Faulkner v. Children
| Decision Date | 07 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 15-852 CG/LAM,CV 15-852 CG/LAM |
| Parties | JAMES FAULKNER and KYM FAULKNER, in their Individual Capacity and as Parents and Next Friends of J.F., a Minor Child, Plaintiffs, v. NEW MEXICO CHILDREN, YOUTH AND FAMILIES DEPARTMENT, YOLANDA DEINES, RICHARD GLASCOE, JODI L. KIRKPATRICK, HEATHER BROWN ELLIS, MARSHA BUESGUENS, JACKIE BURNS, and STACY GLEATON, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before the Court upon Defendant Jodi L. Kirkpatrick's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Damages and Memorandum in Support Thereof ("Motion"), (Doc. 9), filed October 1, 2015; Plaintiffs' Response in Opposition to Defendant Jodi Kirkpatrick's 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint ("Response"), (Doc. 14), filed October 15, 2015; and Defendant Kirkpatrick's Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint for Damages [Doc. 9] ("Reply"), (Doc. 19), filed November 5, 2015. After reviewing the briefs, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss should be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This case was filed by Plaintiffs James and Kym Faulkner on behalf of their minor child, J.F., after he allegedly suffered serious and disturbing abuse at the hands of his foster parents while in foster care. The facts are alleged as follows: Defendants Richard Glascoe and Jodi L. Kirkpatrick (the "Glascoe Defendants") were approved and certified by the New Mexico Children Youth and Families Department ("CYFD") to provide foster care and placement for minor children in the custody of CYFD. (Doc. 1-1 at 2 ¶ 7). J.F. came in to the custody of CYFD before he was three years old, (Id. at 2 ¶ 2, 4 ¶19), and was involuntarily placed in the Glascoe Defendants' custody by CYFD for several periods of time between 2003 and 2006. (Id. at 4 ¶¶ 21-22, 8 ¶ 50). While J.F. was in the custody of the Glascoe Defendants, J.F. was subjected to severe sexual and emotional abuse at the hands of his foster parents. (Id. at 5 ¶ 29, 6-7 ¶ 35). Plaintiffs allege that CYFD and its employees, who are named as individual defendants in this case, either knew, or should have known, of the danger presented by the Glascoe foster home. (Id. at 4 ¶ 23). At all relevant times, the Glascoe Defendants acted in their capacities as foster parents, as agents of CYFD under the foster parent license, and under the control of CYFD. (Id. at 2 ¶ 7).
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint for Damages ("Complaint"), (Doc. 1-1), on September 22, 2015 in the District Court of Santa Fe County, First Judicial District, State of New Mexico ("State District Court"), alleging claims against several defendants. As is relevant here, Plaintiffs claim that Defendant Jodi L. Kirkpatrick ("Defendant") violated J.F.'s constitutional rights to bodily integrity and to be free fromharm while in foster care. (Doc. 1-1 at 8-9). Plaintiffs additionally state that, as a result, J.F. suffered severe injuries and seek compensation for those injuries under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also allege negligence claims under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act for Defendant's failure to warn and to protect J.F. against the severe harm inflicted by her husband, Richard Glascoe, who is also a defendant in this case. (Id. at 9-10).
Thereafter, the case was removed to this Court on September 24, 2015. (Doc. 1). Defendant then filed her Motion to Dismiss pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. In the Motion, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because, as a foster parent, Defendant did not act under color of state law for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 9). Further, even if Defendant could be considered a state actor under § 1983, Defendant contends that she is entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' constitutional claims. Finally, Defendant maintains that she is immune from Plaintiffs' negligence claims, and that those claims should also be dismissed.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a complaint must contain a "short and plain" statement of: (1) the ground supporting the court's jurisdiction; (2) the claim showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a). A defendant may move the court to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain allegations of fact that, taken as true, "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw reasonable inferences that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680 (2009). "The nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context." Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). While the court must accept as true all of the allegations in the complaint, the court need not grant the same deference to conclusory statements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Moreover, "a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action" will not suffice to state a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Dismissal with prejudice is appropriate where a complaint fails to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and granting leave to amend would be futile. Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir. 2006).
"The doctrine of qualified immunity protects government officials 'from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). It is an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation, and acts as an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. Jiron v. City of Lakewood, 392 F.3d 410, 414 (10th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
Where a defendant raises the defense of qualified immunity, the court must determine whether the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that: (1) the defendant's actions violated her constitutional or statutory rights; and (2) whether that right was clearlyestablished at the time of the alleged misconduct. Riggins v. Goodman, 572 F.3d 1101, 1107 (10th Cir. 2009). "If a plaintiff fails to satisfy either part of the two-part inquiry, the court must grant the defendant qualified immunity." Medina v. Cram, 252 F.3d 1124, 1128 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995)). Thus, a court may consider either prong of the qualified immunity analysis. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236.
In her Motion, Defendant argues that, accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, acting as a foster parent licensed by the State of New Mexico is insufficient to render her a state actor for purposes of § 1983. (Doc. 9 at 4-8). Defendant next contends that, even if this Court finds that Defendant acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983, Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity. (Id. at 8). Finally, as to Plaintiffs' state negligence claims, Defendant contends that Defendant, as a public employee acting within the scope of her duties as a foster parent, is immune from liability under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act ("NMTCA"). (Id. at 10).
Plaintiffs respond that, given New Mexico's regulation of foster homes, and the fact that the State has accepted responsibility for a foster parent's actions, there is a sufficient nexus and entwinement between the State and foster parents to render New Mexico foster parents state actors. (Doc. 14 at 3-7).Plaintiffs also argue that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity because she violated J.F.'s clearly established constitutional right to be reasonably safe from harm by state officials. (Doc. 14 at 8-9). As to Plaintiffs' state negligence claims, Plaintiffs respond that this exact issue has already been decided by the State District Court prior to removal of this case, and thatthis court found that Defendant had waived her immunity under the NMTCA. (Id. at 9-10). Pursuant to the law of the case doctrine, Plaintiffs argue that this Court is precluded from reconsidering the question of waiver of immunity under the NMTCA. (Id. at 10).
First, Defendant argues that, accepting the allegations in the Complaint as true, she did not act under color of state law. Defendant contends that acting as a foster parent licensed by the State of New Mexico is insufficient to render her a state actor for purposes of § 1983, citing to several cases from other jurisdictions in support.
Plaintiffs respond that the State of New Mexico maintains extensive control over foster homes through a detailed regulatory framework and that foster parents are included as "public employees" under the NMTCA. Given the State's regulations of foster homes, and the fact that the State has accepted responsibility for a foster parent's actions, Plaintiffs argue that there is a sufficient nexus and entwinement between the State and foster parents to render New Mexico foster parents state actors.
A civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be brought against a "person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges,...
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