Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Reed

• Decision Date: 02 May 1988
• Docket Number: No. A035595,A035595
• Citation: 200 Cal.App.3d 1230,248 Cal.Rptr. 11
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Leonard REED et al., Defendants and Appellants.

Page 11

248 Cal.Rptr. 11

200 Cal.App.3d 1230

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Leonard REED et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. A035595.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

May 2, 1988.

Harry L. Ducey, Lafayette, Dwight B. Bishop, Walnut Creek, for defendants and appellants.

James J. Marchiano, James C. Martin, Lucy Ablan, Joseph P. Mascovich, Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, Oakland, for plaintiff and respondent.

MERRILL, Associate Justice.

In this case we hold that injuries suffered by an intoxicated woman who was struck by a car as she walked home from a bar did not arise out of her husband's use of his insured vehicle within the meaning of his automobile liability insurance policy, even though he took the keys to that vehicle from her and left her at the bar without transportation. We hold that the independent acts of the woman herself and the driver who struck her broke any causal connection between the husband's use of his vehicle and her injuries.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts are undisputed. In August 1983, appellants Leonard Reed and Beverly Reed were husband and wife and lived in Clayton. Mrs. Reed, who was an episodic alcoholic, had not had a driver's license since 1980. Upon arriving home on the day in question, Mr. Reed learned that his wife had driven one of their vehicles to a local restaurant and bar, the Pioneer Inn. He went to the restaurant and found his wife there, intoxicated and upset. Because he was angry and upset himself and did not want her to drive, he took the car keys from her and left. Later that evening, as Mrs. Reed was walking along Clayton Road, she was hit by a car driven by Charles Schultz. She may also have been struck by another unidentified vehicle.

Mrs. Reed filed a personal injury action against Charles Schultz, the Pioneer Inn, and her husband, among other defendants. ¹ As against her husband, she alleged that he negligently failed to provide transportation home from the restaurant for her and that his negligence was a concurrent proximate cause of her injuries.

An automobile insurance policy issued by respondent Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers), an interinsurance exchange, to the Reeds was in effect on the date of Mrs. Reed's injuries. That policy provided in pertinent part that the insurer would pay damages for which any insured person was legally liable "because of bodily injury to any person ... arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a private passenger car...."

Farmers filed the instant action against the Reeds for declaratory relief, seeking a determination of its obligations under the policy; it later moved for summary adjudication of the issues. The trial court concluded that Mrs. Reed's injuries did not arise out of her husband's ownership, maintenance or use of his automobile, that the policy excluded liability coverage for her injuries, and that Farmers was not obligated to defend Mr. Reed in Mrs. Reed's action against him or to pay any judgment rendered against him in that action. Judgment in accordance with the order granting the motion was entered in favor of respondent and against the Reeds. Both Reeds have appealed. ²

DISCUSSION

Appellants contend that the trial court erred when it concluded that Mrs. Reed's injuries did not arise out of her husband's use of his automobile. The contention is not persuasive.

In determining whether an activity involving a vehicle amounts to a "use" within the meaning of an insurance policy, we must construe any uncertainties in the policy language in favor of imposing liability on the insurer. (United Services Automobile Assn. v. United States Fire Ins. Co. (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 765, 769, 111 Cal.Rptr. 595.) Therefore, the term "use" is not limited to motion on the highway, but " '... extends to any activity in utilizing the insured vehicle in the manner intended or contemplated by the insured.' [Citations.]" (Ibid.)

Nevertheless, although the word "use" must be understood in its most comprehensive sense, there must be a causal connection between the use and the injury beyond a "but for" link. "The automobile is so much a part of American life that there are few activities in which the 'use of an automobile' does not play a part somewhere in the chain of events. Clearly the parties to an automobile liability policy do not contemplate a general liability insurance contract. [Citation.]" (Truck Ins. Exch. v. Webb (1967) 256 Cal.App.2d 140, 145, 63 Cal.Rptr. 791.) The use of the vehicle must be a " 'predominating cause' " or a " 'substantial factor' " in causing the injury. ( Id., at p. 148, 63 Cal.Rptr. 791.) Where the injuries are caused by an act independent of and remote from the insured vehicle's use, the requisite causal connection between the use and the injury is not established. (Interinsurance Exchange v. Macias (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 935, 937-939, 172 Cal.Rptr. 385; Truck Ins. Exch. v. Webb, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d at pp. 145-146, 63 Cal.Rptr. 791.)

In Truck Ins. Exch. v. Webb, supra, 256 Cal.App.2d 140, 63 Cal.Rptr. 791, a worker transported a load of cardboard boxes in an insured truck, unloaded and ignited them, and drove away. The fire spread to some nearby buildings. ( Id., at p. 142, 63 Cal.Rptr. 791.) The court held that the damage to the buildings did not arise out of the use of the truck within the meaning of the policy. Although the truck's use did play a part in the chain of events which led to the fire, it could not be reasonably said that the damage arose out of the "use" of the vehicle. Instead, the conduct of the worker in setting the boxes on fire and leaving them unattended was independent of and unrelated to the use of the truck. "The use of the truck was neither a 'predominating cause' or a 'substantial factor' in causing the injury." ( Id., at p. 148, 63 Cal.Rptr. 791.)

In Interinsurance Exchange v. Macias, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d 935, 172 Cal.Rptr. 385, a father used his insured vehicle to transport his intoxicated adult son to the son's own car, even though the father was aware that his son would then drive that car. The son, whose vehicle was uninsured, struck and injured a third party. (Id., at pp. 936-937, 172 Cal.Rptr. 385.) The court held that the third party's injuries did not arise out of the use of the father's vehicle within the meaning of his automobile insurance policy. Although the father may have been liable under general negligence principles, his automobile insurer was not. Id., at p. 937, 172 Cal.Rptr. 385.) The court acknowledged that but for the father's negligence in transporting his son to the son's car, the accident would not have occurred. (Ibid.) Nevertheless, it held that when the son left the father's vehicle and negligently drove off in his own car, those independent acts broke the causal link between the use of the insured vehicle and the victim's injuries. (Id., at pp. 937-938, 172 Cal.Rptr. 385.)

In this case, Mr. Reed's taking of the car keys from his wife may have been one link in the unfortunate chain of events which culminated in her injury, but that fact does not establish the causal connection between the injury and his use of his vehicle required to impose liability on his insurer. Just as the independent acts of the intoxicated son in Macias broke the causal connection between the father's use of his vehicle and the victim's injuries, here Mrs. Reed's own independent conduct in walking home and the independent act of the driver or drivers who struck her broke any causal...