Faulkner v. California Toll Bridge Authority

• Decision Date: 25 February 1953
• Citation: 253 P.2d 659,40 Cal.2d 317
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: FAULKNER et al. v. CALIFORNIA TOLL BRIDGE AUTHORITY et al. Sac. 6377.

Page 659

253 P.2d 659

40 Cal.2d 317

FAULKNER et al. v. CALIFORNIA TOLL BRIDGE AUTHORITY et al.

Sac. 6377.

Supreme Court of California, in Bank.

Feb. 25, 1953.

Byers, Burd & Fraser, Berkeley, for appellants.

Edmund G. Brown, Atty. Gen., E. G. Funke, Asst. Atty. Gen., Ralph W. Scott. Deputy Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Reed. Atty. for Dept. of Public Works of the State, Sacramento, for respondents.

SCHAUER, Justice.

Plaintiffs ¹ appeal from a judgment entered on the sustaining without leave to amend of defendants' ² general demurrer to plaintiffs' complaint for injunction, mandamus, and general relief. In plaintiffs' language, 'This is an action to restrain the California Toll Bridge Authority and the Department of Public Works from proceeding with the construction and financing of the Richmond-San Rafael Bridge * * * The complaint seeks a temporary restraining order and a preliminary and permanent injunction restraining Defendants from proceeding with the proposed construction work and the financing thereof. Also sought are a * * * judgment declaring invalid certain resolutions of Defendants * * * and the acts of Defendants committed pursuant thereto, and a writ of mandate to compel the California Toll Bridge Authority to grant Plaintiffs herein a fair and adequate hearing on the question of whether a bridge or an earth fill type of crossing should be built.' We have concluded that the demurrer was properly sustained and that the judgment should be affirmed.

The complaint, framed in five causes of action, is based upon three theories. So far as here material, allegations common to all causes of action are: On September 23, 1952, defendants held a hearing in Sacramento concerning the proposed construction of a highway toll bridge (hereinafter termed the bridge) between Richmond and San Rafael (i. e., between the County of Contra Costa and the County of Marin), which was continued to September 26, 1952. On the latter date, in Sacramento, defendant California Toll Bridge Authority (hereinafter termed the authority) 'adopted a resolution approving the opinion, determination, and recommendation of the Department of Public Works to construct the * * * Bridge, and authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds to obtain funds for construction * * *; said Authority also adopted a resolution directing the preparation of a resolution authorizing the issuance of toll bridge revenue bonds and an Official Statement in connection therewith.' On November 7, 1952, the authority adopted the following resolutions: (a) 'authorizing the creation of an issue of not exceeding $72,000,000 Richmond-San Rafael Toll Bridge Revenue Bonds and providing for the initial issuance of $62,000,000 principal amount of Series A bonds'; (b) 'approving the official statement of the Authority relating to said Series A Bonds'; (c) 'authorizing the sale of Series A bonds for the purpose of providing funds for the construction of the Bridge and directing publication of Notice of Sale of' such bonds; (d) 'directing the Department of Public Works to call for bids on construction of the substructure and superstructure of said Bridge; * * * and to fix the date for the opening of said bids at not later than December 22, 1952.'

Plaintiffs' first theory (upon which their first three alleged causes of action are based) is that the authority's resolutions of September 26 and of November 7, 1952, constituted 'regulations' within the meaning of the sections of the California Administrative Procedure Act (hereinafter termed the act) governing 'quasi-legislative' action of administrative agencies, and that the authority's admitted failure to comply with such sections in connection with the resolutions was unlawful.

The act is set forth in Chapters 4 and 5 of Title 2, Division 3, Part 1, of the Government Code, and it is upon certain provisions of Chapter 4 (i. e., sections 11370-11445) that plaintiffs rely.

Section 11371 provides, so far as here material, that as used in Chapter 4 "Regulation' means every rule, regulation, order, or standard of general application * * * adopted by any state agency ³ to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by it, or to govern its procedure, except one which relates only to the internal management of the state agency.' Section 11380 requires that 'Every state agency shall: (a) File with the Secretary of State a certified copy of every regulation adopted by it except one which: (1) Establishes or fixes rates, prices or tariffs. (2) Relates to the use of public works, including streets and highways, under the jurisdiction of any state agency when the effect of such order is indicated to the public by means of signs or signals. (3) Is directed to a specifically named person or to a group of persons and does not apply generally throughout the State * * *' Sections 11409 through 11415 provide for publication in the California Administrative Code (and Register) of all regulations required to be filed with the Secretary of State, and for sale of copies of such Code and Register. Sections 11420 through 11427 have as their purpose the establishment of 'basic minimum procedural requirements for the adoption, amendment or repeal of administrative regulations * * * (which) are applicable to the exercise of any quasi-legislative power conferred by any statute heretofore or hereafter enacted * * *' except that they do not apply 'to any regulation not required to be filed with the Secretary of State * * *' (§§ 11420, 11421 ⁴.)

It is plaintiffs' contention that the authority's resolutions here involved were 'regulations' required to be filed with the Secretary of State under the provisions of section 11380, that adoption by the authority of such resolutions constituted exercise of a 'quasi-legislative power,' and that the authority's failure to comply with section 11380 and with the procedural requirements of sections 11420 through 11427 was therefore unlawful and renders invalid the resolutions and any action taken thereunder.

We are of the view, however, that defendants are correct in their position that the resolutions were not of 'general application * * * adopted * * * to implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by' the authority 'or to govern its procedure,' and hence, regardless of how they might be described or identified otherwise, do not fall within the definition (§ 11371) of a regulation which must be filed with the Secretary of State. Rather, they were adopted for particular application to the subject of either approving or disapproving, under the provisions of the California Toll Bridge Authority Act (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 3000 et seq.), the recommendation of the Department of Public Works that the bridge be constructed, and of authorizing the issuance of revenue bonds following approval of such recommendation (Sts. & Hy. Code, § 30200 ⁵). Plaintiffs argue that the resolutions are of general application in that the tolls to be collected on the bridge affect the public generally, and that the bonds to be issued may be purchased by any one in the world. However, inasmuch as the 'application' so urged by plaintiffs relates to only one particular bridge, and solely to the specific project described, and as the resolutions (as alleged) do not purport to treat generally with, for instance, all bridges or all toll bridges or any open class under the jurisdiction of the authority, we are satisfied that plaintiff's position in this respect is without merit. Moreover, it is to be noted that section 11380 (Gov.Code) expressly excepts a regulation which 'Establishes or fixes rates, prices or tariffs,' or 'Is directed to a specifically named person or to a group of persons and does not apply generally throughout the State.'

Furthermore, it appears that the pertinent resolutions are not calculated or effective to 'implement, interpret, or make specific the law enforced or administered by' the authority (§ 11371), but rather that they were adopted in the course of compliance with the statutory mandate that the authority act, one way or the other, upon the recommendation of the Department of Public Works that the bridge be constructed (§ 30200, Sts. & Hy.Code). In other words, the resolutions constituted steps in the performance of a statutory duty, rather than acts which would 'implement, interpret, or make specific the law.'

Since the resolutions do not fall within the definition of a 'regulation' required to be filed with the Secretary of State, it becomes unnecessary to determine whether the authority, in adopting them, was exercising a 'quasi-legislative power' as that term is used in section 11420 of the Government Code.

Plaintiffs' second theory forms the basis of their fourth alleged cause of action. They aver that a portion of the proposed Richmond-San Rafael Bridge will be within ten miles of the San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, that revenue bonds are still outstanding against the latter bridge, and that such bonds were on November 27, 1951, authorized by the authority and issued, but 'were dated and bore interest from September 1, 1951.' It is plaintiffs' contention that construction of the new bridge would violate the so-called ten mile limit within which the law once provided (Sts. & Hy.Code, §§ 30350, 30351) that other crossings should not be constructed while revenue bonds were 'outstanding' against the Bay Bridge. It may further be noted that under section 30353, Streets and Highways Code, the prohibitions of the ten mile limit 'constitute a contract to that effect for the benefit of the holders of' outstanding bonds.

By a 1951 amendment of section 30354 of the Streets and Highways Code, effective September 22, 1951, a highway bridge or other crossing between the County of Marin and the County of Contra Costa was excepted from such ten mile limit. Plaintiffs argue that since the Bay Bridge bonds are dated September 1, 1951, they, or their subsequent...