Farris v. State

• Citation: 117 S.W. 798
• Parties: FARRIS v. STATE.
• Decision Date: 10 March 1909
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

117 S.W. 798

FARRIS v. STATE.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 10, 1909.

Appeal from District Court, Grimes County; S. W. Dean, Judge.

G. W. Farris was convicted for cattle theft, and he appealed. Affirmed.

F. J. McCord, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

DAVIDSON, P. J.

This conviction was for cattle theft; the punishment assessed being two years' confinement in the penitentiary.

The alleged purchaser testified, in substance, that he bought from appellant the head of cattle in question, as well as a cow at the same time. The yearling was claimed by Hamilton. The cow and yearling were running on the range at the time of the sale and purchase. Appellant sold the yearling to the witness as his property. The identification of the animal is sufficient as belonging to Hamilton. Appellant did not introduce any evidence. It will be observed that the witness does not testify, nor does the evidence show, that appellant was in actual manual possession of the property. In fact, he seems to have sold the animal on the range, and the purchasing witness subsequently took charge of it.

Appellant requested the court to instruct the jury that, before the title to an animal running on the range can be conveyed, there must be a bill of sale, signed and acknowledged by the seller, or it must be shown that the accused had actual manual possession of the cattle at the time of the sale. This charge was refused, and correctly. It is not necessary to the transfer of title to property, in prosecutions for theft of animals, that a bill of sale be either written, or written and acknowledged.

The charge of the court is criticised because it failed to charge that, if the jury should have a reasonable doubt that the animal claimed to have been sold by appellant to the purchaser was the animal claimed by Hamilton, they should acquit. The court gave a general charge on reasonable doubt, and also instructed the jury that they must find the animal belonged to Hamilton before they could convict. The charge as given, under the facts of this case, sufficiently presented the question referred to in appellant's exception. There seems to be, so far as the testimony is concerned, no reasonable doubt of the fact that the animal was Hamilton's. Appellant introduced no evidence at all, and all the evidence upon which the verdict was predicated was introduced by the state. This sufficiently shows that the animal appellant sold to the alleged purchaser was the animal of Hamilton. At least, Hamilton so...