Farris v. Koplau
| Decision Date | 03 February 1911 |
| Docket Number | 16,958 - (249) |
| Citation | 129 N.W. 770,113 Minn. 397 |
| Parties | WILLIAM FARRIS v. R. KOPLAU |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Clay county to recover $92.92 upon a promissory note. The substance of the answer is stated in the opinion. The reply was a general denial. The case was tried before Baxter, J., and a jury which returned a verdict in favor of defendant. From an order granting plaintiff's motion for a new trial, defendant appealed. Reversed.
Fraud in obtaining promissory note -- failure to instruct jury not a ground for new trial.
The failure of the court to instruct the jury upon all the elements necessary to constitute a defense under section 2747, R.L. 1905, relative to the procurement of negotiable instruments by fraudulent means, is not, in the absence of special requests or proper exceptions at the trial, ground for a new trial.
Fraud in obtaining promissory note -- question for jury.
Evidence held sufficient to justify the submission to the jury of the question whether the promissory note in suit was obtained by fraudulent representations and without negligence on the part of defendant.
Ground for new trial -- case limited.
A trial court has no authority to grant a new trial for errors not duly excepted to on the trial, or on a motion for a new trial, as provided for by section 4200, R.L. 1905. Bank of Willmar v. Lawler, 78 Minn. 135, limited.
Peterson & Adams, for appellant.
Nye & Dosland, for respondent.
This action was brought to recover upon a promissory note, alleged to have been made and delivered by defendant, of which the following is a copy:
"$92.92.
Sabin Minn., Aug. 6, 1908.
It was indorsed in blank with the name of the maker and payee, "R. Koplau." The complaint alleged that the note was delivered to the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, and the evidence tends to show that it was delivered to an agent of that company in payment of the first premium on an insurance policy issued upon the life of defendant. The complaint also alleged that before the maturity of the note the insurance company for value sold and transferred the same to plaintiff. The defendant in his answer denied the execution or delivery of the note as alleged in the complaint or otherwise, and further alleged that, if plaintiff had a promissory note of the terms and effect of that described in the complaint, it was procured from defendant by false and fraudulent representations, and by trick, artifice, and fraud. Defendant had a verdict, and the court granted plaintiff's motion for a new trial. Defendant appealed.
1. Plaintiff's motion for a new trial was based upon two grounds, namely: (1) Errors in law occurring on the trial; and (2) that the verdict was not justified by the evidence. The court made a general order granting the motion, without assigning reasons therefor. It cannot, therefore, be sustained as a discretionary order, and we have only to determine whether the evidence reasonably tends to support the verdict, and, if so, whether there were any errors in the rulings or instructions of the court of a nature to justify a new trial. Fitger v. Guthrie, 89 Minn. 330, 94 N.W. 888.
2. It is contended by plaintiff in support of the order that the evidence wholly fails to support the defense, and therefore that the verdict cannot stand. While it is true that the evidence fairly shows that plaintiff was a bona fide purchaser of the note, section 2747, R.L. 1905, makes available to defendant the defense of fraud; and the question whether a promissory note was procured by false representations, trick, or artifice is by that statute made a question of fact for the jury. A bona fide holder of negotiable instruments in not protected by his good faith, but takes title subject to this particular defense. We have examined the record, and find therein evidence reasonably tending to support the allegations of fraud, and plaintiff's contention that it wholly fails to make a defense is not sustained.
We also similarly dispose of plaintiff's further claim that the evidence is conclusive that defendant was guilty of negligence in signing the note without first ascertaining its real purpose and effect. The evidence made this a question of fact. It would serve no useful purpose to discuss the evidence. Sibley County Bank v. Schaus, 104 Minn. 438, 116 N.W. 928.
3. It is further contended in support of the order that the court below erred in its instructions to the jury. The statute relied upon by defendant (section 2747) provides that no person shall be liable upon a promissory note or other negotiable instrument executed by him, if he shall make it appear that his signature was obtained by fraudulent representations, trick, or artifice as to the nature and terms of the contract, that he did not at the time of signing the same believe it to be a promissory note or other negotiable instrument, and that he was not guilty of negligence in signing the paper without the knowledge of its terms. It also provides that the question of negligence shall be one of fact for determination by the jury. To constitute a defense under this statute it must be made to appear (1) that the instrument was obtained by fraudulent representations trick, or artifice; (2) that the maker thereof did not believe he was signing a negotiable...
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