Farrand v. State Medical Bd.

• Decision Date: 23 March 1949
• Docket Number: 31541.
• Citation: 151 Ohio St. 222,85 N.E.2d 113
• Parties: FARRAND v. STATE MEDICAL BOARD.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

85 N.E.2d 113

151 Ohio St. 222

FARRAND v. STATE MEDICAL BOARD.

No. 31541.

Supreme Court of Ohio

March 23, 1949

Syllabus by the Court.

1. The word, 'appeal,' as used in Section 154-73 General Code, means the proceedings whereby a court reviews the action or decision of an administrative agency and affirms, reverses, vacates or modifies an order of the agency complained of in the appeal. The court may not substitute its judgment for that of the agency but is confined to determining the rights of the parties in accordance with the statutes and other law applicable.

2. The word, 'appeal,' as used in Section 154-73 General Code, does not authorize a trial de novo of the matter which was before an administrative agency.

Appeal from Court of Appeals, Franklin County.

See also 80 N.E.2d 508.

The record discloses that the secretary of the State Medical Board of the state of Ohio, hereinafter referred to as appellant, filed with the appellant an application for suspension or revocation of two certificates held by appellee entitling appellee to practice two branches of limited medicine. As a result of a hearing before appellant, both certificates to practice were revoked.

Upon appeal to the Court of Common Pleas the decision of appellant was found to be neither unreasonable nor unlawful and was affirmed.

Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas was reversed.

The case is in this court following the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Joseph W. Adkins, Jr., of Circleville, and Richard Huggard and Collis Gundy Lane, both of Columbus, for appellee.

Hugh S. Jenkins and Herbert S. Duffy, Attys. Gen. and Joseph F. Ford, of Columbus, for appellant.

TURNER Judge.

We are called upon here to determine the meaning of the word, 'appeal,' as used in Section 154-73, General Code, 120 Ohio Laws, 366, which provided in part as follows:

'Any person whose license has been revoked * * * may appeal to the common pleas court * * * from the order of said agency * * *.

'In the hearing of the appeal the court shall be confined to the record as certified to it by the agency, provided, however, the court may grant a request for the admission of additional evidence when satisfied that such additional evidence is newly discovered and could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertained prior to the hearing before the agency. * * * The hearing in the court of common pleas shall proceed as in the trial of a civil action. * * * and evidence introduced if the court has granted a request for the presentation of additional evidence.'

The foregoing section was a part of the Administrative Procedure Act as it was originally enacted in 1943, 120 Ohio Laws, 358. Various sections of the original act were amended effective October 12, 1945, 121 Ohio Laws, 578, but such amendments do not require differentiation and the same question may arise under the act as amended, requiring the same answer.

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court committed error in considering and deciding the appeal from the decision of the State Medical Board as an appeal on law intead of considering and deciding it upon its merits as an appeal on law and fact. In so holding, the Court of Appeals was in error. That court arrived at its conclusion by the generally understood definition of the word, 'appeal,' as used in our statutes prior to the enactment of Section 12223-1 et seq., General Code, 116 Ohio Laws, 104, effective January 1, 1936, commonly referred to as the new Appellate Procedure Act. When the General Assembly adopted such new appellate Procedure, it abandoned the theretofore understood meaning of the word, 'appeal,' and in Section 12223-1, General Code, defined the word, 'appeal,' as used in that act as meaning 'all proceedings whereby one court reviews or retries a cause determined by another court, an administrative officer, tribunal, or commission.'

It will, therefore, be seen from the statutory definition that the word, 'appeal,' in Section 12223-1, General Code, may mean either a review or retrial. However, such definition is limited to the use of the word, 'appeal,' in the appellate procedure act.

As Section 154-73, General Code, makes provision for specific cases, we are of the opinion that we do not need to go outside that section to find the definition of 'appeal' as used therein. The purpose of the General Assembly in providing for administrative hearings in particular fields was to facilitate such matters by placing the decision on facts with boards or commissions composed of men equipped with the necessary knowledge and experience pertaining to a particular field. In providing for an appeal from the decision of such a board or commission, the General Assembly did not intend that a court should substitute its judgment for that of the specially created board or commission but did intend to confer a revisory jurisdiction on the court. Otherwise, the section would not have contained the provision, 'In the hearing of the appeal the court shall be confined to the record as certified to it by the agency, provided, however, the court may grant a request for the admission of additional evidence when satisfied that such additional evidence is newly discovered and could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertained prior to the hearing before the agency.' (Italics ours.)

We are of the opinion that this lastquoted provision is inconsistent with a de novo hearing whereby the court substitutes its judgment for that of the agency which heard the facts. It is argued that the provision in Section 154-73, General Code that 'The hearing in the court of common pleas shall proceed as in the trial of a civil action, and the court shall determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the statutes applicable to such action,' requires a court to proceed as it would in any other civil action. (Italics ours.) However, this contention overlooks the modification created by the there following sentence which refers to the evidence which is introduced when the court has granted a request for the presentation of additional evidence. No evidence not certified as a part of the record may be introduced unless the court in its discretion grants a request for permission for such introduction, upon being satisfied that such additional evidence is newly discovered and could not with reasonable diligence have been ascertained prior to the original...