Farms v. Star Creek Co.
| Docket Number | 06-22-00081-CV |
| Decision Date | 02 August 2023 |
| Parties | A.H. FARMS, LLC, A TEXAS LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, Appellant v. STAR CREEK CO., ERIC H. FARLEY, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS THE SUCCESSOR INDEPENDENT EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF PATRICIA FARLEY HERNANDEZ, DECEASED, GARY D. CORLEY, JOHN HENRY SKOTNIK, COURT APPOINTED SUCCESSOR DEPENDENT ADMINISTRATOR WITH THE WILL ANNEXED/ATTACHED OF THE ESTATE OF EFRIN ARTURO HERNANDEZ, DECEASED, AND W.M. DAVISAND MARY H. DAVIS, Appellees |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Submitted: July 3, 2023
On Appeal from the 336th District Court Fannin County, Texas Trial Court No. CV-20-44563
Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Jeff Rambin Justice.
In this third appeal of a dispute over the ownership of a 100-acre tract in Fannin County, A.H. Farms, LLC (Farms), appeals the take-nothing judgment rendered against it by the trial court it in its trespass to try title suit. This case is one of several that have been filed over the years dealing with the Estate of Patricia Hernandez, and those claiming through her son by her first marriage, Eric Farley, as opposed to those (including Farms) claiming through her husband at the time of her death, Arturo Hernandez. The central issue in this case is Farms's collateral attack on the validity of a summary judgment entered by the County Court at Law No. 1 of Grayson County (the Grayson Court) and affirmed by the Dallas Court of Appeals in the first appeal of the dispute over the ownership of the 100-acre tract. See In re Est. of Hernandez, No. 05-16-01350-CV, 2018 WL 525762, at *8 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 24, 2018, no pet.) (mem op.).[1] Because we find that Farms's collateral challenge to the Grayson Court's final summary judgment failed and that the final judgment divested Farms of any interest in the 100-acre tract, we will affirm the trial court's judgment.
"Trespass to try title is the sole method to determine title to land or real property in cases where there is no boundary dispute." Great N. Energy, Inc. v. Circle Ridge Prod., Inc., 528 S.W.3d 644, 669 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2017, pet. denied) . "In a trespass to try title suit, 'it is "incumbent on the plaintiff to discharge the burden of proof resting on him to establish superior title."'" Id. ().
"To maintain an action of trespass to try title, the person bringing the suit must have title to the land sought to be recovered." Id. at 670 (quoting Tipps, 2014 WL 4377813, at *5). "A plaintiff[']s right to recover depends on the strength of his or her own title, not the weaknesses of the title of his or her adversary." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Tipps, 2014 WL 4377813, at *5). "A plaintiff is not entitled to recover unless the plaintiff's own title is effectively disclosed." Id. (quoting Tipps, 2014 WL 4377813, at *5). "Recovery can be based on proof of . . . superior title out of a common source . . . ." Id. (quoting Tipps, 2014 WL 4377813, at *5). "On the failure of a plaintiff to establish superior title in a trespass to try title suit, the proper course of action is for the trial court to enter a take-nothing judgment." Id. (quoting Tipps, 2014 WL 4377813, at *5).
Patricia Hernandez died on January 15, 2001, and left a will that devised the residuary of her estate to her husband, Arturo Hernandez, "to do with as he desires." The will further stated that, upon Arturo's death, any of her residuary estate that Arturo "may own or have any interest in" would be devised to her son, Farley. Patricia's residuary estate included, inter alia, the 100- acre tract. On January 30, 2002, Arturo, who had been named independent executor under her will, filed his application to probate Patricia's will and for letters testamentary in cause number 2002-40P, in the County Court of Grayson County.[2] On July 18, 2002, Arturo, as independent executor of Patricia's estate, conveyed some of the real property in her estate to himself, individually.[3] On June 18, 2009, Arturo, individually, conveyed the 100-acre tract to Farms, a member-governed, limited-liability company of which Arturo was the sole member. Arturo died on October 3, 2013, and Pena was appointed independent executor of Arturo's estate on December 15, 2014, by the County Court at Law of Fannin County (Fannin CCL).
In re Est. of Hernandez, 2018 WL 525762, at *3 (alteration in original). The Grayson Court initially denied Farley's motion because it found Patricia's will ambiguous. Id. After a jury determined that Patricia intended to leave Arturo a life estate, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment on October 26, 2016, that incorporated the jury's verdict and awarded Farley attorney fees (the Declaratory Judgment). Id. Farley then filed a motion for reconsideration of his motion for summary judgment in light of the jury's verdict and seeking "an order confirming that Patricia['s] . . . property possessed by [Arturo] at his death passed to him." Id. at *4 n.8.
On November 10, 2016, the Grayson Court entered an order appointing Farley as the successor independent executor of Patricia's estate. On that same date, the Grayson Court granted Farley's motion for summary judgment, in which it (1) found three tracts of land, including the 100-acre tract, were among "the real property belonging to [Patricia's estate] which was possessed by [Arturo], or in which [Arturo] had an interest . . . at the time of his death" and (2) ordered that Farley, as successor independent executor of Patricia's estate, have and recover the three tracts, including the 100-acre tract, from Pena, as independent executor of Arturo's estate (the Summary Judgment).[6] Pena filed a notice of appeal in the Dallas Court of Appeals that appealed both the Declaratory Judgment and the Summary Judgment.[7] However, Pena only asserted one issue in his brief that related to the Declaratory Judgment and did not challenge the Summary Judgment. Id. at *4, *8.
On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals construed the residuary clause of Patricia's will to "unambiguously, as a matter of law, convey[] the property of [Patricia] to [Arturo] in fee simple determinable" and to "devise[] to [Farley] whatever interest [Arturo], upon his death, still held in the property." Id. at *8. It also noted that Arturo's death "automatically divested his estate of the remaining devised property operating as a fee simple determinable causing that property to pass to [Farley] in fee simple absolute." Id. As a result, the court of appeals reversed the Declaratory Judgment and rendered judgment that Patricia's will "conveyed the property in fee simple determinable to [Arturo] with an executory interest to [Farley] in fee simple absolute." Id.
However, as to the Summary Judgment, the court of appeals noted that "it specifically identifie[d] the real property belonging to [Patricia]'s estate 'that was possessed by [Arturo] or in which [Arturo] had an interest . . . at the time of his death' and award[ed] that real property to [Farley]." Id. Because Pena did not challenge the Summary Judgment on appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the Summary Judgment. Id. The judgment of the Dallas Court of Appeals was not appealed, and the court issued its mandate on April 6, 2018.
On January 10, 2017, Farley, as successor independent executor of Patricia's estate, conveyed certain property to Farley, individually, and to Gary D. Corley by a special warranty deed. On October 24, 2017, Pena was removed as independent executor of Arturo's estate, and John Skotnik was appointed as successor executor. The Fannin CCL then entered an order granting an application for an order of sale on July 11, 2019, and based on the opinion of the Dallas Court of Appeals, found that 313.37 acres of land[8] that then stood in the names of Arturo and Farms were not property of Arturo's estate or of Pena's, as sole beneficiary of...
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