Farrington v. Maine State Highway Commission

• Decision Date: 05 March 1963
• Citation: 188 A.2d 483,159 Me. 95
• Parties: Donald E. FARRINGTON and Christine E. Farrington v. MAINE STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 483

188 A.2d 483

159 Me. 95

Donald E. FARRINGTON and Christine E. Farrington v. MAINE STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 5, 1963.

Lewis I. Naiman, Gardiner, for plaintiff.

Frank E. Southard, Jr., Augusta, for defendant.

Before WILLIAMSON, C. J., and WEBBER, TAPLEY, SULLIVAN, SIDDALL and MARDEN, JJ.

MARDEN, Justice.

On appeal from judgment and from the denial of a motion by the State for a new trial on the usual grounds addressed to the Presiding Justice. This is a complaint for damages occasioned by the taking of land from plaintiffs for highway purposes and involves the usual elements of the actual taking of a certain area (.78 approximately acres), the rendering of a second portion inaccessible (.10 approximately acres) and the imposition on the plaintiff's remaining land of two drainage easements.

The jury was given the benefit of testimony of the owners, an appraiser (whose qualifications were conceded by the appellant) called by the plaintiffs, testimony from State Engineers, and an appraiser (whose qualifications were accepted by the court) offered by the State, and a view of the premises. To a verdict in the amount of $2,800.00 the State addressed its motion and prosecutes its appeal contending that the owner's testimony of fair market value was based upon an erroneous foundation; that the opinion of the expert offered by the owner was not based upon sufficient facts of record; and that that evidence together with the view by the jury did not support the verdict.

The authorities which the State cites in support of its appeal are recognized as sound. The State urges that an owner's testimony properly to be accepted by the jury should not be based upon the opinion of others or involve sentimental value (Maher v. Commonwealth, 291 Mass. 343, 197 N.E. 78 (1955)); that likewise the testimony of a professional appraiser properly to be accepted must be based upon sound principles, and not ignore consideration of the highest and best use of the land involved (In Re: Clearview Expressway, 9 N.Y.2d 439, 214 N.Y.S.2d 438, 174 N.E.2d 522 (1961)); that opinion evidence without any support in the demonstration and physical facts is not substantial evidence and that opinion evidence is only as good as the facts upon which it is based (Washington v. United States, 9 Cir., 214 F.2d 33, 43 (1954) and (headnotes 14-16)); that the opinion of an appraiser is no better than the hypothesis or the assumption upon which it is based (International Paper Company v. United States, 5 Cir., 227 F.2d 201, 205 (1956)); and that an appraiser should give facts upon which his opinion is based (City of Newport v. Dorsel Co., 281 Ky. 372, 136 S.W.2d 11 (1940)).

The State also urges that in the light of what it submits as insufficiency upon the record, the jury must have placed unauthorized reliance upon their view of the premises and that a jury may not base its assessment of damages on view alone, with which last statement we concur, Jahr on Eminent Domain § 249, but see Bangor and Piscataquis R. R. Co. v. McComb, 60 Me. 290, 302. We have no way of knowing the impression which the jury received from the view as compared to the recorded evidence, but are mindful of the declarations of this court in jury viewed land damage cases in Wakefield v. Boston & Maine R. R., 63 Me. 385 and Shepherd v. Inhabitants of Camden, 82 Me. 535, 20 A. 91.

'In order to enable the jury to form a correct judgment of the amount of damages sustained by reason of the location of the railroad, they should 'view the premises' from such standpoints, and in such a manner as will give them an accurate knowledge of the considerations that go to make up the damages, such as the value of the land taken and the use to be made of it, the effect of the severance upon the character, situation, present and prospective use of the remainder of the lot, and any other facts that diminish the value of the premises.' Wakefield v. Boston & Maine R. R., 63 Me. 385, 387.

'* * * there was evidence on both sides submitted to the jury, and the preponderance is not so great as to satisfy us that the verdict was the result of bias or prejudice of the jury, or of any mistake made by them. Furthermore, we have not before us all the evidence which the jury had to act upon. They properly viewed the premises; and they had a right to take into...