Farnum v. Ramsey
| Decision Date | 25 November 1918 |
| Citation | 120 N.E. 841,231 Mass. 286 |
| Parties | FARNUM v. RAMSEY. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Exceptions from Superior Court, Worcester County; Charles U. Bell, Judge.
Action by Eugene S. Farnum against Howard G. Ramsey. There was a verdict for defendant, and plaintiff excepts. Exceptions overruled.
Frank W. Morrison, of Whitinsville, and Holton Davenport and Wilfred B. Feiga, both of Worcester, for plaintiff.
Samuel B. Taft, of Uxbridge, for defendant.
This is an action of contract for the price of five tons of coal alleged to have been sold by the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant had a verdict, and the case is here on exceptions taken to the refusal to give the four instructions set forth below1 and on one exception taken to that part of the charge of the presiding judge there set forth.2
The defendant was put on the witness stand by the plaintiff. He testified ‘that he bought the coal of Sawyer and not of’ the plaintiff; that Sawyer wanted the defendant to sell him a motorcycle and offered to ‘give as the first payment five tons of coal, which he [Sawyer] said was his personal property’; that he (the defendant) ‘agreed to this and made out a conditional bill of sale of the motorcyle to Sawyer’; that ‘later’ he ‘received from Sawyer’ a bill on Farnum's ‘regular billhead’ in these words: ‘Uxbridge,’ ‘October 22, 1915.’ This was marked and will be referred to as Exhibit I. The defendant further testified that the coal was delivered ‘in the latter part of October’ by Sawyer; that he knew at the time that ‘Sawyer was employed by the plaintiff as the driver of a team by which coal was delivered.’ In addition the defendant testified that ‘at some time later the plaintiff’ asked him to change the lease of the motorcycle ‘from Sawyer to him’ and he refused to do so ‘until he [Sawyer] broke the bargain’ that Sawyer made with him.
The plaintiff testified that Sawyer told him ‘that he, Sawyer, was anxious to have a motorcycle but could not get one as Ramsey would not trust him; that the plaintiff said that if Sawyer would stop drinking the plaintiff would buy the motorcycle and that Sawyer could use it and then buy it from the plaintiff, paying for it out of his, Sawyer's, wages; that the plaintiff further suggested that Ramsey would probably be willing to credit his winter's supply of coal in part payment and directed Sawyer to go to Ramsey and see if the trade could be made; that later, Sawyer returned and reported that Ramsey was willing; that the bill signed as produced by Ramsey was then sent to Ramsey to be delivered by Sawyer.’ There was no evidence connecting the defendant with the facts so testified to. The plaintiff further testified that ‘Sawyer broke his promise to stop drinking’ and the plaintiff told the defendant that the sale of the motorcycle ‘should have been made to [him] the plaintiff;’ and told him that ‘he would have to be paid for the coal or have the lease of the motorcycle made to him which the defendant said he could not do because Sawyer had bought it and had not broken the lease.’
Sawyer was not put upon the witness stand by either party.
There is a short answer to the first ruling asked for and to the plaintiff's complaint that the title to the motorcycle ought to have been taken in his (the plaintiff's name) and not in Sawyer's name. The short answer is that on the assumption on which the plaintiff proceeded it was immaterial whether the title was put by the defendant in Sawyer's name or in the plaintiff's name. The plaintiff went on the assumption that Sawyer acted as his agent in selling the coal and buying the motorcycle. If he did the title to the motorcycle was in the plaintiff as between the plaintiff and Sawyer although the defendant put the title in Sawyer's name. Since Sawyer acted as the plaintiff's agent any title taken in his agent's name was his.
There are other objections to this request for a ruling which are fatal. But it is not necessary to consider them.
A short answer to the second, third and fourth rulings asked for is that the money due for the coal had been paid by being applied as parial payment on the motorcycle in accordance with the terms of the bill for the coal delivered by Sawyer to the defendant if that is to be taken to be a bill for the sale of the coal by the plaintiff to the defendant.
It is apparent from the pleadings and the terms of the bill of exceptions, however, that the case was...
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