Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist.
| Citation | 187 Wash.2d 27,384 P.3d 232 |
| Decision Date | 17 November 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 92216-1,92216-1 |
| Parties | Shane Fast, Jamie Fast, the marital community comprised thereof, Robert Dalton Fast, and the estate thereof, Petitioners, v. Kennewick Public Hospital District d/b/a Kennewick General Hospital and d/b/a Mid-Columbia Women's Health Center, a Washington public hospital district organized as a government entity, municipal, or quasi-municipal corporation ; Adam T. Smith, D.O., individually and for the marital community with spouse or registered domestic partner Jane Doe Smith; Gregory Schroff, M.D., individually and for the marital community with spouse or registered domestic partner Jane Doe Smith; and Does 1 through 50, Respondents. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Washington |
Scott E. Rodgers, Rodriguez, Interiano, Hanson & Rodgers, 7502 W. Deschutes Pl., Kennewick, WA, 99336-7719, for Petitioners.
Edward Joseph Bruya, Eric Roche Byrd Bruya & Associates, P.C., 601 W. Riverside Ave., Ste. 1600, Spokane, WA, 99201-0626, Jerome R. Aiken, Attorney at Law, P.O. Box 22680, Yakima, WA, 98907-2680, Peter McGillis Ritchie Meyer, Fluegge & Tenney, P.S., 230 S. 2nd St., Yakima, WA, 98901-2865, Michael J. Wiswall, Hart Wagner LLP, 1000 S.W. Broadway, Ste. 2000, Portland, OR, 97205-3072, for Respondents.
Valerie Davis Mcomie, Attorney at Law, 4549 N.W. Aspen St., Camas, WA, 98607-8302, Bryan Harnetiaux, WA State Ass'n for Justice Foundation, 517 E. 17th Avenue, Spokane, WA, 99203, Daniel Edward Huntington, Richter-Wimberley PS, 422 W. Riverside, Ave., Ste. 1300, Spokane, WA, 99201-0305, for Amicus Curiae on behalf of Washington State Association for Justice Foundation.
WIGGINS
, J.
¶1 The medical negligence statute of limitations (MNSOL) requires filing a claim for medical negligence within three years of the allegedly negligent act or omission or within one year of when the negligence is or should have been discovered, whichever is later. RCW 4.16.350(3)
. The MNSOL may be tolled for one year upon the making of a good-faith request for mediation. RCW 7.70.110.
¶2 The general torts catchall statute of limitations is also three years. RCW 4.16.080(2)
. However, there is no tolling provision associated with the general torts catchall statute of limitations. We hold that in cases of wrongful death resulting from negligent health care, the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3) ) applies.
FACTS
¶3 Jamie Fast entered into a doctor/patient relationship with Dr. Adam Smith and Kennewick Public Hospital District on January 25, 2008. Jamie1 sought care because of difficulty conceiving
and menstrual bleeding, which had been heavier and more prolonged than normal. At her first appointment, she completed medical history forms including questions regarding her health and the health of her relatives. Jamie noted that her grandmother had diabetes
and both her parents had high cholesterol.
¶4 In late March 2008, Dr. Smith confirmed Jamie was pregnant. Jamie bled for the first few months of pregnancy—visiting the emergency room at least once for bleeding. Jamie phoned Dr. Smith's office multiple times to inquire about her bleeding. Each time, Jamie went to Dr. Smith for an examination or she had an ultrasound at the hospital. After each checkup or ultrasound, Dr. Smith assured Jamie that everything was fine or normal.
¶5 Several times during the pregnancy, Jamie mentioned excessive thirst and frequent urination to Dr. Smith and/or his nursing staff. She was assured that this was normal. During an August 8, 2008 visit, Jamie raised concerns about a 10 pound weight loss; again, she was reassured that her pregnancy was progressing normally. Also during this visit, a glucose challenge test
was postponed. A glucose challenge test is designed to measure blood sugar and determine whether the mother is at risk for gestational diabetes. Neither Dr. Smith nor his nursing staff ever raised concerns about blood sugar, diabetes, high blood pressure, or weight loss during Jamie's pregnancy.
¶6 At Jamie's August 25, 2008 appointment, Dr. Gregory Schroff covered for Dr. Smith. Dr. Schroff scheduled a glucose challenge test
four days later, on August 29, 2008, Jamie's first blood sugar test since establishing care with Dr. Smith. Jamie's blood glucose concentration was over six times the upper limit of normal—so high that Dr. Schroff did not believe the accuracy of the results. Dr. Schroff scheduled another blood sugar test the following day, August 30, 2008—these results indicated a glucose concentration over four times normal levels. Dr. Schroff admitted Jamie to the hospital for management of diabetes and pregnancy that same day. Jamie was 29 weeks pregnant.2
¶7 At the hospital, Dr. Schroff ordered intermittent fetal monitoring
. The monitor detected fetal distress several times, indicating decelerations of the fetal heart rate. The nursing staff's response was to turn off the monitor, rather than to substitute a different monitor or to expedite delivery of the unborn child.3 No further action was taken. Dr. Schroff failed to review fetal monitor strips; Jamie and her husband, Shane Fast, presented evidence that the slips indicated that intervention was necessary.4 Around 4 a.m. on August 31, 2008, nurses were unable to detect a fetal heartbeat—Jamie's unborn child had died. Later that day, Jamie delivered her stillborn baby. She has been an insulin-dependent type 2 diabetic since this stillbirth.
¶8 On August 26, 2011 the Fasts served requests for mediation on Drs. Smith and Schroff and the hospital that employed them, Kennewick Public Hospital District (collectively defendants). Under the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)
), a good-faith mediation request tolls the statute of limitations for one additional year. RCW 7.70.110.5 Defendants expressed no interest in mediating. On July 18, 2012, the Fasts filed a complaint against defendants “for injuries resulting from healthcare” and “injury or death of a child” under chapter 7.70 RCW and RCW 4.24.010
, respectively. Clerk's Papers (CP) at 7-8 ).
¶9 The relevant dates here are:
¶10 Dr. Smith, joined by the other defendants, moved for summary judgment, on the ground that the wrongful death claim was barred by the general torts catchall statute of limitations and violation of a tort claim statute, which is not at issue here. The trial court granted summary judgment on both grounds. The Fasts appealed. Division Three upheld the summary judgment ruling that RCW 4.16.080(2)
, the general torts catchall statute of limitations, applies to actions for wrongful death caused by medical malpractice. Fast v. Kennewick Pub. Hosp. Dist. , 188 Wash.App. 43, 45–46, 53, ¶¶ 3, 27, 354 P.3d 858 (2015).6 The Fasts petitioned for review on the general torts catchall statute of limitations question, and we granted review.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 We review matters of statutory interpretation de novo. Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC , 146 Wash.2d 1, 9, 43 P.3d 4 (2002)
.
ANALYSIS
¶12 Our fundamental goal in statutory interpretation is to “discern and implement the legislature's intent.”
State v. Armendariz , 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, ¶ 7, 156 P.3d 201 (2007)
. The court discerns legislative intent from the plain language enacted by the legislature, considering the text of the provision in question, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, amendments to the provision, and the statutory scheme as a whole. Campbell & Gwinn , 146 Wash.2d at 9–10, 43 P.3d 4.
¶13 The Fasts argue for the application of the three-year MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)
) with an additional year of tolling for a good-faith mediation request RCW 7.70.110. The defendants argue for the application of the general torts catchall statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.080(2) ), and the Court of Appeals agreed.
RCW 4.24.0109
neither includes nor expressly incorporates a statute of limitations. We hold that in cases of wrongful death resulting from negligent health care, the MNSOL (RCW 4.16.350(3)
) applies.
RCW 4.16.350(3)—Medical Negligence Statute of Limitations
¶15 Washington's medical negligence statute is codified in chapter 7.70 RCW. The legislature began with a declaration of intent that chapter 7.70 RCW would govern all actions for damages resulting from health care:
The state of Washington, exercising its police and sovereign power, hereby modifies as set forth in this chapter and in RCW 4.16.350
, as now or hereafter amended, certain substantive and procedural aspects of all civil actions and causes of action, whether based on tort, contract, or otherwise, for damages for injury occurring as a result of health care which is provided after June 25, 1976.
RCW 7.70.010
(emphasis added). “[W]henever an injury occurs as a result of health care, the action for damages for that injury is governed exclusively by RCW 7.70.” Branom v. State , 94 Wash.App. 964, 969, 974 P.2d 335 (1999).
¶16 Prior to 1971, there was no separate medical malpractice statute of limitations. Medical negligence cases fell within the limitation statutes applicable to all tort claims. Bixler v. Bowman , 94 Wash.2d 146, 148, 614 P.2d 1290 (1980)
; Wood v. Gibbons , 38 Wash.App. 343, 346–47, 685 P.2d 619 (1984). “In 1971 the Washington Legislature, in harmony with the nationwide trend to limit recovery by medical malpractice victims, enacted RCW 4.16.350, which governs the statute of limitations for medical malpractice suits.”10 Donna L. Walker, Recent Case, Bixler v. Bowman , 94 Wash.2d 146...
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