Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. City of Newton

Decision Date09 April 1896
Citation66 N.W. 784,97 Iowa 502
PartiesTHE FARMERS' LOAN AND TRUST COMPANY v. THE CITY OF NEWTON, et al., Appellants
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Appeal from Jasper District Court.--HON. A. R. DEWEY, Judge.

THIS is an appeal from the decree of the district court, canceling and setting aside an assessment for taxation made upon the property of plaintiff, by the board of equalization of the city of Newton.--Modified and affirmed.

MODIFIED AND AFFIRMED.

H. S Winslow for appellants.

McElroy & Northup for appellee.

OPINION

DEEMER, J.

We are first confronted with a motion to dismiss the appeal, based upon the grounds: First, that the appellants have no right to appeal; second, that plaintiff has not appealed; third, this court has no jurisdiction. The argument made in support of this motion proceeds upon the theory that, under the statute, no one but the person aggrieved (who, it is contended, must be the party against whom the assessment is made) can appeal. The statute conferring the right to appeal is as follows (McClain's Code, section 1312): "Any person who may feel aggrieved at anything in the assessment of his property may appear before said board of equalization in person, or by agent, at the time and place mentioned in the preceding section, and have the same corrected in such manner as to said board may seem just and equitable, and the assessor shall meet with said board and correct the assessment books as they may direct. Appeals may be taken from all boards of equalization to the circuit (district) court of the county where the assessment was made, within sixty days after the adjournment of such board of equalization, but not afterwards." It is well settled that the right of appeal is purely statutory, and, unless conferred by statute, it does not exist; and it may be that the statute quoted does not confer upon the city or its board of equalization, the right of appeal to the district court. But we have another general statute (McClain's Code, section 4392), which provides that "the supreme court has appellate jurisdiction over all judgments and decisions of all other courts of record, as well in case of civil actions as in proceedings of a special or independent character." Other provisions of the Code provide how the appeal may be taken. We have, in effect, held that this last statute confers the right of appeal in all cases coming within the class named, unless there be another statute limiting the final jurisdiction to the inferior court or tribunal. Lampson v. Platt, 1 Iowa 556. Again, we have said that "this court has appellate jurisdiction over all judgments and decisions of courts of record in the state;" and this cause not having been shown to be an exception to the rule, jurisdiction of it must be assumed to exist." Farley v. Geisheker, 78 Iowa 453 (43 N.W. 279). See also Davis v. City of Clinton, 55 Iowa 549 (8 N.W. 423), which was an appeal by the city from the decree of the district court, on appeal from the action of a board of equalization. The language used by Rothrock, J., in the case of Appeal of Des Moines Water Co., 48 Iowa 324, has reference to appeals from the board of equalization to the (circuit) district court, and not to appeals to this court from the order of a court of record; and the same may be said with reference to the language of the court in Grimes v. City of Burlington, 74 Iowa 123 (37 N.W. 106). Upon appeal to the district court, the city and board of equalization, acting for, and on behalf of the city, become parties, and, as such, are empowered by the statute last quoted to prosecute an appeal to this court. The motion to dismiss is overruled.

II. The case comes to us for trial de novo, and it is for us to do as the lower court should have done on the evidence adduced. The record discloses the following facts: In the latter part of the year 1888, an attempt was made to organize a corporation under the name of the Farmers' Loan & Trust Company. Articles of incorporation were filed in the office of the county recorder, and with the secretary of state, but the attempted corporation never issued any stock, nor did it have any property, except some blank applications for loans notes and mortgages, which it had printed. Its promoters expended some money in organizing the corporation, and procuring blanks, but received no stock or other evidence of membership. When the corporation was organized, its main purpose was to "make and sell loans"; but this was abandoned, and the organization was never fully perfected. The blanks which were procured were divided among the promoters, and were used by them in their private business. In order to make the blanks available, assignments in blank were executed in the name of the proposed corporation, and these papers, when divided, all had blank assignments thereon. The promoters of the corporation used these blanks, and the records of the county disclose a large number of mortgages standing in the name of the corporation. The board of equalization made an assessment on the strength of these records, but it is shown affirmatively that the corporation had no...

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