Liberty Disposal, Inc. v. Scott

• Decision Date: 26 August 2009
• Docket Number: No. 09 C 1985.,09 C 1985.
• Citation: 648 F.Supp.2d 1047
• Parties: LIBERTY DISPOSAL, INC.; City of Kankakee; ABC Disposal, Inc.; Neblock Trucking, Inc.; Brett Lingren, John Andruch, and Jack Andruch, Jr. d/b/a Walnut Farms, Plaintiffs, v. Douglas P. SCOTT, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

Page 1047

648 F.Supp.2d 1047

LIBERTY DISPOSAL, INC.; City of Kankakee; ABC Disposal, Inc.; Neblock Trucking, Inc.; Brett Lingren, John Andruch, and Jack Andruch, Jr. d/b/a Walnut Farms, Plaintiffs, v. Douglas P. SCOTT, in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, Defendant.

No. 09 C 1985.

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

August 26, 2009.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Jennifer J. Sackett-Pohlenz, Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., Chicago, IL, Charles M. English, Wendy M. Yoviene, Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver P.C., Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

James Allen Lang, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Chicago, IL, Rachel Jana Fleischmann, Illinois Attorney General's Office, Floor Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RUBEN CASTILLO, District Judge.

Liberty Disposal, Inc. ("Liberty Disposal"), the City of Kankakee ("Kankakee"), ABC Disposal, Inc. ("ABC"), Neblock Trucking, Inc. ("Neblock Trucking"), Brett Lingren ("Lingren"), and John Andruch and Jack Andruch, Jr. ("the Andruch brothers") (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), filed this action against Douglas P. Scott ("Defendant"), in his official capacity as Director of the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency ("IEPA"), alleging that a permit issued by the IEPA to United Disposal of Bradley, Inc. ("United Disposal") violates Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution ("the Commerce Clause"). (R. 17, Corrected Compl.) Defendant moves to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs lack prudential standing and fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (R. 24, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 1.) For the reasons stated below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.

RELEVANT FACTS

The Illinois Environmental Protection Act, 415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (the "Act"), dictates the conditions under which waste can be disposed of, treated, stored, or abandoned within the state of Illinois, and the conditions under which waste can be transported into or within the state of Illinois for disposal, treatment, storage or abandonment. (R. 17, Corrected Compl. ¶ 14.) Previously, the Act distinguished between local pollution control facilities ("LPCFs") and regional pollution control facilities ("RPCFs"). (Id. ¶ 17.) LPCF's were prohibited from receiving waste generated outside the boundaries of the locality in which they were located, while RPCFs had no such prohibition. (Id. ¶ 18.) Zoning approval from the local government was required before obtaining a LPCF permit from the IEPA. (Id.) RPCF's, however, did not require zoning approval but had to obtain site location approval by the IEPA. (Id.)

In Tennsv, Inc., v. Gade, No. 92-503-WLB, 1993 WL 566803, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10403, at *4-5 (S.D.Ill. July 8, 1993), the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois struck down distinctions between LPCFs and RPCFs in the Act as a violation of the Commerce Clause. (Id. ¶ 19.) In response, the Illinois legislature enacted Illinois Public Act 94-951 ("the 1994 Amendment"), abolishing the LPCF/RPCF distinction and requiring all new pollution control facilities to obtain site location approval. (Id. ¶ 20.) The 1994 Amendment applied to pollution control facility applications filed on or after its effective date, December 22, 1994. (Id.)

United Disposal operates a waste collection business and a waste transfer facility in Bradley, Illinois. (Id. ¶ 21.) Prior to the 1994 Amendment, United Disposal obtained zoning approval and applied for a permit with the IEPA to construct an LPCF in Bradley. (Id. ¶ 23.) The IEPA granted United Disposal both a developmental and operational permit for the Bradley facility. (Id. ¶ 23-24.) The operational permit contained a geographical restriction, "Special Condition No. 9," which provided that: "No waste generated outside the municipal boundaries of the Village of Bradley may be accepted at this facility." (Id. ¶ 24.) On March 31, 2003, United Disposal filed an application asking the IEPA to modify its permit to remove Special Condition No. 9. (Id. ¶ 25.) The IEPA denied the modification application. (Id.) United Disposal appealed, but the IEPA's decision was affirmed by the Illinois Pollution Control Board ("IPCB") and the Illinois Appellate Court. (Id.)

Plaintiffs generate or transport waste generated outside the boundaries of Bradley and seek to have their waste accepted at United Disposal's transfer station. (Id.) United Disposal cannot accept Plaintiffs' waste because of Special Condition No. 9's geographical restriction. (Id. ¶ 4.) Therefore, Plaintiffs must use a different transfer station in Momence, Illinois, for their waste transfer needs. (Id. ¶¶ 5-11.) Plaintiffs allege that for identical services, the Momence transfer station imposes higher fees than United Disposal. (Id. ¶¶ 6-11.) In addition, Plaintiffs allege that they are closer to United Disposal's Bradley station than they are to the Momence transfer station. (Id.)

On March 31, 2008, Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this Court, alleging a violation of the Commerce Clause.¹ (R. 1, Compl.) On May 20, 2009, Defendants moved to dismiss based on lack of standing and failure to state a claim. (R. 24, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Rule 12(b)(1) requires the dismissal of claims over which the federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction.² Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). In deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the Court must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint, drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom in the plaintiffs favor. Lee v. City of Chicago, 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir.2003). The plaintiff, as the party invoking federal jurisdiction, bears the burden of proving that the requirements of standing have been met. Pollack v. United States DOJ, 577 F.3d 736, 739 (7th Cir.2009).

Rule 12(b)(6) requires dismissal for failure to state a claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court assumes all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint to be true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Brooks v. City of Chicago, 564 F.3d 830, 832 (7th Cir.2009). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the complaint must overcome "two clear, easy hurdles": (1) "the complaint must describe the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds on which it rests;" and (2) "its allegations must actually suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, by providing allegations that raise a right to relief above the `speculative level.'" Tamayo v. Blagojevich, 526 F.3d 1074, 1084 (7th Cir. 2008).

ANALYSIS

The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "to regulate Commerce ... among the several states." U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In addition, the Supreme Court has found that the Commerce Clause contains a negative command, know as the "dormant Commerce Clause," which prohibits states from "advancing their own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of articles of commerce, either into or out of the state." Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Department of Natural Resources, 504 U.S. 353, 359, 112 S.Ct. 2019, 119 L.Ed.2d 139 (1992) (quotation and citation omitted). "The dormant Commerce Clause applies with full force to state regulation of the collection, transportation, processing and disposal of solid waste." National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652, 657 (7th Cir.1995).

In this case, Plaintiffs allege that the Special Condition No. 9 restriction issued by Defendant violates the dormant Commerce Clause because there "is no legitimate, non-discriminatory justification" for prohibiting the transfer of waste outside the boundaries of Bradley to United Disposal's facility. (R. 17, Corrected Compl. ¶ 29.) Further, Plaintiffs allege that the "purpose and intent and practical effect" of the prohibition is "to favor the persons who generate waste within the `boundaries' of Bradley and to discriminate against persons who generate waste outside of Bradley and outside of Illinois." (Id. ¶ 30.) Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack prudential standing to bring this constitutional claim and have also failed to state a dormant Commerce Clause claim. (R. 24, Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss.)

I. Rule 12(b)(1): Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

As part of Article III's case or controversy requirement, a party must demonstrate standing to sue in federal court by establishing: (1) an injury in fact; (2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and (3) a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); Rawoof v. Texor Petroleum Co., 521 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir.2008). In addition to constitutional standing, there is also "prudential" standing, a more intangible requirement created by the judiciary to limit lawsuits in the interests of justice and practicality. Id. at 756-57; MainStreet Org. of Realtors v. Calumet City, Illinois, 505 F.3d 742, 744-47 (7th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court has not exhaustively defined the prudential standing requirements. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). However, it is clear that prudential standing encompasses the general prohibition on a plaintiff seeking to enforce another person's rights and requires that the allegations of plaintiff's complaint fall within "the zone of interests" protected by the law invoked. Id.

Defendant first argues that Plaintiffs lack prudential standing because their alleged injuries are "not even marginally related to the purposes underlying the dormant Commerce Clause."³ (R. 25, Def.'s Mem. at 5.) The fundamental purpose of the Commerce Clause and its "dormant" corollary is to confer "a right to...