Farmer v. State

• Decision Date: 02 March 1990
• Docket Number: Nos. S-2890,S-3072,s. S-2890
• Citation: 788 P.2d 43
• Parties: Arthur O. FARMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Bill Weith and Mike Metrokin, individually and in their official capacities as Alaska State Troopers, Appellees.
• Court: Alaska Supreme Court

Page 43

788 P.2d 43

Arthur O. FARMER, Appellant, v. STATE of Alaska, Bill Weith and Mike Metrokin, individually and in their official capacities as Alaska State Troopers, Appellees.

Nos. S-2890, S-3072.

Supreme Court of Alaska.

March 2, 1990.

Judith K. Bush, William E. Caldwell, Alaska Legal Services Corp., Fairbanks Raymond Funk, Asst. Atty. Gen., Fairbanks, and Douglas B. Baily, Atty. Gen., Juneau, for appellees.

Carol H. Daniel, Alaska Legal Services Corp., Anchorage, for appellant.

Before MATTHEWS, C.J., and RABINOWITZ, BURKE, COMPTON and MOORE, JJ.

OPINION

BURKE, Justice.

Arthur Farmer brought suit against the State of Alaska and two State Troopers, Bill Weith and Mike Metrokin, claiming the troopers violated his state and federal constitutional right to be free from unreasonable government seizures, his right not to be deprived of property without due process of law, and his right to enjoy the rewards of his own industry. The trial court granted Metrokin's motion for summary judgment, ruling the claim against Metrokin time-barred. The trial court additionally ruled that Farmer's failure to join a third party defendant merited dismissal of his claim under Civil Rule 19. Farmer appeals, arguing that summary judgment was erroneously granted and that the complaint should not have been dismissed. We agree and, thus, reverse.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Upstream from the Village of Ruby, on the Yukon River, is 14 Mile Island. Arthur Farmer harvested 43 house logs from this island and rafted them downriver to Ruby on July 9, 1985. Farmer believed he had the right to harvest such timber, but Dineega Corporation (Dineega) disagreed, and claimed title to the logs. Farmer was confronted in Ruby by Don Honea, Dineega's president. Faced with the conflicting claims of Farmer and Honea, two state troopers summoned to the dispute confiscated the logs, tagged them and ordered Honea to have the logs dragged up on the river bank. ¹

Farmer knew the identity of one trooper, Bill Weith, but the name of the other trooper was unknown. Accordingly, Farmer brought suit on July 2, 1987, against the State, Trooper Bill Weith, and "Trooper John Doe, whose name is not known by plaintiff, [but who] was then stationed in Fairbanks." Farmer alleged that the troopers wrongfully interfered in the dispute he was having with Dineega and that their conduct deprived him of his state and federal constitutional rights. ²

After filing the complaint, Farmer promptly sought the identity of the unknown trooper. ³ On January 11, 1988, after learning that the unknown trooper was Mike Metrokin, Farmer moved to file an amended complaint. The motion was granted. Metrokin was served with the amended complaint on February 3, 1988. On March 1, Gary Foster, the attorney representing the state entered an appearance on behalf of Metrokin and filed an answer.

After answering the complaint, Metrokin moved for summary judgment, contending that the action against him was time-barred by the two year statute of limitations. ⁴ On April 20, 1988, the trial court granted Metrokin's motion. The court ruled that Metrokin lacked notice of the suit within a two year period, thus precluding application of the relation back doctrine under Rule 15(c). ⁵ The trial court further decided that the doctrine of constructive notice was inapplicable under these facts and entered final judgment dismissing Metrokin from the case.

Farmer did not assert a claim against Dineega Corporation. The state, in filing its answer, pled seven affirmative defenses, but it failed to assert the necessity of joining another party. On March 14, 1988, the state filed a motion to compel Farmer to join Dineega as an indispensable party under Civil Rule 19. ⁶ The state asserted that an issue central to the case, ownership of the logs, required adjudication. Farmer countered, contending that ownership of the logs was not at issue with respect to his claims for police infringement of his constitutional rights. Farmer further argued that the state waived this defense by not asserting that Dineega was a necessary party in its answer.

On April 20, 1988, the trial court granted the state's motion and ordered Farmer to join Dineega as "an indispensable party defendant to this action against the defendants." The court vacated the initial trial date pending Dineega's joinder. Farmer then filed a motion to set a new trial date without first joining Dineega. Farmer argued that Dineega was not an indispensable party within the contemplation of Civil Rule 19(b) and that he had no desire to litigate a claim against Dineega. The court denied Farmer's motion.

In August, Farmer served Dineega with a summons, a copy of the amended complaint and a copy of the court order requiring Farmer to join Dineega. In response, Dineega's counsel wrote to both parties, stating that because Dineega was not named as a party defendant, "Dineega will file no pleading in the referenced matter, and will take no action in that matter." As a result of Dineega's recalcitrance to join the suit, the state and Weith moved to dismiss Farmer's complaint with prejudice for failure to comply with the court's order compelling joinder of Dineega. Farmer opposed the motion stating that he had, in fact, complied with the court order by serving Dineega with a summons and that "Dineega is therefore before the Court, albeit in the status of a party against whom no claim for relief has been made." On October 13, 1988, the court dismissed Farmer's complaint with prejudice.

After Farmer's complaint was dismissed, the state ⁷ moved for an award of full attorney's fees of $6,166.80 (later reduced to $6,126.40) on the ground that Farmer's action was frivolous. On November 29, 1988, the court entered its final judgment, awarding the state $4,000 in partial attorney's fees. The court struck the state's proposed finding that Farmer's action was frivolous. Farmer now brings this appeal.

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Erred in Granting Metrokin's Motion for Summary Judgment

At the outset, we note that the trial court committed plain error in applying the two-year period of limitation expressed in AS 09.10.070. Actions against peace officers are subject to the three-year period of limitation expressed in AS 09.10.060(a). Jenkins v. Daniels, 751 P.2d 19 (Alaska 1988). The only one of Farmers' claims governed by the two year statute was his claim under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. Id. at 24. The discussion that follows is thus applicable only to Farmer's section 1983 claim, as his other claims were clearly timely.

Farmer contends that the trial court erred in granting Metrokin's motion for summary judgment. ⁸ Farmer posits that under the circumstances of this case, the amended complaint substituting Metrokin for the trooper "John Doe" defendant should relate back to the date of the original complaint. Farmer asserts that the amended complaint should relate back since Metrokin had constructive, or imputed, notice of the action within the limitations period. Conversely, the state argues that under existing federal and state case law, Metrokin must have received actual notice of the suit within the prescribed statutory time-frame.

We note initially that the state has not challenged whether Farmer could properly invoke "John Doe" pleadings under the Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure. ⁹ Thus, this issue is not before the court. We address only whether the amended complaint in this action properly relates back to the original timely complaint. ¹⁰

Civil Rule 15(c) governs the application of the relation back doctrine. Federal Rule 15(c) largely parallels the state rule regarding the relation back of amendments, with one critical difference. Unlike the federal rule, ¹¹ the state rule does not contain an express provision allowing mere service on the state's attorneys to serve as sufficient notice for all state agencies or officers for purposes of relation back under Rule 15(c). Although the two rules are largely overlapping, the facts of this case have implicated a situation where the difference between the state and federal civil rule is important. Thus, we may look to federal case law interpreting this rule for guidance in our own application. To the extent that the state rule does not contain the provision allowing mere service on government attorneys to satisfy the notice and prejudice clauses within the rule, federal law is only illustrative and the state provision is not facially dispositive on the question whether the existing language of the rule nonetheless affords relief in this circumstance. We will proceed to examine the language and purpose of the rule to ascertain whether it does.

Before addressing the specific execution of the rule in the case sub judice, we must first briefly set forth the mission of the rule.

Rule 15(c) is based on the idea that a party who is notified of litigation concerning a given transaction or occurrence is entitled to no more protection from statutes of limitations than one who is informed of the precise legal description of the rights sought to be enforced. If the original pleading gives fair notice of the general fact situation out of which the claim arises, the defendant will not be deprived of any protection which the state statute of limitations was designed to afford him.

3 J. Moore, supra, § 15.15 at 15-144 to 15-145 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Thus, the touchstone of the relation back doctrine is fairness; does the substituted or additional party have fair notice of the cause of action, within the prescribed statutory period, such that the party's rights will not be prejudiced? In construing this rule, as with all rules of procedure, we are governed by the "general philosophy of the pleading rules": the rules should be liberally construed to insure that no plaintiff is deprived of his day in court solely because of the intricacies and technical limitations of pleading. Rather, our policy remains...