Farris v. Catlett

• Decision Date: 31 July 1862
• Citation: 32 Mo. 469
• Parties: HENRY C. FARRIS, Respondent, v. BENJAMIN F. CATLETT, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

32 Mo. 469

HENRY C. FARRIS, Respondent,

v.BENJAMIN F. CATLETT, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1862.

Appeal from Buchanan Court of Common Pleas.

Vories & Vories, for appellant.

The only question presented in this case is, does the answer of the defendant present facts which constitute a defence to the plaintiff's action? It is contended by the defendant that the plaintiff having taken the note not for value, but as collateral security for another debt; or that, if he had notice of the facts, as alleged in the answer; or that, if he took the note after due, (all of which facts are admitted by the motion to strike out the answer,) he stands just in the same position that Nixon, the payee of the note, would have stood if he had brought suit to recover the note himself. (Chitty on Bills, s. p. 217, 218, and notes; Story on Bills of Exchange, § 187 and following; Ship & Woodbridge v. Stacker et al., 8 Mo. 145; 2 Greenl. Ev. § 199.)

Loan & Bassett, for respondent.

I. The answer was properly stricken out. The matters contained in it present no bar to plaintiff's cause of action. The note is absolute on its face, and if the payee of the note failed to observe his agreement with the maker thereof, his remedy is on the contract, and not by a defence to the note. (Atwood v. Lewis, 6 Mo. 392; Bircher v. Payne, 7 Mo. 462.) The matters set forth in the answer do not show a payment, defeasance, or other discharge of the note.

BATES, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit on a negotiable note, made by the defendant to Nixon, and by him endorsed to the plaintiff.

The defendant answered that the note was, after maturity, assigned by Nixon, without consideration, to the plaintiff as collateral security for a precedent debt; that when the note was given it was part of the consideration of the purchase, by defendant from Nixon, of a piece of land which was then encumbered by several deeds of trust, (which included also other lands) and that it was agreed between the defendant, said Nixon, and the parties to said deeds of trust, that the note should be turned over to one of the trustees in said deeds of trust, who should collect the same and pay the amount thereof upon the debts secured by said deeds of trust, in proportion to their several amounts; and thereupon the land was to be released from the liens of said deeds of trust; of all which the plaintiff had full knowledge when he acquired said note; that the defendant has been compelled...