Farris v. Commonwealth

Decision Date11 November 1886
PartiesFARRIS v. COMMONWEALTH.
CourtKentucky Court of Appeals

Appeal from Bourbon circuit court.

Emmet M. Dickson, for appellant, Farris. P. W. Hardin, for the Commonwealth.

PRYOR C.J.

The right of self-defense does not authorize one to hunt up his adversary, that he may slay him, on the idea that it is necessary to save his own life. In this case the appellant had left the stable where the difficulty between himself and the deceased is said to have originated, and gone to the family residence, and, obtaining a shotgun, returned with the avowed purpose of taking the life of the deceased. After leaving the stable, the appellant was out of danger, and the only reason inducing his return was to kill the deceased which he did as soon as he was near enough to shoot him. How he had been treated by the deceased in the original trouble between them is involved in doubt. A witness, who had heard what was going on, states that the deceased said to the accused, "he did not intend to hurt him;" but supposed, from the way the accused talked, he was being choked by the deceased. Appellant stated at the time he shot that the deceased had not only choked him, but drew a pistol on him; but if this fact was clearly established, if, after his release, and when in entire safety, he returns, and fires the fatal shot, his offense, if time for cooling had not elapsed, would certainly have been that of manslaughter, and no case of self-defense existed.

The accused, in a mental condition bordering almost on idiocy had been excited by some talk or rough treatment by the negro, and, in a moment of excitement, with scarcely mind enough to know the consequences resulting from his action fired the fatal shot. The question as to the condition of his mind was submitted to the jury, under an instruction that was unobjectionable, and they have found him guilty of manslaughter. The jury, by their verdict, in effect said that the accused knew it was wrong to take human life, and had mind enough to make him responsible for his acts. However strong the evidence may be as to the mental imbecility of the accused, it cannot be considered by this court, except in applying the law to the facts.

There was no controversy as to the manner of the killing, and the only defense the accused had was the unfortunate condition of his mind. The jury was told that if his mind was so feeble as not to enable him to know right...

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2 cases
  • Shaeffer v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • November 2, 1895
    ...to control his actions, if he knew right from wrong as to the particular act with which he is charged. 60 Am. Rep. 210; 16 id. 408; 1 S.W. 729; 50 Ark. 518. Instruction two asked was a proper one. 49 Ark. 516. The refusal was not cured by giving number one. 5. A non-expert or non-profession......
  • Davidson v. Commonwealth
    • United States
    • Kentucky Court of Appeals
    • October 17, 1916
    ...Criminal Law, Vol. 1, Sec. 31; 12 Cyc. 161; Shannahan v. Commonwealth, 8 Bush 463; Graham v. Commonwealth, 16 B. Monroe 587; Farris v. Commonwealth, 1 S. W. 729; Murphy v. Commonwealth, 92 Ky. 485; 1 Wharton's Criminal Law, Sec. 33; Bishop's Criminal Law, Sec. 383b; Clark's Criminal Law, Se......

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