Bays v. State, Director of Dept. of State Police, Docket No. 77-4243

• Decision Date: 02 April 1979
• Docket Number: Docket No. 77-4243
• Citation: 280 N.W.2d 526,89 Mich.App. 356
• Parties: Det. Sgt. George BAYS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE of Michigan, DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE, State of Michigan, Defendants-Appellants. 89 Mich.App. 356, 280 N.W.2d 526
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 526

280 N.W.2d 526

Det. Sgt. George BAYS et al., Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. STATE of Michigan, DIRECTOR OF DEPARTMENT OF STATE POLICE State of Michigan, Defendants-Appellants.

Docket No. 77-4243.

89 Mich.App. 356, 280 N.W.2d 526

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

April 2, 1979.

Released for Publication July 12, 1979.

[89 MICHAPP 357] Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Robert A. Derengoski, Sol. Gen., Varda N. Fink and Robert Kane, Asst. Attys. Gen., for defendants-appellants.

James F. Finn, Jerome P. Cavanagh, co-counsel, Detroit, Kenneth Laing, (Amicus), Lansing, for plaintiffs-appellees.

Before BEASLEY, P. J., and WALSH and McDONALD, ^* JJ.

WALSH, Judge.

Defendants appeal entry by the [89 MICHAPP 358] Court of Claims of judgment for plaintiffs. The Court of Claims ruled that plaintiffs, officers and classified employees of the Michigan State Police, were entitled to compensation for standby time. Specifically, the Court of Claims judge found that scheduled off-duty standby hours were "work" within the meaning of the rules of the Civil Service Commission. He further ruled, however, that the Court of Claims did not have jurisdiction to require the Civil Service Commission to set any particular rate of compensation.

We address two issues on appeal:

1. Did plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies preclude judicial review?

2. If administrative remedies had been exhausted, or if exhaustion was unnecessary or had been excused, did the Court of Claims have jurisdiction over plaintiffs' action?

Only two of the named plaintiffs attempted to exhaust administrative remedies before filing for relief in the Court of Claims. Detective Sergeant James M. Thomas filed a grievance but stopped at step three of the Civil Service Commission's established grievance procedure. Detective Sergeant George Bays proceeded to step four, where he requested a hearing on his grievance. In response to his request, John G. Fitch, employee relations administrator of the Civil Service Commission's state employee relations division, wrote the following letter:

"This letter is in response to your appeal to Step 4. A conference between the parties was called by the Employee Relations Division and held on September 28, 1973.

"Since your appeal concerns a 'stand-by' pay policy it will be necessary for you to provide this office with a [89 MICHAPP 359] copy of the policy which has been violated before we can process your grievance further.

"If no 'stand-by' pay policy exists, and the intent of your grievance is to have the Hearing Officer provide such a policy, then the matter cannot be handled through the Grievance Procedure. It is not within the jurisdiction of the Hearing Officer to legislate policies, rules or regulations."

Det. Bays did not respond to Mr. Fitch's letter. He did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission itself (step five). Instead, he filed his claim for standby compensation in the Court of Claims. In addition to challenging the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over plaintiffs' claims, defendants unsuccessfully argued in that forum that plaintiffs had not exhausted the administrative remedies available to them as established by the Civil Service Commission.

It is plaintiffs' position that, based on Mr. Fitch's letter, further pursuit of Civil Service Commission remedies would have been an exercise in futility. Trojan v. Taylor Twp., 352 Mich. 636, 638-639, 91 N.W.2d 9 (1958). We disagree. In the Court of Claims plaintiffs stated their theory as follows: "Plaintiffs claim that these after duty hours, which said officers are required to serve, on a scheduled basis, are actual hours worked, and are compensable." They then proceeded to discuss various rules of the Civil Service Commission which, they argued, supported their claim. (Theory of Plaintiffs' Case and Brief in Support Thereof, filed in the Court of Claims February 3, 1977.) In rendering a decision for plaintiffs, the Court of Claims judge relied on certain Civil Service Commission rules which, he found, established their right to compensation for standby time.

We are not convinced that, had he set forth the [89 MICHAPP 360] specific basis for his grievance as later revealed in the Court of Claims (I. e., certain rules of the Civil Service Commission), plaintiff Bays would have been denied a hearing at step four. Nor are we convinced that it would have been futile for him to take his grievance to step five and ask the commission to order a step four hearing. The record does not set forth sufficient evidence of prejudgment on the part of the Civil Service Commission to allow immediate judicial review. Hardy v. State Personnel Director, 392 Mich. 1, 5, fn. 1, 219 N.W.2d 61 (1974). We note also that the Civil Service Commission has filed an amicus curiae brief in this Court and has indicated its desire for development of a full record before the commission. In light of the several significant policies served by the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, we are not persuaded that exhaustion was excused in this case. IBM Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury, 75 Mich.App. 604, 610, 255 N.W.2d 702 (1977), Lv. den. 401 Mich. 816 (1977). ¹

We also reject plaintiffs' argument that exhaustion was not necessary because their action filed in the Court of Claims was not an appeal from the Civil Service Commission but rather a claim for compensation for past services. The cases cited by plaintiffs in support of their argument did not involve interpretation of civil service rules. Farrell [89 MICHAPP 361] v. Unemployment Compensation Comm., 317 Mich. 676, 27 N.W.2d 135 (1947), Norris v. Liquor Control Comm., 342 Mich. 378, 70 N.W.2d 761 (1955). The instant plaintiffs were in effect asking the Court of Claims to exercise supervisory power over the Civil Service Commission. The Court of Claims has no power to do so. Farrell v. Unemployment Compensation Commission, supra, 317 Mich. at 680, 27 N.W.2d 135.

We hold that exhaustion of administrative remedies was necessary and now turn to the question of which court will be the appropriate forum for review in the event of appeal from a final Civil Service Commission ruling.

Although the Administrative Procedures Act does not apply to the internal procedures of the Michigan Civil Service Commission, Viculin v. Dep't of Civil Service, 386 Mich. 375, 393-394, 396-397 fn. 20, 192 N.W.2d 449 (1971), M.C.L. § 24.203(2); M.S.A. § 3.560(103)(2), the Supreme Court has adopted GCR 1963, 706.3, which was intended to promote uniformity of the appeal process from administrative agencies, Viculin v. Dep't Civil Service, supra at 396, fn. 20, 192 N.W.2d 449, and which provides as follows:

"An appeal from a decision of the Michigan Civil Service Commission is governed by the provisions for appeals from administrative agencies in the Administrative Procedures Act (M.C.L.A. § 24.201 Et seq.; M.S.A. § 3.560(101) Et seq.)." ²

The Administrative Procedures Act establishes the proper forum for judicial review of administrative decisions in M.C.L. § 24.302; M.S.A. § 3.560(202):

[89 MICHAPP 362] "Judicial review of a final decision or order in a contested case shall be by any applicable special statutory review proceeding in any court specified by statute and in accordance with the general court rules. In the absence or inadequacy thereof, judicial review shall be by a petition for review in accordance with sections 103 to 105 (M.C.L. §§ 24.303-24.305; M.S.A. §§ 3.560(203)-3.560(205))."

Under Section 103 of the APA, judicial review of...