Farrall v. Ellis
| Citation | 157 A.2d 127 |
| Decision Date | 12 January 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 2474.,2474. |
| Parties | Willie C. FARRALL and Congressional Insurance Co., a corporation, Appellants, v. Kerney ELLIS, Appellee. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Columbia District |
Lawrence E. Carr, Jr., Washington, D. C., with whom Michael F. X. Dolan, Washington, D. C., was on the brief, for appellee.
Before ROVER, Chief Judge, and HOOD and QUINN, Associate Judges.
At about one o'clock in the morning of March 16, 1959, appellant Farrall's taxicab was negligently struck by an automobile owned by appellee Ellis. Farrall way thrown from his cab by the force of the collision and as he picked himself up he saw a man and a woman running from the other automobile. These two people were never identified and the striking vehicle was unoccupied when Farrall examined it. In bringing this action against Ellis, Farrall and his insurance carrier relied upon the presumption created by Code 1951, § 40-424, Supp. VII.1 Ellis testified that he was the owner of the striking vehicle, but that it had been in possession of his brother for some months and he did not know who was driving it at the time of the accident. His brother testified that on the night of the accident he had parked the automobile about midnight, locked it and took the keys with him; that he did not know who was driving the automobile at the time of the accident or how the person obtained possession of it.
At the conclusion of the evidence the trial court directed a verdict for Ellis. Appellants say this was error and that the case should have been submitted to the jury.
Unless Ellis offered uncontradicted proof that the automobile was not at the time of the accident being used with his permission, the question of liability should have been submitted to the jury as a question of fact. Positive, unequivocal and uncontradicted testimony of the owner may constitute such proof; but if the proof offered by the owner contains inconsistencies and self-contradictions, raising doubt as to his credibility or that of his witnesses, the issue is one for the jury. Conrad v. Porter, D.C.Mun.App., 79 A.2d 777, affirmed 90 U.S.App.D.C. 423, 196 F.2d 240; Simon v. Dew, D.C.Mun. App., 91 A.2d 214. Uncontradicted proof "requires evidence which destroys all inferences and presumptions supporting plaintiff and which raises no doubts against defendant." Hiscox v. Jackson, 75 U.S. App.D.C. 293, 294, 127 F.2d 160, 161.
In our opinion there were certain features in the testimony for defendant which left "some doubts as to the absolute credibility of the witnesses,"2 and required submission...
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Green v. District of Columbia Dept. of Emp., 84-1364.
...which is contradictory or subject to contradictory interpretations is not sufficient to overcome the presumption."); Farrall v. Ellis, 157 A.2d 127, 128 (D.C. 1960) (owner must offer positive, unequivocal and uncontradicted testimony that the automobile was not at the time of the accident b......
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Myers v. Gaither
...evidence, combined with minor contradictions and possible impeachment of appellee's testimony, bring this case within Farrall v. Ellis, D.C.Mun.App., 157 A.2d 127 (1960). There the owner testified he had lent his car to his brother from whom it was stolen. We reversed a directed verdict for......
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Curtis v. Cuff
...360 (D.C. 1963) (footnotes omitted); accord, Alsbrooks v. Washington Deliveries, Inc., 281 A.2d 220, 221 (D.C. 1971); Farrall v. Ellis, 157 A.2d 127, 128 (D.C. 1960). Where there is such uncontradicted proof, the owner is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Love v. Gaskins, 153 A.2d 66......
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Athridge v. Iglesias, CIV.A.89-1222 JMF.
...Joyner v. Holland, 212 A.2d 541, 542 (D.C.1965), Miller v. Imperial Insurance, Inc., 189 A.2d 359, 360 (D.C.1963), and Farrall v. Ellis, 157 A.2d 127, 128 (D.C.1960). In each of these cases discussing the MVSRA and the effect of its presumption, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that, while ......