about his impartiality." Rutland v. Pridgen, 493 So.2d 952, 954 (Miss. 1986). However, the presumption is "that a judge, sworn to administer impartial justice, is qualified and unbiased. To overcome the presumption, the evidence must produce a `reasonable doubt' (about the validity of the presumption) ." Turner v. State, 573 So.2d 657, 678 (Miss.1990). When a judge is not disqualified under the constitutional or statutory provisions, "the propriety of his or her sitting is a question to be decided by the judge, and on review, the standard is manifest abuse of discretion." Ruffin v. State, 481 So.2d 312, 317 (Miss.1985). In determining whether a judge should have recused himself, the reviewing court must consider the trial as a whole and examine every ruling to determine if those rulings were prejudicial to the complaining party. Hunter v. State, 684 So.2d 625, 630-31 (Miss.1996).

¶ 7. Though this Court has not addressed the propriety of a judge presiding at the trial of a matter in which he previously heard a guilty plea, we have recognized that "[i]t is not unusual for a judge to sit on successive trials following mistrials or to hear on remand a case where he previously has heard and ruled on the evidence...." Garrison v. State, 726 So.2d 1144, 1151 (Miss.1998). This Court has applied the same rule where a judge who previously tried a civil action hears a subsequent criminal case involving the same party and stemming from the same transaction. Adams v. State, 220 Miss. 812, 72 So.2d 211, 214 (1954). See also Steed v. State, 752 So.2d 1056, 1062 (Miss. Ct.App.1999)

; Wallace v. State, 741 So.2d 938, 942 (Miss.Ct.App.1999) (trial judge is not required to recuse himself from hearing a case in which he issued a search warrant absent a showing of prejudice or bias). In recognizing the undue burden which would attend adopting a contrary rule, we explained:

[i]f we should hold that a trial judge is disqualified merely because he has previously presided at the trial of a case involving the same evidence and transaction, then it would be necessary for him to stand aside and turn the duties of his office over to a special judge in every case in which there has been a mistrial, in every case where on appeal a new trial has been ordered, in every case where he himself has granted a new trial, and in every case growing out of the same transaction or based upon the same facts. The Legislature has not so enacted and we decline to adopt such a rule.

Garrett v. State, 187 Miss. 441, 455, 193 So. 452, 456 (1940).

¶ 8. Farmer's concerns regarding Judge Evans's supposed recollection of the facts surrounding his guilty plea are no different from those raised by a trial judge presiding at a second trial on remand by an appellate court. Though Judge Evans was privy to Farmer's earlier "admission" of guilt, the version of events recounted by Farmer at the hearing on his guilty plea is no different than the version he espoused at trial. Accordingly, absent some showing of actual prejudice or bias, we find no error in Judge Evans presiding at Farmer's trial. We turn now to Farmer's allegations of bias.

1. Judge Evans's Alleged Recollection of Farmer's Guilty Plea

¶ 9. Farmer first contends that although Judge Evans claimed he could not remember the facts of the case at the hearing on the Motion for Recusal, at the sentencing hearing he managed to recall "in great detail particular statements" made by Farmer upon entry of his guilty plea. Review of the record reveals that Judge Evans did not discuss any statements previously given by Farmer but only the testimony presented at the trial. Although Farmer's first claim is meritless, we address Judge Evans' remarks that could have conceivably been recollections of the earlier proceeding.

¶ 10. At the sentencing hearing, Judge Evans recounted the procedural history of Farmer's case. He noted that Farmer previously entered a guilty plea to the crime of aggravated assault and that "we had some question about whether [the 85%] law would be applicable to the sentences imposed...