Athridge v. Iglesias, CIV.A.89-1222 JMF.
| Decision Date | 12 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.92-1868 JMF.,No. CIV.A.89-1222 JMF.,CIV.A.89-1222 JMF.,CIV.A.92-1868 JMF. |
| Parties | Thomas P. ATHRIDGE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Jorge IGLESIAS et al., Defendants. Thomas P. ATHRIDGE et al., Plaintiffs, v. Hilda RIVAS, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Charles Belsome Long, William Joseph Rodgers, Collier Shannon Scott, PLLC, Joseph Hayes Koonz, Jr., Koonz, McKenney, Johnson, Depaolis & Lightfoot, Michael H. Selter, Manelli, Denison & Selter, Washington, DC, Martin Stanley Protas, Rockville, MD, Lisa Rene Riggs, Riggs, Abney, Neal, Turpen, Orbison & Lewis, Tulsa, OK, for Plaintiffs.
Irving Starr, Richard Edward Starr, Alexandria, VA, Alan Russell Siciliano, Decaro, Doran, Siciliano, Gallagher & Deblasis, L.L.P., Lanham, MD, David F. Grimaldi, Martell, Donnelly, Grimaldi & Gallagher, P.A., Washington, DC, for Defendants.
At trial, a crucial question arose concerning how the jury should be instructed as to the significance of the rebuttable presumption created by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act ("MVSRA"), D.C.Code § 50-1301.08. This issue is complicated and made no clearer by the serious dispute as to the significance of various presumptions that the law creates. See David W. Louisell, Construing Rule 301; Instructing the Jury on Presumptions in Civil Actions and Proceedings, 63 Va. L.Rev. 281 (1977).
In this case, the law of the District of Columbia provides the rule of decision and creates the following rebuttable presumption: once ownership of a car has been established, it is presumed that the driver operated the car with the owner's consent, express or implied. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 302, the effect of this presumption is determined by state law, and thus the federal rules provide no guidance on this issue.
We know from the decision rendered in this very case that, in assessing whether a defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted, the MVSRA creates "a powerful presumption [of the owner's consent to drive the car] that can only be overcome by `uncontradicted and conclusive evidence' of non-consent." Athridge v. Rivas, 312 F.3d 474, 477 (D.C.Cir.2002) (citing Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216, 218 (D.C.Cir.1968)). If, therefore, the defendants produce uncontradicted evidence of non-consent, the statutory presumption is overcome, and there is no issue to be submitted to a jury; instead, judgment must be entered in favor of the defendants. Id. If defendants' evidence is contradicted, however, the issue must be determined by the jury. Id. As noted by the D.C. Circuit, in this case, defendants' assertions of non-consent were sufficient to send this case to a jury. Id. at 478-79.
Thus, the question arises: when consent is disputed, and there is evidence of both consent and non-consent, what is the standard by which the jury must evaluate the evidence?
Plaintiffs argue that defendants bear the burden on the consent issue and that defendants must prove by "uncontradicted and conclusive evidence" that they did not consent to Jorge's use of the car. In their proposed jury instructions, defendants seemed to be of the view that, once they produced substantial evidence of non-consent the statutory presumption ceased to operate, and the burden would shift back to plaintiffs to prove consent by a preponderance of the evidence. However, during opening and closing statements, defense counsel indicated that defendants had the burden of proof, and during the charge conference, defendants made no objection to the court's proposed instructions, which placed the burden of proving non-consent on the defendants. Thus, defendants' position at trial was that, when the case went to the jury, the burden of proof remained with defendants, but they only needed to demonstrate non-consent by a preponderance of the evidence. After reviewing the case law, it is clear that: (a) defendants bear the burden of proving non-consent, and (b) they must do so by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Green v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 499 A.2d 870, 874 (D.C.1985), the D.C. Court of Appeals discussed the "bursting bubble" theory of presumptions and determined whether a certain rebuttable regulatory presumption vanished once the opponent offered evidence against the fact presumed. The Green court stated that, while the bursting bubble theory was the prevailing view, there are exceptions, especially when the presumptions are founded on strong social policies. Green, 499 A.2d at 874. The court went on to state that such presumptions "impose on the parties against whom they operate not only the burden of production but the burden of persuasion as well." Id. The court then stated that "other presumptions buttressed by weighty social policies have been held to operate to fix the burden of persuasion on the party controverting the presumed fact: e.g., ... the statutory presumption that the owner of a motor vehicle has consented to the operator's use...." Id. at 874-75. In support, the court cited Alsbrooks v. Washington Deliveries, Inc., 281 A.2d 220, 221 (D.C.1971), Eastern Aquatics, Inc. v. Washington, 213 A.2d 293, 294 (D.C.1965), Joyner v. Holland, 212 A.2d 541, 542 (D.C.1965), Miller v. Imperial Insurance, Inc., 189 A.2d 359, 360 (D.C.1963), and Farrall v. Ellis, 157 A.2d 127, 128 (D.C.1960). In each of these cases discussing the MVSRA and the effect of its presumption, the D.C. Court of Appeals stated that, while uncontradicted proof of nonconsent would entitle the defendant to a directed verdict, in the absence of such evidence, "the trier of fact must assume its usual role of resolving the conflict presented." Alsbrooks, 281 A.2d at 221. See also Eastern Aquatics, Inc., 213 A.2d at 294; Farrall, 157 A.2d at 128; Joyner, 212 A.2d at 542; Imperial Ins., Inc., 189 A.2d at 360. Thus, the cases cited by the Green court clearly indicate that, in order to secure a directed verdict in their favor, defendants must overcome the statutory presumption by "uncontradicted and conclusive evidence." If they fail to meet that standard and instead offer substantial evidence of non-consent, as was the case here, the issue is one for the jury to decide according to the usual standards regarding burden of proof. Curtis v. Cuff, 537 A.2d 1072, 1077 (D.C.1987). Accordingly, the jury must be instructed to make its determination based on the preponderance of the evidence.
That being said, there still remains the question of which party bears the burden of persuading the jury by a preponderance of the evidence. In Jones v. Halun, 296 F.2d 597, the D.C. Circuit stated that, Jones v. Halun, 296 F.2d 597, 598 (D.C.Cir.1961) (emphasis added). See also Amicar Rentals, Inc. v. Moore, 294 A.2d 361, 362 (D.C.1972). Thus, according to Jones, if the presumption is not overcome by uncontradicted proof of non-consent, the question is one for the jury, and bubble bursting having occurred, plaintiff has the burden of proof. Jones, 296 F.2d at 598.
The problem with the 44-year-old decision in Jones and its reading of the MVSRA is that the subsequent decision...
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Athridge v. Iglesias, CIV.A.89-1222(JMF).
...to trial, the owners will be liable only if they fail to establish non-consent by a preponderance of the evidence. Athridge v. Rivas, 355 F.Supp.2d 230, 233 (D.D.C.2005). There may be other situations where one party is automatically vicariously liable for another's action, and the judgment......
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Athridge v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.
...of the evidence that they did not consent to Jorge's use of the car. Athridge, 474 F.Supp.2d at 108-09; Verdict Form [# 224], Athridge v. Iglesias, 355 F.Supp.2d 230 (D.D.C.2005). That evidence was excluded because the Rivas jury did not conclude that there had been consent, the case was th......