Farrell v. Citizens' Light & Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 15 February 1908 |
| Citation | 114 N.W. 1063,137 Iowa 309 |
| Parties | FARRELL v. CITIZENS' LIGHT & RY. CO. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Muscatine County; D. V. Jackson, Judge.
Action to recover damage for personal injuries. Verdict and judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.E. M. Warner, for appellant.
Jayne & Hoffman, for appellee.
The defendant company operates a street railway in the city of Muscatine, Iowa, and at the time in question plaintiff was a girl of 16 years of age, residing with her father, and attending school in that city. According to her testimony, which is corroborated in most respects by other witnesses, she boarded one of the defendant's cars to ride to a convenient point near the school in which she was a student. The car was of a kind used in warm weather, having a footboard or step running along the side, from which step direct access could be had to the seats which were set at right angles with the length of the car. On arriving at the place where she wished to alight, the car stopped, but as others were getting off at the same time, and direct egress was blocked, plaintiff went around to the rear of the seat she had occupied, and out upon the footboard at that opening. Just as she was stepping from the footboard to the ground the car was started, throwing her down, and wrenching and injuring her knee quite severely. On the part of the defendant it is contended, and there is evidence to the effect, that plaintiff was not at first intending to leave the car at this corner, but to continue her ride to another crossing, and in pursuance of such purpose she had requested and received a transfer permitting her to ride upon another line, the junction with which had not yet been reached. There is also evidence tending to show that when the car stopped at the place of the accident plaintiff did not arise or manifest any intention to leave the car until after it began to move forward, when she hastily stepped out upon the footboard, and thence to the ground, without notifying the conductor of her purpose so to do or requesting him to stop the car for her accommodation. The issue of fact thus raised was so clearly one for the jury that counsel's argument is chiefly devoted to the consideration of errors alleged to have been committed by the trial court in its rulings on the admission of evidence and in giving and refusing instructions to the jury.
1. The manager of the defendant company testified that he was on the car at the time of the accident, and, having given his version of the circumstances, was asked, on cross-examination, if he had seen such accidents at any other time, and, on answering that he had witnessed several of them, was further asked how often such things had occurred, and he responded that they were of frequent occurrence. This examination was allowed over defendant's objection, and the ruling is assigned as error. While the matter might have been properly excluded as irrelevant, there was no prejudice in its admission. The witness had testified that plaintiff sprang up from her seat and down the step to the ground after the car had started, and the circumstances as related by him were such as to indicate no negligence whatever on part of the company or its employés. It was such accidents--accidents in which no blame could attach to the company--that he said occurred frequently, and we do not see how such matter could in any way prejudice the defense in the minds of the jury. A somewhat similar record appears in the cross-examination of the motorman in charge of the car when plaintiff was hurt; but, for reasons already stated, we are disposed to hold there was no reversible error.
2. It is next argued that plaintiff having taken a transfer to another line, the junction with which had not yet been reached, the conductor was justified in assuming that she would remain in the car until such junction was reached, and if, without announcing her change of purpose or in some manner signifying such change to the conductor, she attempted to leave the car before such point was reached, the defendant is not liable for her injuries if at the time she left the car it had waited a reasonable time for passengers to alight unless the conductor at the time of starting the car actually saw her in the act of alighting. Upon this theory of...
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