Faulk v. Bluitt, 10-05-00435-CV.
| Decision Date | 29 November 2006 |
| Docket Number | No. 10-05-00435-CV.,10-05-00435-CV. |
| Citation | 211 S.W.3d 418 |
| Parties | Isaac FAULK & Transit Mix Concrete & Materials Co., Appellants, v. Collie BLUITT, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Heather Bailey, New, Haynes & Boone LLP, Dallas, for appellants.
William J. Clay, Charles W. McGarry, Law Office of Charles W. McGarry, Dallas, Michael Ace, Michael Ace PC, Tyler, for appellee.
Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, Justice REYNA.
Collie Bluitt was injured in a motor vehicle accident when his car collided with a Transit Mix concrete truck being driven by Isaac Faulk. The evidence as to who caused the accident was controverted: Bluitt and his witness testified that Faulk swerved into Bluitt's lane and caused the accident, while Faulk and his witness testified that Faulk maintained his lane. The investigating police officer was unable to determine who caused the accident and did not assign fault to either driver.
At trial, the jury likewise had difficulty determining fault. The trial court submitted a three-question comparative negligence charge to the jury. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court, inquiring: The trial court responded with the following written instruction:
The jury then returned a verdict that neither Faulk nor Bluitt was negligent, but despite a conditioning instruction, answered Question No. 2 on the parties' comparative negligence:
Did the negligence, if any, of the persons named below proximately cause the collision in question?
Answer "Yes" or "No":
ANSWER:
Collie Bluitt NO
If you have answered "Yes" to Question No. 1 for more than one of those named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
The percentages you find must total 100 percent (100%). The percentages must be expressed in whole numbers....
What percentage of the negligence that caused the occurrence do you find to be attributable to each of those listed below and found by you in your answer to Question 1, to have been negligent?
a. Collie Bluitt 50%
b. Isaac Faulk 50%
Question 3 asked the jury to award damages; it was not preceded by a conditioning instruction. The jury answered it, awarding damages totaling $236,167.62.
Because of the jury's apparent confusion between findings of "no negligence" on each party and "equal negligence" of each party, combined with the jury's failure to follow the charge's conditioning instruction by answering Question 2, the trial court did not accept the verdict. The trial court sent the jury home with instructions to return the next day, and overnight the parties were permitted to brief the questions raised by the jury's answers. The next day, Faulk moved for a take-nothing judgment based on the jury's initial answer to Question 1. The trial court denied the motion and instead sent the jury to deliberate further with the following written instruction:
In Question Number 1 you have found that a preponderance of the evidence does not establish that either party was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the collision in question. The Court's previous instructions provide if you have answered yes to Question Number 1 for more than one of these named below, then answer the following question. Otherwise, do not answer the following question. Irrespective of this instruction to Question 2 you have assigned negligence to both parties. Please retire to consider these and previous instructions of the Court relative to Questions Number 1 and Number 2.
The jury deliberated further and then returned an 11-1 verdict. This time, on Question 1, the jury found that Bluitt was not negligent but that Faulk was. The previous "NO" answer for Faulk was scratched out and "YES" was written beside it. The jury changed its answers to Question 2, scratching out the "50%" answers for Bluitt and Faulk and writing "0%" for each with the word "BLANK" under each "0%".1 And finally, the jury changed its answers to Question 3, increasing its damages award to $318,667.50.
Faulk again moved for a take-nothing judgment based on the jury's first answers to Question 1, but the trial court entered judgment in Bluitt's favor, awarding him the sum of $318,667.50. Faulk and Transit Mix now appeal. We will affirm.
Faulk's first issue complains that the trial court erred when it resubmitted the charge to the jury because, Faulk asserts, there was a reasonable basis to reconcile the jury's apparently conflicting original answers to Questions 1 and 2. Faulk concludes that the trial court erred by not entering a take-nothing judgment against Bluitt based on the jury's original answers to Question 1.
Faulk correctly contends that a court has the duty to reconcile apparently conflicting jury findings. See Signal Oil & Gas v. Universal Oil Prod., 572 S.W.2d 320, 326 (Tex.1978). He states the correct question and test for when jury findings apparently conflict: whether there is any reasonable basis on which the apparently conflicting jury findings may be reconciled. See Bender v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 600 S.W.2d 257, 260 (Tex.1980). The "court must consider each of the answers claimed to be in conflict, disregarding the alleged conflicting answer but taking into consideration all of the rest of the verdict, and if, so considered, one of the answers would require a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the other would require a judgment in favor of the defendant, then the answers are fatally in conflict." Little Rock Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Dunn, 148 Tex. 197, 222 S.W.2d 985, 991 (1949); see Otis Spunkmeyer, Inc. v. Blakely, 30 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2000, no pet.). Faulk is also correct that, had the trial court accepted the jury's original answers, there would not have been a fatal conflict and the trial court should have entered a take-nothing judgment against Bluitt; the test is not met when the jury finds that a defendant is not negligent in the liability question but then apportions him a percentage of responsibility in the comparative negligence question. See Young v. Cox Foodarama, Inc., 672 S.W.2d 891, 892 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ); Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Hartman, 556 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1977, orig. proceeding); Ingles v. Cohen, 543 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd, n.r.e.).
But we agree with Bluitt that this case does not fall within the above rubric because the trial court did not accept the jury's verdict and instructed the jury to deliberate further. There is only one verdict in a case, and it is the one accepted and ordered filed by the trial court. McCarty v. Morrison, 468 S.W.2d 350, 351-52 (Tex.1971); Harris County v. Patrick, 636 S.W.2d 211, 212, 214 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1982, no writ); Robertson Tank Lines, Inc. v. Sawyer, 416 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ); see TEX.R. CIV. P. 293. The Dallas court recently observed:
It is well-settled law that a verdict does not become an official act that is effective in law until it has been received and accepted by the court. See Dilbeck v. Ideal Bread Co., 562 S.W.2d 563, 564 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1978, no writ); Jones v. Square Deal Cab Co., 501 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); King v. Smith, 459 S.W.2d 202, 204 (Tex.Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1970, no writ); Wheeler v. Oxford, 321 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1959, no writ); Lee v. Galbreath, 234 S.W.2d 91, 95 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.). It follows that, until such time as the trial court accepts the jury's verdict a judgment may not be rendered thereon.
In the present case, the trial court expressly refused to accept, as the jury's verdict, the jury's answers to the unamended charge. The trial court had no duty to render judgment on jury answers that had not yet been accepted as a verdict because such answers had no legal effect. See Dilbeck, 562 S.W.2d at 564; Jones, 501 S.W.2d at 748; King, 459 S.W.2d at 204; Wheeler, 321 S.W.2d at 190; Lee, 234 S.W.2d at 95.
Blakely, 30 S.W.3d at 692. Until the trial court accepts a verdict, jurors may change their vote and render a different verdict. See Sharp v. Reynolds, 395 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex.Civ.App.-Amarillo 1965, no writ); State v. Finch, 349 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. Civ.App.-San Antonio 1961, no writ); see also TEX.R. Civ. P. 294.
We thus focus on whether the trial court had discretion, under the circumstances of this case, not to accept the jury's original answers and to instruct the jury to deliberate further. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 295 controls; it provides:
If the purported verdict is defective, the court may direct it to be reformed. If it is incomplete, or not responsive to the questions contained in the court's charge, or the answers to the questions are in conflict, the court shall in writing instruct the jury in open court of the nature of the incompleteness, unresponsiveness, or conflict, provide the jury with such additional instructions as may be proper, and retire the jury for further deliberations.
TEX.R. Civ. P. 295 (emphases added). Rule 295 thus authorizes further instruction to the jury if the verdict is incomplete, nonresponsive to the questions contained in the court's charge, or contains answers that are in conflict. Fish v. Dallas ISD, 170 S.W.3d 226, 229 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied); Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Bohall, 114 S.W.3d 42, 46 (Tex.App.-Eastland 2003, no pet.); Patrick, 636 S.W.2d at 213. And...
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