Farnsworth v. Lime Rock R. Co.

• Citation: 22 A. 373,83 Me. 440
• Parties: FARNSWORTH et al. v. LIME ROCK R. CO.
• Decision Date: 21 April 1891
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Maine (US)

22 A. 373

83 Me. 440

FARNSWORTH et al.

v. LIME ROCK R. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

April 21, 1891.

(Official.)

Report from supreme judicial court. Knox county.

The Lime Rock Railroad Company having applied to the county commissioners for Knox county by petition dated June 18, 1888, to assess the damages caused by their taking the lands of the appellants, under their charter, for railroad purposes, notice was accordingly given. The appellants appeared under protest, moved to have the petition dismissed, and, reserving all objections, etc., denied the commissioners' jurisdiction, and contested their right to act upon the petition for the following, among other, reasons:

"That under the constitution and laws of Maine the said company was not and is not a corporation, and under said laws not authorized to procure a condemnation of said land in any form.

"That the individuals or company doing business under the name of the Lime Rock Railroad Company have never duly organized as a corporation under said constitution and laws.

"That the alleged railroad which said Individuals or company propose to construct across the respondents' land is not for such use as gives them the right or authority under said laws to procure a condemnation thereof; and that they had not filed any location of said road in form or substance as required by law, before the date of this petition.

"That, whether said petitioners are a corporation or not, all of the proceedings taken to obtain title to or right to cross said premises are under the said constitution and laws of Maine invalid.

"That said company has no right to construct a railroad over respondents' land, and that said company had no right or authority under said laws to procure a condemnation of land for that or any other purpose."

After the view and a hearing the commissioners overruled the motion to dismiss, and made, on October 17, 1888, an award of the damages sustained by the appellants, who took their appeal to the supreme judicial court.

J. H. Montgomery and W. H. Fogler, for appellants.

C. E. Littlefield, for defendants:

PETERS, C. J. The charter of the railroad company whose acts are called in question in this controversy was granted by the legislature in 1861, amended in 1873, and again in 1889. The location was filed and the road built in 1888.

It is argued against its legality that the original charter became lost by non-acceptance before the constitutional amendment of 1875, requiring railroad and other corporations to be formed under general laws, and that any act of revivor passed since 1875 is unconstitutional, in view of decisions of the supreme court of the United States, and especially by force of the doctrine of the case of Oregon Ry. & Nav. Co. v. Oregonian Ry. Co., 130 U. S. 1, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 409. The charter and amendments were expressly accepted by the corporation in 1889, but the facts clearly enough indicate an implied acceptance before that time, and prior to the date of the constitutional amendment. This court has held that no vote of the corporation is necessary, and that acceptance may be Implied by circumstances. Railroad v. Smith, 47 Me. 34. The charter in question is for peculiar purposes, and no class of persons but those incorporated would want it. The charter was asked for, not tendered to them. They desired it for future use, hoping and expecting all the time that the day would be at hand when the road would be built. A very strong evidence of acceptance is that, in 1873, they applied for an amendment of the charter. Subsequent events confirm that evidence. The fact of spending several hundred thousand dollars in constructing the road confirms it. Late events show the earlier intention.

The constitutional amendment does not apply to legislative amendments of charters gran ted before 1875. The legislature, having granted a charter before 1875, may amend it after that date, the amendment being germane to the original act.

A further objection urged against the validity of the charter is that the company was not organized within four years after the date of its incorporation, forfeiture following for such lapse by the provision of Rev. St. c. 1, § 6, art. 26. The answer is that the legislature waived forfeiture by the amendments which it granted.

It is objected against the validity of the proceedings of the corporation in its application to have the land damages ascertained that the application does not allege that the parties themselves could not agree...