Farnham v. Murch

• Citation: 36 Minn. 328
• Parties: SUMNER W. FARNHAM and another <I>vs.</I> JOSEPH H. MURCH.
• Decision Date: 03 January 1887
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

36 Minn. 328

SUMNER W. FARNHAM and another vs. JOSEPH H. MURCH.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

January 3, 1887.

Plaintiffs brought this action in the district court for Hennepin county, to recover the price of lumber sold, as alleged, to defendant. The defence was a general denial. At the trial, before Young, J., the evidence showed that the lumber was bought for use and was used in building the fence and grand stand at the grounds of the Minneapolis Base-Ball Association, of which the defendant was a director, and the principal question was whether the sale was made to the association or to the defendant. The plaintiffs had a verdict, and the defendant appeals from an order refusing a new trial.

Weed Munro, for appellant.

Miller, Young & Miller, for respondents.

VANDERBURGH, J.

There was evidence sufficient to send the case to the jury upon the issue of the sale of the lumber in question to the defendant. The plaintiffs' agent testified that he was applied to for lumber for the use of the base-ball association by the defendant and others, and that he distinctly informed them that he would not sell to the association, or others with whom he was not acquainted, but that he knew Murch, the defendant, and was willing to sell him the lumber, and to this, his understanding is, the defendant assented, and the lumber was accordingly delivered upon his credit, and charged to him. He thinks the defendant expressed his assent to the proposition to sell to him by saying, "All right," or to that effect. And upon his re-examination he states that defendant did not, at the time, by any expression or sign, manifest his dissent.

There was no error in receiving this last evidence. It was to be taken in connection with his previous testimony, and was proper for the consideration of the jury. The evidence of the witness Reid was properly received in corroboration of the first witness, though he did not hear all the conversation.

Evidence that the defendant turned over to the treasurer of the base-ball association the bills of the lumber sent to him was rejected as immaterial. In this there was no error, and certainly no prejudice, because the fact afterwards appeared in evidence without objection, and the nature of the bills so sent was well understood by him.

The bill of this lumber was introduced in evidence by plaintiffs, and purported to be receipted for as follows, viz.: "Rec'd payment by 60 days' acceptance from date." This acceptance, it appeared by the...