Farmers' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Nixon

• Decision Date: 23 May 1892
• Citation: 2 Colo.App. 265,30 P. 42
• Parties: FARMERS' & MERCHANTS' INS. CO. v. NIXON.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

30 P. 42

2 Colo.App. 265

FARMERS' & MERCHANTS' INS. CO. v. NIXON.

Court of Appeals of Colorado

May 23, 1892

Appeal from district court, Yuma county; S.S. DOWNER, Judge.

Action by G.B. Nixon against the Farmers' & Merchants' Insurance Company on a policy of fire insurance. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Montgomery & Frost, for appellant.

REED, J.

Appellant insured a building used as an hotel, the policy running to appellee. The property was destroyed by fire. Suit was brought to recover the insurance; trial had to a jury verdict for plaintiff in the sum of $200 and interest judgment on the verdict. There was no question in regard to the origin of the fire. An open vessel of gasoline for replenishing the fire was brought in by a servant. It took fire, and the building was consumed. The defense was based upon the fact that a gasoline stove was used in the building for cooking; that by the terms of the policy the use of gasoline was prohibited, and that such use of it rendered the policy void. It was contended by the plaintiff that the use of gasoline was known to the agents of the company who effected the insurance at the time of insuring, and that the provision was waived, and that subsequent agents knew the fact, acquiesced in its use, and did not cancel the policy. This was denied by appellant. The testimony was rather conflicting, but the jury found the issue for the plaintiff and that is conclusive. Several errors are assigned on the admission of testimony. No specific objections to the admissibility of it were made, nor proper exceptions saved hence the assignments will not be considered. See Higgins v Armstrong, 9 Colo. 57, 10 P. 232; Gilpin v. Gilpin, 12 Colo. 517, 21 P. 612; Ward v. Wilms, 16 Colo. 86, 27 P. 247. It is contended that the court erred in refusing the instructions asked by appellant and in those given. It is insisted that the local agents had no authority to waive the condition; that, if it was waived by the agent, the waiver having been by parol, and the policy containing no waiver, it was inoperative; and that it was error to submit the question to the jury. We do not so regard it. In May, Ins. § 126, it is said: "A person authorized to accept risks, to agree upon and settle the terms of insurance, and to carry them into effect by issuing and renewing policies, must be regarded as a general agent of the company pending negotiations; *** and the possession of blank policies and renewal receipts signed by the president and secretary is evidence of such agency." See Insurance Co. v. Friedenthal, ...