Fatemi v. State, 55960

Decision Date09 November 1977
Docket NumberNo. 55960,55960
PartiesYasmine FATEMI, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.
CourtTexas Court of Criminal Appeals
OPINION

PHILLIPS, Judge.

This is an appeal from an order revoking conditional discharge under Art. 4476-15, Sec. 4.12, V.T.C.S.

On September 15, 1975, appellant pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine and the court ordered she be placed on conditional discharge for a period of two years subject to the condition, inter alia, that she commit no offense against the laws of this or any State or of the United States. On August 2, 1976, the State filed a motion to set aside the order of conditional discharge for a violation of the conditions of discharge; namely, possession of a controlled substance, methaqualone, on or about June 25, 1976. Following a hearing on the State's motion on September 9, 1976, the court ordered the conditional discharge be set aside and adjudged appellant guilty of the primary offense, possession of cocaine. Punishment was assessed by the court at two years; however, imposition of sentence was suspended and appellant was placed on probation for a period of two years.

Appellant contends the trial court erred in admitting, over timely objection, evidence obtained as the result of an unlawful traffic stop and detention.

At the hearing on the motion to set aside conditional discharge, Officer Villegas of the Austin Police Department testified he was on duty on June 25, 1975, around 2:15 a.m. when he noticed a 1969 blue Volvo, with the lights on, parked on the shoulder facing southbound in the 600 block of Robert E. Lee. No one was in the vehicle and the engine was not running. Officer Villegas stated he turned in a "wanted" check on the automobile to determine if it were stolen. While waiting for the check to be run, Villegas circled the block. Finding the vehicle had been moved, Villegas searched the immediate area and then travelled the main thoroughfares, spotting the automobile turning onto Manchacha Road. Villegas testified he "made the traffic stop in the 3400 block of Manchacha Road" and "at this time I wanted to identify the driver." As Villegas approached the driver's side, a lady, identified in court as appellant, stepped out of the vehicle and started to meet him half way toward the rear of the automobile. Villegas asked to see her driver's license and appellant returned to her car and dumped the contents of her purse into the front seat. Villegas saw "a baggie with some type of pills in them". Over objection, Villegas said he asked appellant what the pills were and she replied, "You can have them", handing Villegas the baggie containing two white pills, one yellow one and one black pill. From his experience, Villegas determined the white pills were a controlled substance, "possibly Qualude", and appellant was placed under arrest. Witness Owen, a chemist and toxicologist for the City of Austin, testified the two white pills contained methaqualone and the black capsule contained amphetamine.

Officer Villegas' testimony concerning his reasons for stopping appellant's automobile is as follows:

"A At this time I stopped the vehicle to identify the driver, and I was still waiting for my 'wanted' check to come back from the computer.

Q (BY STATE'S ATTORNEY): You had not yet gotten your 'wanted' check back?

A No, sir, I hadn't gotten it yet.

A All right, sir.

A So I stopped the vehicle.

Q Now, your purpose in stopping the vehicle you say was to identify the driver?

A Yes, sir, and a return on my 'wanted' check to see if the vehicle was stolen or not.

Q (BY DEFENSE COUNSEL): So then after you saw this vehicle who had its parking lights on parked on this roadway, you decided when you saw that vehicle was gone, you decided you were going to stop that vehicle and make a further investigation?

A Yes, sir.

Q And you say that you stopped it for a traffic stop I believe that's the term you used?

A This traffic stop being for identification and the 'wanted' check.

Q So you at that time stopped that vehicle to make a driver's license check to see if that person had a driver's license?

A And to identify them and the owner of the car.

Q To identify that person and determine whether or not she owned that car?

A Yes, sir.

Q All right. Did you have any information at that time that that vehicle was stolen?

A Not at the time, no, sir.

Q Now, at the time that you pulled over this vehicle, that is at the time that you turned on your lights, which was a signal for her to stop, did you have any information that she had violated the law in any form or manner at that time?

A No, sir, I didn't."

Appellant contends the initial detention of her automobile was unauthorized, thus the evidence concerning the pills was inadmissible. The State contends the stop was justified under Art. 6687b, Sec. 13, V.T.C.S., which provides any peace officer may stop and detain any motor vehicle operator for the purpose of determining whether such person has a driver's license.

The State argues the fact that Officer Villegas' "interest might have first been triggered by other suspicious circumstances and no way detracts from" the authority granted by Art. 6687b, Sec. 13, supra. The State's position is "it is only necessary that a purpose in stopping the vehicle was to determine whether the driver had a valid driver's license", whereas appellant contends "the driver's license check must be the operative or dominant purpose behind the officer's decision to stop the vehicle."

This Court has upheld temporary detentions authorized by Art. 6687b, Sec. 13, supra, under circumstances which show the check of the driver's license is the sole purpose for the detention. See Tardiff v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 548 S.W.2d 380 (Department of Public Safety Officers were conducting a routine check of equipment and driver's licenses and were stopping every car on U.S. Highway 83 two...

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    ...a temporary investigation or detention because investigation is a lesser intrusion on personal security than an arrest. Fatemi v. State, 558 S.W.2d 463 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). An inarticulable hunch or suspicion that a person has or is committing a crime is not sufficient; a peace officer must h......
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