Farrall v. Bragalini
Decision Date | 04 April 1958 |
Citation | 178 N.Y.S.2d 850,11 Misc.2d 1075 |
Parties | G. Clayton FARRALL, Plaintiff, v. George M. BRAGALINI, Ira J. Palestin, Frederick R. Clark, State Tax Commissioners, and Joseph P. Kelly, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, Defendants. |
Court | New York Supreme Court |
William Evans, III, New Hartford, for plaintiff.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Atty. Gen., for defendants. Philip J. Fitzgerald, Albany, of counsel.
This is a motion for judgment on the pleadings made by the defendants, the State Tax Commissioners and the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles. The plaintiff makes a cross-motion for summary judgment.
The amended complaint seeks judgment declaring the invalidity, on constitutional grounds, of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Schedule D of subdivision 7 of section 11 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which provides for the registration fees required for station wagons, and of subdivision 5 of section 11 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, which relates to the times for registration and re-registration of motor vehicles. The action is for a declaratory judgment. The material allegations of the amended complaint are not controverted and there is no real question of fact in issue. The questions of law joined by the motions are (1) whether the Legislature had power to enact, and (2) whether the classification adopted lacks a rational basis.
The amended complaint, stripped of its excess verbiage, pleads the conclusion that plaintiff's station wagon is a private passenger motor vehicle bought and used for such purposes. If further pleads that plaintiff applied for renewal of registration on this 3,417-pound vehicle and tendered therewith the sum of $17 as provided by the rate set forth in subdivision 6 of section 11 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law; that the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles rejected the application and informed plaintiff that the fee for renewal would be $25.50; that plaintiff resubmitted his application and paid under protest the fee of $25.50; that paragraphs 2 and 3, Schedule D, subdivision 7 of section 11 in prescribing a higher rate for station wagons than for private passenger vehicles, and subdivision 5 of section 11 in providing a shorter period of time for registering and re-registering station wagons unfairly and arbitrarily discriminate against plaintiff and are unconstitutional and void.
Paragraph (a) of subdivision 6 of section 11 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, in part, provides:
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Schedule D of subdivision 7 of section 11 provide the registration fees for station wagons as follows:
'2. For each suburban the annual fee of seventy-five cents for each one hundred pounds, or major fraction thereof, of unladen weight.
Subdivision 5 of section 11 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law provides:
For some years prior to 1927, the type of registration required for a station wagon (suburban) depended solely upon the purposes for which the vehicle was used. By Chapter 461 of the Laws of 1927, that part of tht then Highway Law, the precursor to section 11 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, was amended to provide for a completely different fee system for registration of this particular vehicle. Instead of basing the amount of registration fees on a 'use' basis, the Legislature then changed the statute to provide for fees on a 'type' basis. In other words, this type of vehicle, usable both for carrying passengers and for delivery purposes, was treated differently from the ordinary passenger motor vehicle in so far as registration fee purposes were concerned.
Chapter 668 of the Laws of 1951 changed the then existing schedule of fees for a station wagon and predicated such fees upon a 'maximum gross weight' basis. This system was short lived, however, for in the following year, the present statute (L.1952, c. 636) employing an 'unladen weight' basis was enacted.
Statutes providing for license taxes or fees, which are not inherently oppressive or based upon unreasonable classifications, are not offensive as denying equal protection of the laws. Mid-States Freight Lines v. Bates, 279 App.Div. 451, 111 N.Y.S.2d 578, affirmed 304 N.Y. 700, 107 N.E.2d 603, reargument denied 304 N.Y. 788, 109 N.E.2d 82 certiorari denied 345 U.S. 908, 73 S.Ct. 648, 97 L.Ed. 1344; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of R. Com'rs, 332 U.S. 495, 68 S.Ct. 167, 92 L.Ed. 99; Storaasli v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 57, 51 S.Ct. 354, 75 L.Ed. 839. It is beyond question...
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