Faught v. State

• Decision Date: 16 December 1974
• Docket Number: No. 1--474A58,1--474A58
• Citation: 162 Ind.App. 436,319 N.E.2d 843
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court
• Parties: , 73 A.L.R.3d 8 Thomas M. FAUGHT, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.

Page 843

319 N.E.2d 843

162 Ind.App. 436, 73 A.L.R.3d 8

Thomas M. FAUGHT, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee.

No. 1--474A58.

Court of Appeals of Indiana, First District.

Dec. 16, 1974.

James D. Lopp, Sr. and James D. Lopp, Jr., Evansville, for defendant-appellant.

Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., G. Philip Duckwall, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.

LOWDERMILK, Judge.

Defendant-appellant, Faught, was charged, with others, with the offense of the armed robbery of a drug store on November 9, 1971.

Appellant Faught filed a special plea of insanity to which the State filed answer.

Trial was commenced before a jury on September 10, 1973, on which date the State filed a Motion in Limine over objection of appellant. The Motion in Limine was sustained and the court advised the parties that each witness would be instructed prior to the witness's testifying as to the contents of said motion.

The State and Faught entered into a written stipulation of facts. The stipulation was read to the jury by the court and the jury was instructed as to the effect of such stipulation.

At the close of the trial the jury returned its verdict of guilty of armed robbery, on which verdict the defendant was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment.

The first issue is whether it was error for the trial court to grant the State's Motion in Limine.

The morning of trial the State submitted to the trial court a Petition in Limine which, if granted, would have excluded evidence of the defendant's abstinence from drugs and any criminal behavior by the defendant after November 9, 1971. Over the objection of appellant Faught the Petition in Limine was granted and witnesses were instructed not to comment as to appellant Faught's criminal or drug related behavior after November 9, 1971.

We do not question the validity of the rule that sanity is a question of fact for the jury to be decided from all relevant evidence. Our decision in Faught v. State (1973), Ind.App., 293 N.E.2d 506, made it clear that the defendant may present all relevant, competent and material expert evidence pertaining to his state of mind at the time of the robbery. We note in Faught, supra, that the effect of deprivation of drugs on one addicted was competent as bearing on the defendant's mental condition at the time the crime was committed. Rogers v. State (1870), 33 Ind. 543.

We find no reason to depart from the reasoning or the holding in Faught, supra. Appellant Faught was entitled to present all relevant medical evidence as to his state of mind at the time the alleged offense was committed, including the effects of drug addition and/or withdrawal symptoms.

Appellant, however, urges reversal of his conviction because the State's Petition in Limine excluded evidence of 'abstinence from drugs or crime' after November 9, 1971.

We cannot agree with Faught's contention. Faught's evidence regarding his insanity covers 77 pages in the transcript. The four experts called by appellant exhaustively covered his family life, school incidents, peer pressure, his marriage and the characteristics of the drugs used by appellant, as well as partial and complete withdrawal from such drugs. This rather complete history of Faught's life and drug problems properly had some bearing on his alleged insanity. However, we do not find it was reversible error to grant the Petition in Limine which excluded evidence of appellant's conduct in jail and thereafter. In the course of the trial Faught's attorney made an offer to prove which shows on its face that Faught hoped to show that he was reformed from drug abuse and that he did not participate in a jail break. In our opinion, the exclusion of this proffered evidence is not reversible error, if it were error.

The purpose of a Motion in Limine is clearly set out in Baldwin v. Inter City Contractors Service, Inc. (1973), Ind.App. 297 N.E.2d 831, 834, where this court stated:

'. . . The exclusion by the trial court may encompass both prejudicial and irrelevant matter, but the primary purpose for granting the motion must be that the matter excluded would be prejudicial to the moving party. Burrus v. Silhavy (1973), Ind.App., 293 N.E.2d 794.'

The trial court could have reasonably concluded that the evidence excluded by the Motion in Limine was not relevant to the issue of sanity and was, in fact, prejudicial to the moving party. While it is true that Motions in Limine are to be used and granted in restrictive circumstances, it is also true that the trial court has full discretion to grant all or any portion of the State's Petition in Limine. In light of appellant's exhaustive evidence on insanity and the nature of the evidence which appellant was not permitted to present, we find the granting of the Motion in Limine was not error. The evidence excluded could well have unduly prejudiced the jurors in their consideration of other relevant evidence bearing on the question of insanity. It is our opinion that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's Petition in Limine

The second issue is whether the stipulation of facts was a de facto confession or guilty plea and in violation of Faught's constitutional rights.

At trial the defendant and the State entered into a stipulation of facts. The stipulation contained all of the evidence that was introduced at trial, with the exception of the evidence relating to the special plea of insanity. The stipulation stated that the defendant, in company with three other individuals, planned the robbery in question. The defendant and said individuals put on masks and went to the drug store and sought to obtain certain drugs. The method used to obtain these drugs was for the defendant and one of his companions to threaten the druggist with a gun and put him in fear of his life. Certain drugs and money were obtained in this manner, whereupon the defendant and the other individuals left the drug store and subsequently divided up the loot.

Appellant contends that he was denied a fair trial by reason of the introduction into evidence of the stipulation. Appellant urges that the stipulation had the effect of a legal confession, or, in the alternative, was, in effect, a guilty plea. Appellant further argues that if the stipulation is considered a confession or a plea of guilty that the record is devoid of any mention of the defendant being informed of his constitutional rights prior to the introduction of the stipulation. Thus, appellant contends that he was denied his constitutional rights by the introduction into evidence of the stipulation.

It is essential to a determination of this issue that the true purpose and effect of any stipulation of facts be set out. 26 I.L.E. Stipulations, § 1, p. 383, defines a stipulation as 'an agreement between counsel with respect to business before a court.' This general definition is expanded and explained by case law. In City of Indianapolis v. Link Realty Co. (1932), 94 Ind.App. 1, 20, 179 N.E. 574, 580, the court stated that:

'. . . As we view the stipulation, it meant nothing more than an agreement as to the facts therein contained, . . .'

Further, in the case of Schreiber v. Rickert (1943), 114 Ind.App. 55, 58, 50 N.E.2d 879, 880, the court explained a stipulation as 'an express waiver made in court or preparatory to trial, by the party or his attorney, conceding for the purposes of the trial the truthfulness of some alleged fact.' See also, Johnson v. State ex rel. Slinkard (1881), 80 Ind. 220.

From these cases it is apparent that a stipulation of facts when entered into is in lieu of testimony or evidence that would be given during the course of the trial. The parties, in effect, have agreed that the evidence contained in the stipulation would have been brought forth at trial. Once a stipulation is entered into between the parties it is the generally accepted rule that the facts so stipulated are conclusive upon both the parties and the tribunal. Bruggner et al. v. Shaffer (1965), 138 Ind.App. 183, 210 N.E.2d 439; Tahash, Supt., etc. v. Clements (1955), 234 Ind. 197, 125 N.E.2d 439; Bd. of Trustees, etc. et al. v. State ex rel. Russell (1966), 247 Ind. 570, 219 N.E.2d 886.

It has been held, however, that a stipulation of facts will not be construed to admit facts which were obviously intended to be controverted. Groves et al. v. Burton et al. (1954), 125 Ind.App. 302, 123 N.E.2d 204.

In our determination of this issue we must consider the facts stipulated as true and conclusive unless there is some showing that a fact so stipulated was obviously intended to be controverted by one of the parties.

A careful examination of the stipulation in question leads this court to the inescapable conclusion that said stipulation is nothing more than a stipulation of what the facts would be had the evidence been presented from the witness stand. We cannot agree with appellant's contention that the stipulation is a confession. Green v. State (1973), Ind.App., 304 N.E.2d 845. Nor can we agree with the alternative contention that the stipulation amounts to a plea of guilty. The stipulation in the case at bar is merely a vehicle for presenting facts from which the jury must make its conclusion as to guilt or innocence.

It is true that the stipulation sets forth facts from which the jury could reasonably find that the defendant committed the crime charged. However, in light of appellant's extensive evidence on the issue of his sanity at the time of the commission...