Farmers' Union Ditch Co. v. Rio Grande Canal Co.

• Decision Date: 02 July 1906
• Citation: 86 P. 1042,37 Colo. 512
• Parties: FARMERS' UNION DITCH CO. et al. v. RIO GRANDE CANAL CO. et al.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

86 P. 1042

37 Colo. 512

FARMERS' UNION DITCH CO. et al. v. RIO GRANDE CANAL CO. et al.

Supreme Court of Colorado

July 2, 1906

In Banc. Appeal from District Court, Costilla County.

Action by the Farmers' Union Ditch Company and others against the Rio Grande Canal Company and others. From a judgment for defendants, plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Ira J. Bloomfield, for appellants.

C. M Corlett and Goudy & Twitchell, for appellees.

Fred W Stow and Frank J. Annis, amici curiae.

GABBERT J.

A statutory adjudication of water rights for the purposes of irrigation was had in water district No. 20, by proceedings commenced in 1889 and concluded in 1891. In October, 1901 the Farmers' Union Ditch Company instituted proceedings for a further adjudication of rights in this district. The remaining appellants joined in these proceedings, to which appellees were made parties. From the final judgment rendered the parties claiming to be aggrieved thereby have brought the case to this court for review by appeal. The facts necessary to an understanding of the questions involved will be stated in connection with the propositions urged by the respective appellants.

The Farmers' Union Ditch Company and the appellees appeared in the original proceedings, and by decree duly entered therein the respective rights of these parties were determined. It is now contended on behalf of the Farmers' Union Ditch Company that, since the rendition of the decree of 1891, additional land under its ditch has been brought under cultivation, and additional water actually applied to such land, and by the proceedings now under consideration it seeks to have the right to such water relate back to the date work was commenced upon its ditch. This the trial court denied. That judgment was correct. It has been so frequently determined by this court that except as specially provided by the statutes, or in case of fraud, decrees rendered in statutory proceedings under the irrigation act are conclusive upon the parties thereto, that an extended discussion of the question would not seem necessary. New Mercer D. Co. v. Armstrong, 21 Colo. 357, 40 P. 989; Louden Canal Co. v. Handy D. Co., 22 Colo. 102, 43 P. 535; Ditch Co. v. Ditch Co., 22 Colo. 115, 43 P. 540; Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer D. Co., 23 Colo. 233, 48 P. 532.

The object of the statutes providing for the adjudication of water rights was to settle questions of the relative priorities of claimants of water for the purposes of irrigation. In the case at bar that question, including the quantity of water to which each was entitled, was settled by the decree of 1891. As between the Farmers' Union Ditch Company and the appellees, the former, by the proceedings instituted, seeks to ignore this adjudication and have a readjudication, which would change that decree. This cannot be permitted, unless we depart from the rule that a statutory adjudication of water rights is res judicata between the parties. Should the contention of counsel for the Farmers' Union Ditch Company obtain, then adjudication proceedings under the statute are of no avail, so far as the settlement of rights are concerned, but could be opened up from time to time with the result that the rights of parties to the use of water for irrigation purposes, although adjudicated, would always be subject to attack in the manner attempted in this case. But counsel for the Farmers' Union Ditch Company insist that it is not sought to attack the decree of 1891; that it is only sought to establish an additional priority which the ditch company could not establish at the time of the original proceedings, to which it is now entitled by reason of the actual application of water to additional lands since the rendition of the original decree, the right to which, under the doctrine of relation, should relate back to the time of the commencement of the construction of its ditch. The position is not tenable. If such an award could now be made, it would change the decree by awarding a right to the use of water in volume and priority to the detriment of others whose rights were established by the original adjudication proceedings. The fallacy of the contention is emphasized by the concession that the rights now claimed could not have been established in the original adjudication proceedings. If the facts at the time when the decree of 1891 was rendered did not entitle the Farmers' Union Ditch Company to the additional water now claimed, then certainly the original decree cannot be disturbed upon facts arising since its rendition, nor can the Farmers' Union Ditch Company invoke the doctrine of relation as to rights which have accrued since that date, so as to have the effect of changing that decree and the relative rights of the parties to the original adjudication proceedings, as thereby established. The necessity for this conclusion is apparent in the circumstances of this case. From time to time, for the period of about 10 years prior to the commencement of these proceedings, consumers of water from the various ditches affected by the decree of 1891 have secured water rights from such ditches, to improve farms. They had the right to assume that this adjudication, except in accordance with the statutes, could not be disturbed, and their rights to the use of water which they had acquired could not be changed to their detriment. But should the contention of counsel on behalf of the Farmers' Union Ditch Company obtain, then an adjudication of water rights under the statute affords no protection to those who have improved farms under ditches awarded priorities by the decree of 1891, and from which they obtained water to grow crops upon their lands. As before indicated, the purpose of the law, in providing for an adjudication of water rights, was to settle the priorities to the use of water for irrigation purposes, and in order to effect this object it must necessarily follow that all parties to such proceedings are concluded thereby, and cannot have the same reviewed or changed except in the manner, or within the time, which the law provides. To hold otherwise would render the title to water rights, although fixed by adjudication proceedings, of that uncertain nature that they would be of little value.

The decree of 1891 was set aside by judgment of the district court of Costilla county in 1896, and judgment rendered readjudicating water rights in district No. 20. An appeal was taken from this judgment, which resulted in a reversal, with instructions to the district court to reinstate the priorities granted to the parties appealing by the decree of 1891, and to modify its decree accordingly. Rio Grande L. &amp C. Co. v. Ditch Co., 27 Colo. 225, 60 P. 726. For the purposes of this case it is urged by counsel for appellants that the decree entered in accordance with the mandate of this court is the only one to consider. We cannot agree with that contention. The effect of the decree rendered in accordance with the views expressed by this court was, in effect, a reinstatement of the original decree of 1891, and the rights of the parties to this proceeding...