Farms v. Scott

• Decision Date: 21 July 2010
• Docket Number: No. 09 C 1985.,09 C 1985.
• Parties: NEBLOCK TRUCKING, INC., John Andruch and Jack Andruch, Jr. d/b/a/ Walnut Farms, Plaintiffs, v. Douglas P. SCOTT, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

725 F.Supp.2d 728

NEBLOCK TRUCKING, INC., John Andruch and Jack Andruch, Jr. d/b/a/ Walnut Farms, Plaintiffs,

v.Douglas P. SCOTT, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Defendant.

No. 09 C 1985.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois,Eastern Division.

July 21, 2010.

Charles M. English, Wendy M. Yoviene, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

James Allen Lang, Rachel Jana Fleischmann, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.

Neblock Trucking, Inc. (“Neblock”), John Andruch and Jack Andruch, Jr. (“Andruch Brothers”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) filed this action against Douglas P. Scott (“Scott”), in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (“IEPA”), alleging that a permit issued by the IEPA violated Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution (the “Commerce Clause”). (R. 17, Corrected Compl.) After the Court's ruling on a prior motion to dismiss, Scott filed an additional motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (R. 41, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss.) In his motion, Scott argues that actions subsequently taken by the IEPA rendered Plaintiffs' action moot. ( Id.) The Court granted Scott's motion on December 17, 2009, and dismissed Plaintiffs' suit without prejudice. (R. 44, Min. Entry.) Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration and clarification. (R. 45, Pls.' Mot. for. Recons.) For the reasons stated below, Plaintiffs' motion is denied.

BACKGROUND ¹

I. Relevant Prior Proceedings

Prior to December 22, 2004, the Illinois Environmental Protection Act (the “Act”), 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1 et seq. , distinguished between regional pollution control facilities (“RPCF”) and local pollution control facilities (“LPCF”). (R. 17, Corrected Compl. ¶ 6.) LPCFs were prohibited from receiving waste generated outside of the local general purpose unit of government in which they were located, while RPCFs did not have such a limitation. ( Id. ¶ 18.) To obtain an IEPA permit for a LPCF, zoning approval of the local government in which the LPCF was located was required. ( Id.) RPCFs, on the other hand, had to obtain site location approval pursuant to the Act. ( Id.) After the December 22, 2004 effective date of an amendment to the Act, the distinction between RPCFs and LPCFs was eliminated, and all new pollution control facilities, including transfer stations, were required to obtain site location approval. ( Id. ¶ 20.)

Prior to the effective date of this amendment, United Disposal of Bradley, Inc. (“United Disposal”)-which operates both a waste collection business and a waste transfer station-applied for a development permit to construct a LPCF in Bradley, Illinois. ( Id. ¶¶ 4, 21, 23.) After United Disposal received local zoning approval from Bradley, the IEPA granted its application for a development permit on September 21, 1994 (No. 1994-306-DE). ( Id. ¶ 23.) On December 5, 1994, United Disposal applied for an operational permit from the IEPA. ( Id. ¶ 24.) In January 1995, the IEPA issued United Disposal the operational permit for its solid waste transfer station in Bradley (No. 1994-306-OP). ( Id.) The issued operational permit contained Special Condition No. 9, which provided: “No waste generated outside of the municipal boundaries of the Village of Bradley may be accepted at this facility.” ( Id.)

On March 31, 2003, United Disposal filed an application with the IEPA for modification of their operating permit in which they requested that Special Condition No. 9 be removed from their operational permit. ( See id. ¶ 25; R. 45, Pls.' Mot. for. Recons., Ex. B at 3.) The IEPA denied their request, and the Illinois Pollution Control Board (“IPCB”) subsequently affirmed the denial. (R. 45, Pls.' Mot. for. Recons., Ex. B at 13.) In affirming, the IPCB found that before the IEPA could grant the requested modification to United Disposal's operating permit, “United Disposal must request a corresponding change to its development permit.” United Disposal of Bradley v. Illinois Envtl. Prot. Agency, PCB 03-325, 2004 WL 1470978, at *14 (Ill. Poll. Control Bd. June 17, 2004). Additionally, the IPCB concluded that “proof of local siting approval is a condition precedent to the [IEPA] granting a modification to [United Disposal's] development permit.” ( Id.) United Disposal appealed the IPCB's decision to the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District. (R. 17, Corrected Compl. ¶ 25.) Again, the denial of United Disposal's application was affirmed.

United Disposal of Bradley, Inc. v. Pollution Control Bd., 363 Ill.App.3d 243, 299 Ill.Dec. 809, 842 N.E.2d 1161, 1168 (2006).

II. The Present Litigation

Neblock is a corporation engaged in the business of hauling steel. ( Id. ¶ 9.) In the execution of its business in and outside of Illinois, Neblock also generates waste. ( Id.) Neblock has sought to have United Disposal collect waste and transfer its waste through United Disposal's Bradley waste transfer station. ( Id.) United Disposal informed Neblock that it could not accept waste generated outside of Bradley because of Special Condition No. 9's geographic limitation. ( Id.)

The Andruch Brothers operate Walnut Farms, a feed and livestock farm, and have sought to bring the waste they generate on their farm to United Disposal's transfer station. ( Id. ¶ 11.) Similarly, United Disposal informed them that it was unable to accept waste generated outside of Bradley because of Special Condition No. 9. ( Id.)

On March 31, 2009, Plaintiffs, along with several other parties, filed a two-claim complaint against Scott. ² (R. 1, Compl.) In their complaint, Plaintiffs alleged that Special Condition No. 9, acting in conjunction with 415 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/21(d)(1), ³ “discriminates against waste generated outside of Bradley and outside of Illinois in violation of [the Commerce Clause].” (R. 17, Corrected Compl. ¶ 35.) As a remedy for this alleged violation, Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. ( Id. ¶ 36.)

Scott filed a motion to dismiss on May 20, 2009. (R. 24, Def.'s Prior Mot. to Dismiss.) The Court, on August 26, 2009, partially granted his motion. Liberty Disposal, Inc. v. Scott, 648 F.Supp.2d 1047, 1056 (N.D.Ill.2009). Specifically, the Court dismissed all parties except for Neblock and the Andruch Brothers for lack of standing. Id. at 1054. Additionally, Plaintiffs' first claim for relief was also dismissed. Id. The Court did, however, find that Plaintiffs' second claim for relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983-which alleged a violation of the Commerce Clause-withstood a motion to dismiss. Id. at 1055.

On December 11, 2009, the IEPA removed Special Condition No. 9 from United Disposal's permit. ⁴ (R. 41, Def.'s Mot., Ex. A.) That same day, Scott filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). ( Id.) In his motion, Scott argued that the IEPA's voluntary removal of Special Condition No. 9 rendered Plaintiffs' action moot. ( Id. at 2-3.) The Court granted Scott's motion on December 17, 2009, and dismissed Plaintiffs' suit without prejudice. (R. 44, Min. Entry.)

Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration and clarification on January 14, 2010. (R. 45, Pls.' Mot. for. Recons.) In their motion, they argue that Scott's “voluntary, unilateral decision to modify the permit is insufficient to resolve the controversy.” ( Id. at 3.) Plaintiffs maintain that because Scott's authority to remove Special Condition No. 9 is questionable, potential third-party suits challenging the revised permit indicate that he “has certainly not shown it is ‘absolutely clear’ that future litigation will not force him to restore the restrictions or that a future administration will not do so.” ( Id. at 6.) As a result, they contend that this action is not moot. Alternatively, they ask the Court to “clarify that [our] mootness determination of December 17, 2009, relies on and incorporates [our] August 26, 2009 Memorandum and Opinion.” ( Id. at 9.)

LEGAL STANDARD

A motion for reconsideration, or, to be precise, a motion to alter or amend a judgment pursuant to Rule 59(e) “is permissible when there is newly discovered evidence or there has been a manifest error of law or fact.” ⁵ Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir.2006). To succeed on a Rule 59(e) motion, the movant must “clearly establish” one of the aforementioned grounds for relief. Id. When the basis for relief is a manifest error of law, the movant must bring to the court's attention the “wholesale disregard, misapplication, or failure to recognize controlling precedent.” See Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601, 606 (7th Cir.2000). The decision whether to grant or deny a Rule 59(e) motion is entrusted to the sound judgment of the district court. Matter of Prince, 85 F.3d 314, 324 (7th Cir.1996).

ANALYSIS

Under Article III of the Constitution, “cases that do not involve ‘actual, ongoing controversies' are moot and must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.” Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 326 F.3d 924, 929 (7th Cir.2003) (“ Federation ”) (quoting Stotts v. Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. No. 1, 230 F.3d 989, 990-91 (7th Cir.2000)). “It is fundamental to the exercise of judicial power under Article III of the United States Constitution that ‘federal courts may not give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions.’ ” Zessar v. Keith, 536 F.3d 788, 793 (7th Cir.2008) (quoting Protestant Mem'l Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Maram, 471 F.3d 724, 729 (7th Cir.2006)).

The general rule is that voluntary cessation of a challenged practice rarely moots a federal case because a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior. Pleasureland Museum, Inc. v. Beutter, 288 F.3d 988, 999 (...