Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank v. Ratliff's Estate

• Decision Date: 27 June 1927
• Docket Number: No. 15980.,15980.
• Citation: 297 S.W. 84
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Parties: FARMERS' & MERCHANTS' STATE BANK OF CLEVELAND v. RATLIFF'S ESTATE.

297 S.W. 84

FARMERS' & MERCHANTS' STATE BANK OF CLEVELAND v. RATLIFF'S ESTATE.

No. 15980.

Kansas City Court of Appeals, Missouri.

June 27, 1927.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cass County; C. A. Calvird, Special Judge.

Claim by the Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank of Cleveland against the estate of F.

A. Ratliff, deceased. The claim was disallowed by the probate court, and on appeal to the circuit court judgment was rendered for the estate, and claimant appeals. Affirmed.

Crouch & Crouch, of Harrisonville, for appellant.

A. A. Whitsitt, of Harrisonville, and D. C. Chastain, of Butler, for respondent.

FRANK, C.

This case originated in the probate court of Cass county, where appellant filed a claim against the estate of F. A. Ratliff, deceased. Said claim, caption and verification omitted, is as follows:

"Plaintiff states that the estate of F. A. Ratliff, deceased, is indebted to it in the sum of nine hundred fifty-four and no/100 ($954.00) dollars, with interest at the rate of eight (8) per centum per annum, interest payable annually, from September 29, 1923, said sum being represented by a promissory note, dated September 29, 1923, payable to Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, of Cleveland, Mo., said note signed F. A. Ratliff, curator for Lola Ratliff; that said F. A. Ratliff was the duly appointed curator of the estate of Lola Ratliff, minor; that no part of said note, principal or interest due thereon has been paid, and plaintiff is entitled to have judgment against the estate of F. A. Ratliff for said sum of $954.00 with 8 per cent, interest thereon from September 29, 1923, as per the tenor of said note, a duly verified copy of said note being filed herein and made a part of this petition.

"1954.00. Cleveland, Mo., Sept. 29, 1923. "'Six months after date, for value received, I promise to pay to the order of the Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank nine hundred fifty-four and no/100 dollars, payable at the Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, Cleveland, Mo., with interest at 8 per cent. per annum from date until paid. With all interest payable annually, and if not so paid, to become as principal and bear the same rate of interest. Should the interest on this note not be paid when due, then the whole sum may, at the option of the legal holder of this note, be declared due and payable at once. Each of the makers hereof and the endorsers herein waive demand, notice and protest on this note. Ten per cent. to be added as attorneys fees if placed in the hands of an officer for collection. F. A. Ratliff,

                                   " `Cur. for Lola M. Ratliff
                                     " `By G. K. Kerr, Atty.'"
                

The claim was disallowed by the probate court, and claimant appealed to the circuit court, where a trial of the cause before Hon. C. A. Calvird, special judge, resulted in a finding and judgment in favor of the estate. Claimant brings the case here by appeal.

The facts giving rise to this controversy may be stated thus: Claimant is a banking corporation engaged in the banking business in the town of Cleveland, Mo. In 1919 Walton Ratliff, son of decedent, was cashier of this bank. In December of that year Walton Ratliff and Georgia Ratliff, his wife, executed to claimant bank their promissory note in the principal sum of $1,000. In February, 1920, Walton Ratliff and Georgia Ratliff, his wife, both died leaving as their only heir Lola M. Ratliff, a minor. Deceased, F. A. Ratliff, father of Walton Ratliff, was living at that time and was appointed administrator of the estates of Walton and Georgia Ratliff. The $1,000 note was not presented as a claim against the estate of either Walton or Georgia Ratliff. In July, 1920, F. A. Ratliff, as administrator, made a payment on the $1,000 note and executed a renewal note for the remainder in the sum of $803.19. He signed the renewal note as administrator. In December, 1920, he executed a renewal note in the sum of $803.19. In July, 1921, he made a small payment on the note and executed a renewal note for the balance due in the sum of $800. This $800 note was signed F. A. Ratliff, curator. Some time prior to the execution of this $800 note, the estates of Walton and Georgia Ratliff had been settled, and F. A. Ratliff had been discharged as administrator of said estates and appointed curator of the estate of the minor heir, Lola M. Ratliff. The $800 note was renewed in the same manner on November 23, 1921. On November 30. 1921, he borrowed $100 from the bank and executed a note therefor in the name of F. A. Ratliff, curator, and the estate was given credit for said $100. On April 4, 1922, the $100 note and the $800 note were combined and a renewal note executed by him as curator in the sum of $900. This $900 note was renewed four different times thereafter, the interest being added to the principal. Each of these renewal notes was signed by F. A. Ratliff, curator, the last renewal being the $954 note involved in this suit.

The note in controversy in this action is signed, "F. A. Ratliff, Cur. of Lola M. Ratliff, by G. K. Kerr, Atty." Prior to the execution of this note, F. A. Ratliff had executed to said G. K. Kerr a "power of attorney," the purpose of which is recited in said instrument as follows:

(1) To make and sign notes for me as curator and to sign same with full authority. (2) To pay any obligation of mine as curator out of any funds available by check or otherwise, and (3) To perform any act or deed for me as curator which I as curator would be lawfully entitled to do.

G. K. Kerr, cashier of claimant bank, testified:

"The people in the bank were dealing with P. A. Ratliff in his representative capacity as such administrator. And afterwards we knew he ceased to be administrator and became curator of the estate of Lola M. Ratliff, his grandchild. In our dealings with him we were dealing with him as curator. That is what we intended to do all the way through."

The record in this case does not show upon what theory the trial court decided it. There was no finding of facts and no declarations of law were asked or given. In this state of the record, if there is any theory upon which the judgment can be upheld it will not be disturbed. Central Missouri Trust Co. v. Taylor (Mo. App.) 289 S. W. 658, 661. The facts are that decedent did not execute the original note out of which the claim in suit arose. Neither did he or the estate of which he was administrator receive any consideration by reason of the execution of the original note. The consideration for which the original note was given passed to Walton Ratliff.

Appellant seeks to hold the estate of decedent liable by reason of the fact that decedent" while acting as administrator of the estate of Walton Ratliff, renewed the note which Walton Ratliff had executed to appellant during his lifetime; the contention being that when decedent signed the renewal note, describing himself as administrator, he became personally liable thereon.

Appellant cites the case of Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co. v. Montgomery, 74 Mo. 101, in support of his contention. The facts in the cited case show that Montgomery was in partnership with one Marine and transacting business under the firm name of Montgomery & Marine; that Marine died and Montgomery was appointed as administrator of the partnership estate; that the partnership was indebted to Studebaker Bros. Manufacturing Company, and Montgomery after his appointment as administrator executed a note to said company covering said partnership indebtedness and signed the note, "N. S. Montgomery, as Administrator, as Surviving Partner of M. & M." In deciding this case on the facts above stated the Supreme Court said:

"An administrator who signs a note describing himself as administrator, does not limit his liability unless he expressly confines his stipulation to pay out of the estate. Edwards on Bills, p. 78. The principle governing such cases is laid down in 2 vol. Parsons on Bills and Notes, p. 6, as follows: `An administrator, like any other trustee, will be held by his indorsement, although he add to his name the word "executor" or "administrator," unless he say expressly that recourse is to be had not to him but only to the estate of the deceased.'"

The quotation from the above-cited case, standing alone, appears to support appellant's contention. However, an examination of the opinion shows that the court decided the case against Montgomery on the theory that the judgment was for the right party for reasons other than those...