Faulk v. State's Attorney for Harford County

• Decision Date: 07 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 155,155
• Parties: Curley L. FAULK v. STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR HARFORD COUNTY et al. Sept. Term 1982.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 493

299 Md. 493

474 A.2d 880

Curley L. FAULK v. STATE'S ATTORNEY FOR HARFORD COUNTY et al.

No. 155 Sept. Term 1982.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

May 7, 1984.

Motion for Reconsideration Denied June 7, 1984.

Diana G. Motz, Asst. Atty. Gen., Baltimore (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, on the brief), for appellees.

Stuart L. Alison, Bel Air (James A. Close, Bel Air, on the brief), for appellant.

Argued before MURPHY, C.J., and SMITH, ELDRIDGE, COLE, DAVIDSON, RODOWSKY and COUCH, JJ.

DAVIDSON, Judge.

This case presents the question whether Maryland Code (1957, 1980 Repl.Vol. & 1983 Cum.Supp.), Art. 76A, §§ 1 through 5A (Maryland Public Information Act) requires the disclosure of investigatory police reports compiled for law-enforcement purposes to a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding. Resolution of this question depends upon whether production of such reports would "interfere with valid and proper law-enforcement proceedings" within the meaning of Art. 76A, § 3(b)(i)(A). More particularly, the question presented is whether under § 3(b)(i)(A), in order to deny access to investigatory police reports to a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding, the State must present particularized evidence showing that the disclosure of such reports would interfere with the pending criminal proceedings or whether under such circumstances a generic determination of interference is appropriate. The relevant statutory provisions are Art. 76A, § 1A, § 2(a), § 3(a), § 3(b)(i), §§ 5(b)(1) and (3).

Article 76A, § 1A provides in pertinent part:

"[A]ll persons are entitled to information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and employees. To this end, the provisions of this act shall be construed in every instance with the view toward public access...."

Article 76A, § 2(a) provides in pertinent part:

"All public records ¹ shall be open for inspection by any person at reasonable times, except as provided in this article or as otherwise provided by law."

Article 76A, § 3(a) provides in pertinent part:

"The custodian of any public records shall allow any person the right of inspection of such records or any portion thereof except ... as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this section."

Article 76A, § 3(b)(i) provides:

"The custodian may deny the right of inspection of the following records or appropriate portions thereof, unless otherwise provided by law, if disclosure to the applicant ² would be contrary to the public interest:

"(i) Records of investigations conducted by, or of intelligence information or security procedures of, any sheriff, county attorney, city attorney, State's attorney, the Attorney General, police department, or any investigatory files compiled for any other law-enforcement, judicial, correctional, or prosecution purposes, but the right of a person in interest ³ to inspect the records may be denied only to the extent that the production of them would (A) interfere with valid and proper law-enforcement proceedings, (B) deprive another person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) disclose the identity of a confidential source, (E) disclose investigative techniques and procedures, (F) prejudice any investigation, or (G) endanger the life or physical safety of any person." (Emphasis added.)

Article 76A, § 5(b) provides in pertinent part:

"(1) On complaint of any person denied the right to inspect any record covered by this article, the circuit court in the jurisdiction in which ... the records are situated, has jurisdiction to enjoin the State, any county, municipality, or political subdivision, any agency, official or employee thereof, from withholding records and to order the production of any records improperly withheld from the complainant.... [T]he court may ... determine whether the records or any part thereof may be withheld under any of the exemptions set forth in § 3, and the burden is on the defendant to sustain its action....

* * *

"(3) Except as to cases the court considers of greater importance, proceedings before the court, as authorized by this section, and appeals therefrom shall take precedence on the docket over all other cases and shall be heard at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every way."

On 7 April 1981, certain invetigatory police reports concerning criminal offenses, allegedly committed by the petitioner, Curley L. Faulk (Faulk), were presented to the Grand Jury for Harford County. On that date, Faulk was indicted for, among other things, two separate burglaries.

On 9 April 1981, in the criminal proceedings pending in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Faulk filed a request for discovery pursuant to Maryland Rule 741 seeking the production of the investigatory police reports. The State refused to produce the requested reports. On 26 January 1982, the trial court denied Faulk's discovery request. The criminal proceedings are still pending.

On 17 April 1981, Faulk made a request to the State, premised upon the Maryland Public Information Act, to inspect and copy the investigatory police reports. The State denied that request.

On 24 April 1981, in the Circuit Court for Harford County, Faulk, pursuant to Art. 76A, § 5(b), filed a "Petition to Enforce Rights Under the Public Information Act" seeking, among other things, the production of the investigatory police reports. The State filed an answer and moved for summary judgment on the ground that disclosure of the investigatory police reports would interfere with the criminal proceedings then pending against Faulk. At a hearing, the State did not present any specific evidence to show that disclosure of the investigatory police reports would interfere with the then pending criminal proceedings. Nevertheless on 19 October 1981, the trial court granted the State's motion and entered an order dismissing Faulk's petition. On 4 November 1981, a motion for reconsideration was denied.

On 17 November 1981, Faulk appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Faulk v. State's Attorney for Harford County, 52 Md.App. 616, 451 A.2d 936 (1982). Faulk filed a petition for a writ of certiorari that we granted. We shall affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.

Here Faulk contends that under Art. 76A, § 3(b)(i)(A), in order to deny access to investigatory police reports to a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding, the State must present particularized evidence showing that the disclosure of such reports would interfere with the pending criminal proceeding. The State contends that under Art. 76A, § 3(b)(i)(A) a particularized case-by-case factual showing of interference is not required, and that a generic determination of interference can be made when a defendant in a pending criminal proceeding seeks access to investigatory police reports relating to pending criminal proceeding.

Similar contentions were considered by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978). That case arose under the federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976) (now 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982)) (FOIA). Section 552(b)(7)(A) (Exemption 7(A)) of that Act provided that the otherwise mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA did not apply to investigatory records compiled for law-enforcement purposes if disclosure would "interfere with enforcement proceedings."

In Robbins, an employer was denied access to certain written statements contained in an investigatory file compiled by the National Labor Relations Board (Board). The statements had been made by witnesses whom the Board intended to call at a pending unfair labor practice proceeding. The question presented was whether under Exemption 7(A) the Board was required to present particularized evidence showing that the disclosure of such statements would interfere with the pending unfair labor proceeding. The Supreme Court concluded that, when an unfair labor practice proceeding was pending, a particularized factual showing was not required and that a generic determination of interference was appropriate.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court made a detailed analysis of the legislative history of the FOIA. According to the Supreme Court, the FOIA, originally enacted in 1966 by Pub.L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, then codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1964 & Supp. III), was broadly conceived. Its purpose was to provide the public the right of access to government information. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79-80, 93 S.Ct. 827, 832, 35 L.Ed.2d 119 (1973). Its basic policy was in favor of disclosure. It mandated disclosure of certain records in the possession of certain agencies unless the requested records were within the scope of a statutory exemption. A person denied the right to inspect any record covered by the FOIA had the right to expedited judicial review. In such a judicial proceeding, the burden was on the public official denying the right to inspect to show that the requested records were within the scope of a statutory exemption. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3). ⁴

Nine statutory exemptions were originally embodied in the FOIA. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). One of these, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (Exemption 7), provided that the otherwise mandatory disclosure requirements of the FOIA did not apply to:

"investigatory files compiled for law enforcement purposes except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency."

With respect to the purpose of Exemption 7 as originally enacted, the Supreme Court, at 437 U.S. 224-25, 98 S.Ct. 2318, said:

"In originally enacting Exemption 7, Congress recognized that law enforcement agencies had legitimate needs to keep certain records confidential, lest the agencies be hindered in their investigations or placed at a disadvantage when it came time to...