Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Cocking
Decision Date | 21 May 1981 |
Citation | 173 Cal.Rptr. 846,29 Cal.3d 383,628 P.2d 1 |
Court | California Supreme Court |
Parties | , 628 P.2d 1 FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Paul COCKING, Jr., et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 31340. |
Horvitz, Greines & Poster, Horvitz & Greines, Ellis J. Horvitz, Marc J. Poster and Alan G. Martin, Encino, for plaintiff and appellant.
Rogers, Joseph, O'Donnell & Quinn, Pettit & Martin, Joseph W. Rogers, Jr., and Susan M. Popik, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and appellant.
Girardi, Keese & Crane and John R. Swaney, San Francisco, for defendants and respondents.
Robert Cartwright, San Diego, Edward I. Pollock, Los Angeles, Stephen I. Zetterberg, Claremont, Richard D. Bridgman, Oakland, Arne Werchick, San Francisco, Ralph D. Drayton, Sacramento, Harvey R. Levine, Claremont, Ian Herzog, Los Angeles, Glen T. Bashore, North Fork, Leonard Sacks, Northridge, Neil M. Levy, San Francisco, and Leslie Steven Rothenberg, Los Angeles, as amici curiae on behalf of defendant and respondent.
We resolve a constitutional challenge to section 11580.1, subdivision (c), of the Insurance Code ( ) which authorizes automobile liability insurers to exclude from coverage an insured's bodily injury liability to any other person insured under the policy. As will appear, we conclude that the provision is valid.
Defendant Cecilia Glorious, wife of defendant Paul Cocking, was injured while she was a passenger in a car driven by him. She sued him for damages alleging that her injuries were caused by her husband's negligence. Seeking to avoid indemnifying Cocking under the automobile liability policy which it had issued to him, plaintiff Farmers Insurance Exchange (Farmers) brought the present declaratory relief action. Farmers relied upon the following exclusion in its policy with Cocking: "(T)his policy does not apply under Part I (liability insurance) ... to the liability of any insured for bodily injury to (a) the named insured, or (b) a relative of the named insured who is a resident of the same household." Another relevant provision of the policy provided that: "If the insured named in Item 1 of the Declarations is an individual, the term 'named insured' includes his spouse if a resident of the same household." It is undisputed that at the time of the accident defendant Glorious was defendant Cocking's wife living with him in the same household. Accordingly, all parties agree that the exclusion, if valid, would bar bodily injury coverage for her injuries.
We note, preliminarily, that the foregoing exclusion is expressly authorized by section 11580.1, subdivision (c), which provides in relevant part that Defendant Glorious readily acknowledges that this statute purports to authorize an automobile liability insurer to exclude coverage for bodily injury to an insured such as herself. She argues, however, that this provision contravenes public policy and is void as a denial of equal protection under both federal and state Constitutions. The trial court accepted her constitutional argument and granted a summary judgment in her favor. Farmers appeals.
Defendant Glorious contends that the exclusion at issue violates public policy and is unenforceable for that reason. As we explain, the exclusion is expressly sanctioned by state statute and, accordingly, cannot be struck down on public policy grounds.
The contention that general public policy forbids an insurer from excluding liability coverage for bodily injury to an insured has been repeatedly rejected both by us and the Court of Appeal. (Schwalbe v. Jones (1976) 16 Cal.3d 514, 521-522, 128 Cal.Rptr. 321, 546 P.2d 1033, overruled on other grounds, Cooper v. Bray (1978) 21 Cal.3d 841, 855, 148 Cal.Rptr. 148, 582 P.2d 604; California Cas. Indem. Exch. v. Hoskin (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 789, 792-793, 147 Cal.Rptr. 348; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hartle (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 852, 857-858, 131 Cal.Rptr. 141; Civil Service Employees Ins. Co. v. Klapper (1976) 59 Cal.App.3d 918, 925- 927, 130 Cal.Rptr. 921; Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 167, 175-176, 123 Cal.Rptr. 613.)
Recently Justice Sullivan, writing for the majority in Schwalbe observed that (16 Cal.3d at p. 521, 128 Cal.Rptr. 321, 546 P.2d 1033.) In Schwalbe, we took judicial notice of the fact that most automobile liability insurance policies contain such exclusions, and that "Any suggestion ... that this (practice) would contravene some vaguely conceived public policy ... must surely founder upon the explicit language used by the Legislature to authorize such exclusions." (Id., at pp. 521-522, fn. 9, 128 Cal.Rptr. 321, 546 P.2d 1033.)
Although the precise holding in Schwalbe was overruled by us in Cooper v. Bray, supra, nothing we said in Cooper casts any doubt upon the validity of the exclusion authorized by section 11580.1. Cooper's holding was directed solely to the propriety of the substantive immunity granted to negligent drivers vis-a-vis owner-passengers under Vehicle Code section 17158. As we explain below, no similar grant of immunity from suit is here involved.
It is argued that section 11580.1 contravenes a basic public policy, expressed in Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), making every person responsible for his own negligent acts. Similarly, it is urged that section 11580.1 also conflicts with the general policy favoring adequate recovery for persons injured in automobile accidents. (See Wildman v. Government Employees' Ins. Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 31, 39, 307 P.2d 359.)
There are two answers to the contention. First, the exclusion authorized by section 11580.1, subdivision (c)(5), is not contrary to the policy expressed in the Civil Code because it is self-evident that an injured party, such as defendant Glorious herein, retains the full unrestricted right to sue the negligent insured. (Accord, Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d 167, 175-176, 123 Cal.Rptr. 613.) The exclusion affects only the right to reach insurance proceeds for the satisfaction of any judgment obtained. Second, and more fundamental, reliance upon general principles favoring recovery for injuries is misplaced. With respect to the specific issue before us, the public policy of this state is contained not in broadly expressed generalized abstractions but in the applicable statutory provisions themselves. Section 11580.05 expressly recites that "The Legislature declares that the public policy of this state in regard to provisions authorized or required to be included in policies affording automobile liability insurance or motor vehicle liability insurance issued or delivered in this state shall be as stated in this article, (and) that this article expresses the total public policy of this state respecting the contents of such policies, ..." (Italics added.) Thus, section 11580.1, subdivision (c), is not only consistent with state public policy, it itself constitutes and expresses that policy. (See Meritplan Ins. Co. v. Woollum, supra, 52 Cal.App.3d at pp. 175-176, 123 Cal.Rptr. 613.)
As we explain below, the Legislature's decision to authorize automobile insurers to continue to exclude bodily injury liability to an insured under the policy is supported by a variety of rational, legitimate reasons. That we may disagree with some or all of these reasons affords no justification whatever for the substitution of our own view of what is proper public policy for that of the Legislature. (Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. California E. Com. (1941) 17 Cal.2d 321, 325, 109 P.2d 935.)
Defendants challenge section 11580.1, subdivision (c)(5), on equal protection grounds, arguing that the exclusion of an insured from bodily injury recovery under the negligent insured's automobile liability policy is irrational and arbitrary. Farmers answers the equal protection challenge by contending, alternatively, that (1) there is no state action upon which to invoke equal protection principles, and (2) in any event, section 11580.1 is supported by sufficient rational bases. As the second contention is clearly meritorious, we need not reach the state action issue.
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