Farrell v. State

• Decision Date: 17 April 1947
• Docket Number: No. 60.,60.
• Parties: FARRELL v. STATE et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

317 Mich. 676

27 N.W.2d 135

FARRELL

v.STATE et al.

No. 60.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

April 17, 1947.

Appeal from Court of Claims; Archie D. McDonald, Judge.

Suit by Mark Farrell against the State of Michigan, the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, and Michigan Civil Service Commission to recover salary allegedly due and unpaid and for other relief. From a judgment dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Before the Entire Bench, except DETHMERS, J.

Prentis, Fitch, Hayes & Andes, of Detroit (Roy F. Andes, of Detroit, of counsel), for petitioner and appellant.

Eugene F. Black, Atty. Gen., Edmund E. Shepherd, Sol. Gen., of Lansing, and Meredith H. Doyle, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendants-appellees.

NORTH, Justice.

On December 13, 1943, plaintiff, Mark Farrell, instituted in the court of claims this suit wherein, in addition to other relief, he sought to recover salary which he alleges is due and unpaid to him between January 1, 1940, and November 30, 1943. Plaintiff claims from January 1, 1940, to July 16, 1940, he received at the rate of $150 per month $975, but that he should have been paid $1852.50; that from July 16, 1940, to December 31, 1940, he received at the rate of $200 per month $1100, but that he should have received $1567.50; and from January 1, 1941, to November 30, 1943, he received at the rate of $200 per month $7000, but that he should have received $9975. It is plaintiff's contention that the alleged underpayment for his services was due either to the failure of defendants to respect plaintiff's classification as Unemployment Compensation Attorney II at a basic salary of $285 per month or due to his having been unlawfully demoted from that classification to the class of Liability Examiner II at a salary of $200 per month. The basis of plaintiff's claim is set forth in his brief as follows:

‘Petitioner (plaintiff) was certified and appointed to said position (of Unemployment Compensation Attorney II) on October 24, 1939, and began at once to perform the duties of said position and has continued to do so * * * until the filing of this suit * * *. In July, 1940, but predated to ‘3/26/40’, the Unemployment Commission ‘allocated’ said position of ‘Unemployment Compensation Attorney II’, which Petitioner was then occupying, ‘to the class of Liability Examiner II’. Petitioner filed written protests with the then ‘Civil Service Department’ of the Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission, and later, after January 1, 1941, with the present Civil Service Commission, but neither of said Civil Service Agencies ever rendered any decision in respect to said protests, and the administrative reliefs prayed for therein.'

Defendants filed a motion in the court of claims to dismiss plaintiff's suit. In support of their motion defendants asserted the following reasons:

‘1. That the court has not jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action.

‘2. That said petition fails to state a cause of action.

‘3. That the supposed cause of action did not accrue within the time limited by law for commencement of an action thereon.’

After hearing and due consideration thereof the trial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and entered an order or judgment dismissing plaintiff's suit. Plaintiff has appealed.

As presented in the court of claims plaintiff in his suit sought relief ‘from defendant's wrongful administrative acts' by way of ‘mandatory injunctive relief’ and by mandamus ‘that his (plaintiff's) said services be forthwith ‘classified’ by Defendant Civil Service Commission under a proper and appropriate ‘classification’ of ‘legal’ or ‘attorney’ effective as of January 1, 1941 * * *.' The trial court, in granting the motion to dismiss, properly held it was without jurisdiction to grant such relief. The court of claims is a court of limited jurisdiction. Reference to the statute creating that court and defining its jurisdiction (Mason's 1940 Supp. §§ 13862-1 to 13,862-25, Stat.Ann.1940 Cum.Supp. §§ 27.3548 [1] to 27.3548 [25] clearly discloses that it has no supervisory power over the civil service commission. Appellant seems now to concede the above, for in his latest brief he says:

‘Petitioner's claim is for the difference in the amount paid him and the amount he should have been paid under his legal classification of Unemployment Compensation Attorney II as a duly certified civil service employee.’

In support of his claim of right to an adjudication of the issue presented by plaintiff as just above noted, he contends that in his pleading he has properly alleged facts and grounds of recovery to entitle him, if such facts and grounds are proven, to a judgment in accordance with the 8th paragraph of his prayer for relief, which reads:

‘That petitioner's claim for judgment in the sum of $4,320.00 (without interest) be rendered in favor of petitioner and against defendant Michigan Unemployment Compensation Commission and the State as set forth in Petitioner's attached bill of particulars.’

It must be borne in mind that the case was disposed of in the trial court by granting defendants' motion to dismiss. No affidavits were filed nor was there any other affirmative showing in support of defendants' motion. Therefore, in determining whether the trial court was correct in granting the motion to dismiss, we must accept as true all properly pleaded facts in plaintiff's petition filed in the court of claims. We note the following allegations contained in plaintiff's pleading under which he asserts a right of recovery on the theory that from January 1, 1940, to November 30, 1943, he was classified and certified as Unemployment Compensation Attorney II and as such was entitled to be paid at the rate of $285 per month.

In paragraph 13, of plaintiff's pleading he alleges that in 1939 he took a state-wide competitive examination for the position of Unemployment Compensation Attorney II and was one of the highest rated individuals who took such examination. In paragraph 14 of his pleading he sets up the following:

‘Further, that on October 24, 1939, petitioner was notified in writing that he has been ‘certified’ to the Unemployment Commission for the position of ‘Unemployment Compensation Attorney.’ That petitioner immediately and at once began officially by direction to perform daily each, every and all of the duties prescribed for such position of attorney, and has continued ever since to do so and is currently doing so at the time of filing this petition.'

But by subsequent allegations in his pleading plaintiff very materially modifies and in effect practically negatives the above allegation. In paragraph 15 of his pleading he sets forth that shortly after January 1, 1940, ‘the Commission was about a year (and more) delinquent in the issuance of its many legal rulings and determination then pending but accumulated in the office;’ and in the next paragraph plaintiff alleges:

‘That to meet such a situation * * * it was represented unto petitioner that the Legal Department was to be abolished, and that the attorneys therein would be assigned to the various Departments of the Commission as requirements dictated * * *; that the General Counsel of the...