Farris v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co.

Decision Date04 January 1912
Citation210 Mass. 585,96 N.E. 1098
PartiesFARRIS v. BOSTON ELEVATED RY. CO.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
COUNSEL

G. H. Mellen and C. R. Darling, for plaintiff.

E. P Saltonstall, for defendant.

OPINION

RUGG C.J.

This is an action for personal injuries received by the plaintiff's intestate while traveling with a horse and buggy on a public way in the evening, through collision with a car of the defendant. There was evidence tending to show that the accident occurred in Boston, on Columbus Avenue which at this point was straight for more than a quarter of a mile and was about fifty-three feet wide between curbstones. Two tracks of the defendant ran in the middle part of the street. The plaintiff's intestate drove out of Davenport Street, which intersects Columbus Avenue on its easterly side, into Columbus Avenue, intending to cross the tracks to the westerly side of the street in order to go southerly on the avenue. There was a block on the southerly corner of Columbus Avenue and Davenport Streets, the distance from which to the nearest rail of the defendant was 50 feet, and as soon as the intestate could see past this block he looked up and down the street for cars and saw one approaching on the track nearer to him going northerly, but 'beyond Benton Street,' a street 150 feet from Davenport Street. He was reported to have said that he saw 'the car was not a dangerous distance,' and also that as he was coming from Davenport Street 'he saw a car way up the street and he thought he had plenty of time to pass as the car was quite a distance.' Other testimony was that the car was 75 yards away at that time.

The only evidence as to the speed of the horse was that it was either trotting or walking or jogging, but the driver did not urge it onward. There was no other car in sight and there was no traffic in the street except one wagon some distance away. The car struck the buggy on 'the rear end,' overturning it and injuring the plaintiff's intestate. There was a regulation of the Board of Aldermen of the city of Boston to the effect that 'in approaching any public or private way intersecting that in which the railway is located the speed of the car must be reduced to such a rate as will make it possible to stop it immediately.'

The jury found in answer to questions that the plaintiff's intestate was in the exercise of due care; that the gong was sounded before the accident; and that the car before the accident was being run at a reckless or unreasonable rate of speed.

The only question is whether as matter of law it can be said that the plaintiff's intestate was not in the exercise of due care at the time of the accident. Generally when a collision occurs between a street car and a horse-drawn vehicle at intersecting streets the question of due care of the driver of each is for the jury. Neither has an exclusive right to which the other must yield. Both have the rights and duties of travellers upon a common thoroughfare. The driver of the car, being limited to the tracks, while the driver of the...

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