Farrens Tree Surgeons v. Winkles
| Decision Date | 09 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 47485,47485 |
| Citation | 334 So.2d 569 |
| Parties | FARRENS TREE SURGEONS and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Petitioners, v. Lonnie B. WINKLES and State of Florida, Industrial Relations Commission, Respondents. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
John C. Taylor, Jr., of Mathews, Osborne, Ehrlich, McNatt, Gobelman & Cobb, Jacksonville, for petitioners.
Michael McDermott, of Provitola & McDermott, DeLand, for respondents.
This matter is before us on a petition for writ of certiorari to the Industrial Relations Commission from an order reversing the Judge of Industrial Claims. Jurisdiction vests pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution.
Respondent Winkles, now 44 years of age and a veteran of some 25 years of employment with petitioner Farrens Tree Surgeons, sustained an injury in an automobile accident arising out of his employment as an hydraulic mechanic on September 17, 1965. At a hearing before the Judge of Industrial Claims in January, 1974, he made no request for temporary disability compensation, because he had continued to receive his regular salary, with occasional raises, from the time of the accident. He did, however, request permanent partial disability compensation based on a 90 percent permanent loss of vision in the right eye, a 30 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole for injuries to the neck, back, and spine; and a 20 percent permanent disability to the left arm. After hearing testimony from Winkles and his supervisor (there were depositions from three doctors, including a chiropractor, as well), the Judge of Industrial Claims found that respondent had sustained a 60 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole because of his injuries sustained in the accident. This figure was reached by adding together the following: a 24 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole resulting from a 100 percent loss of vision of the right eye; a 30 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole because of the spine injury; a 6 percent permanent partial disability to the body as a whole because of the injury to the left extremity.
Winkles filed a timely application for review with the Industrial Relations Commission. The Commission reversed, holding that it was improper to treat combinations of injuries as constituting injuries to the body as a whole under Section 440.15(3)(u), Florida Statutes. 1 Noting that scheduled compensation for the eye injury alone entitled respondent Winkles to 175 weeks of compensation, the Commission specifically disapproved of the conversion of Winkles' individual injuries to a percentage of 'whole body' injuries, and remanded the cause to the Judge of Industrial Claims. It is from the Commission's decision that certiorari to this Court was taken.
In view of Scholastic Systems, Inc. v. LeLoup, 307 So.2d 166 (Fla.1974), the issue before us is whether the Commission's order constitutes 'a departure from the essential requirements of law.' The questions framed for the resolution of this issue are:
(i) Whether the Judge of Industrial Claims erred in treating the claimant's multiple injuries as relating to the body as a whole and in awarding disability benefits based upon a rating to the body as a whole; and
(ii) Whether there was competent substantial evidence for the Judge of Industrial Claims' finding of 60 percent permanent partial disability of the body as a whole.
Relying upon Williamson v. Bush & LaFoe, 294 So.2d 641 (Fla.1974), petitioners assert that the Commission has departed from the essential requirements of law. Since the Florida Workmen's Compensation Act makes no provision for combinations of injuries, the employer/carrier maintains that a Judge of Industrial Claims who is faced with a situation such as the one at bar must find compensation for permanent partial disability under Section 440.15(3)(u), Florida Statutes. Section 440.15(3)(u) follows an enumeration by the Legislature of scheduled injuries to single body members or bodily functions (Section 440.15(3)(a) through (t), Florida Statutes) and refers to 'all other cases in this class of disability.' Petitioners assert that since there are multiple scheduled injuries and an injury to the body as a whole, Section 440.15(3), Florida Statutes, requires the Judge of Industrial Claims to proceed to Section 440.15(3)(u), Florida Statutes. Because multiple scheduled injuries are not defined in Section 440.15(3)(a) through (t), Florida Statutes, it is argued that the situation presented in the instant case must fall within the legislative category of 'other cases'. Petitioners find support for their position in the following language from this Court's opinion in Williamson, supra:
'In connection with this point it should be noted that F.S. § 440.15(3)(d), F.S.A., refers to 'foot lost', the singular and not the plural. The Legislature recognized that it could not possible foresee every possible injury or combination of injuries so it included in the schedule subsection (u) to cover other cases. The injury described sub judice falls into the 'other cases' category.'
In Williamson, supra, the claimant suffered injuries to both feet. The Judge of Industrial Claims found permanent partial disability to each foot on an anatomical basis but concluded that 'the effect of the two scheduled injuries is to reduce the efficiency of the body as a whole.' Accordingly, he rendered an award based on injury to the body as a whole under Section 440.15(3)(u), Florida Statutes. The Commission reversed and remanded, finding that the Judge of Industrial Claims should have found permanent partial disability of scheduled members and not disability of the body as a whole. This Court stated the issue as follows:
'The sole question for our determination is whether independent, simultaneous injuries to two body members, which would be considered as scheduled injuries if they occurred separately, May be treated under Florida Statute § 440.15(3) (u), F.S.A., as an injury to the body as a whole?' (Emphasis supplied)
The Court responded to the question in the affirmative and in arriving at its decision...
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