Farrar v. Farrar
| Decision Date | 15 February 1930 |
| Docket Number | 19584. |
| Citation | 152 S.E. 278,41 Ga.App. 120 |
| Parties | FARRAR v. FARRAR. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by Editorial Staff.
Where on inquiry out of hearing of jury, it appeared that defendant sued for personal injuries was protected by liability insurance, and that insurance carrier was pecuniarily interested in result of suit, and no proof was submitted to show presence or lack of presence of employees, stockholders or relatives of stockholders of insurance carrier on jury, it could not be said as matter of law that request of plaintiff to purge jury with reference to insurance carrier was submitted in bad faith and solely to inform jury that defendant was protected by liability insurance, and purging of jury was not abuse of discretion.
Husband is not liable for torts of wife except as such liability may arise by reason of commission of act by his command or in prosecution and within scope of his business.
In suit against married woman for tort, it was not necessary that husband be joined as defendant in action.
Parents are under no legal obligation to support child after it reaches its majority, and child is under no legal obligation after reaching majority, to remain in home of parents and perform, in return for care and attention given by them, duties usually performed by child who is unemancipated, and hence child who continues to live in home after arriving at majority occupies same status as any other guest, and may sue parent for tort.
What constitutes negligence on part of defendant, proximate cause of injury, and failure to exercise ordinary care on part of plaintiff, are generally questions for jury.
In suit for injuries sustained by guest riding in plaintiff's automobile which ran into rear of automobile of defendant which had stopped in road over which plaintiff was, with knowledge of defendant, traveling, it was for jury to determine whether alleged negligence of defendant in stopping car in dense fog, without giving warning to plaintiff or driver of automobile in which plaintiff was following, was proximate cause of injury, or whether injury proximately resulted from negligence on part of driver of plaintiff's automobile, and whether plaintiff could by exercise of ordinary care have avoided consequences of defendant's negligence.
Except where particular act is declared to be negligence, either by statute or municipal ordinance, question as to what acts constitute negligence is for jury, and it is error for presiding judge to instruct jury what ordinary care requires should be done in particular case.
Driver of automobile is not required by statute when stopping on highway to put out guard to give notice of his presence to drivers of cars approaching from rear.
In suit for injuries sustained in automobile collision, charge to find for plaintiff, if damage was sustained by neglect of defendant in directing agent to stop on wrong side of road and neglecting to put out a guard to notify approaching cars from rear of defendant's presence, held erroneous as instructing jury that both act of stopping and failure to out guard to warn approaching vehicles of presence of defendant's automobile constituted negligence; driver not being under duty to put out guard giving notice of presence of automobile.
Error from City Court of Bainbridge; H. D. Spooner, Judge.
Action by Margaret Farrar against Mrs. L. B. Farrar. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error.
Reversed.
Bryan & Middlebrooks and W. Colquitt Carter, all of Atlanta, and John R. Wilson, of Bainbridge, for plaintiff in error.
W. V. Custer & Son, of Bainbridge, for defendant in error.
Syllabus OPINION.
1. In a suit for personal injuries, where it is made to appear to the court, on private inquiry conducted out of the hearing of the jury, that the defendant is protected by liability insurance, and that the insurance carrier is thus pecuniarily interested in the result of the suit, and there is no proof submitted on behalf of either party to show the presence or lack of presence of employees or stockholders, or relatives of stockholders, of the insurance carrier on the jury, it cannot be said as a matter of law that a request of the plaintiff to purge the jury with reference to the insurance carrier was submitted in bad faith and solely for the purpose of informing the jury that the defendant was protected by liability insurance. Nor can it be said that it was an abuse of discretion to so purge the jury. Bibb Manufacturing Co. v. Williams, 36 Ga.App. 605, 607, 137 S.E. 636.
2. Under the decision of the Supreme Court in Curtis v. Ashworth, 165 Ga. 782, 142 S.E. 111, 117, 59 A.L.R. 1457, a husband is not liable, in Georgia, for the torts of his wife, except as such liability may arise by reason of the commission of the act "by his command or in the prosecution and within the scope of his business." Accordingly, in a suit against a married woman for a tort, whether the husband would or would not be liable, under the doctrine respondeat superior, it is not necessary that the husband be joined as a defendant in the action. Miller v. Straus, 38 Ga.App. 781(2), 145 S.E. 501.
3. Whether or not an unemancipated minor child living with her parents and dependent upon them for support is prevented on grounds of public policy from suing one of them for a tort committed upon her person, there is no legal obligation resting upon parents to support a child after it reaches its majority, nor is there any legal obligation resting upon a child, after reaching majority, to remain in the home of the parents and...
To continue reading
Request your trial