Faulkner v. Franco
| Decision Date | 25 November 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 15-0493 MCA/CEG,CV 15-0493 MCA/CEG |
| Parties | JOHN ANTHONY FAULKNER, Petitioner, v. GERMAN FRANCO, Warden, and HECTOR H. BALDERAS, New Mexico Attorney General, Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on John Anthony Faulkner's Petition brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in state custody filed on June 10, 2015, and his numerous Declarations, (Docs. 1, 3, 18, 20, 21, & 22), (together the "Petition")1; Respondents' Answer to Pro Se Petitioner John Anthony Faulkner's Petition for Relief for Writ of Habeas Corpus (28 U.S.C. § 2254) [Doc. 1], filed on August 6, 2015, (Doc. 13), with Respondents' Notice of Errata filed August 17, 2015, (Doc. 15) (together the "Answer"); Petitioner's Writ to Grant Petitioner[']s Relief filed August 20, 2015, (Doc. 14); and Respondents' Response in Opposition to John Anthony Faulkner's Writ to Grant Petitioner[']s Relief [Doc. 14] filed August 20, 2015. (Doc. 16).
Petitioner is in the custody of Respondent German Franco, Warden of the Penitentiary of New Mexico, and seeks federal habeas relief on the basis that his conviction was obtained in violation of federal law and the Constitution of the United States. (Doc. 1 at 1-15). Petitioner raises various claims for review under 28 U.S.C. §2254, including that he: (1) was deprived due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (2) received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (3) has been subject to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Respondents German Franco and Hector H. Balderas contend that Petitioner has not suffered a violation of any federal law or federal constitutional provision to mandate the granting of federal habeas relief. (Doc. 13). They also assert that certain claims in the Petition are unexhausted, but explain that they explicitly waive this argument in lieu of asking the Court to find that all of Petitioner's claims are plainly meritless and dismiss them with prejudice accordingly. (Id. at 8 n.4).
United States Chief District Judge M. Christina Armijo referred this case to this Court to make findings of fact, conduct legal analysis, and recommend an ultimate disposition. (Doc. 4). Having reviewed the pleadings, the entire state court record, and relevant law, the Court recommends that the Petition be denied and dismissed with prejudice, and that a certificate of appealability also be denied.
On May 22, 2009, Petitioner was convicted of several criminal counts in two separate proceedings in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Eddy County ("state district court"). (Doc. 13-1, Exs. C & H). In Cause Number D-503-CR-200900024, Petitioner pled no contest to one count of third-degree aggravated battery against a household member, and one count of fourth-degree aggravated assault against a household member. (Id., Ex. C). In exchange for Petitioner's plea of no contest, he was sentenced to a total concurrent term of four years of imprisonment. (Id., Ex. A at 1-2).
In Cause Number D-503-CR-200900026, Petitioner pled no contest to a third-degree felony offense of attempt to commit trafficking by manufacturing. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. H). He was sentenced to another four-year term of imprisonment for that count, to be served consecutively with the aforementioned term. (Id., Exs. A & G).
Since both sentences were entered on July 2, 2009, and Petitioner did not pursue direct appeal in either matter, the judgments became final on August 3, 2009. Petitioner instead filed a state habeas petition in state district court in the assault and battery case only; the state habeas petition was docketed on June 10, 2010 by the state district court. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. D). Based on the administrative record of the state district court, it is not entirely clear what, if anything, became of that state habeas petition. (Doc. 13 at 2). The record shows that Petitioner subsequently filed two separate requests that the respondent in that case answer his state habeas petition. (Doc. 13-1, Exs. E & F). A handwritten notation on one of the requests indicates that the petition may have been denied. (Id., Ex. F). Respondents, however, maintain that no order by the state district court exists in the record denying the petition. (Doc. 13 at 2).
On or around May 8, 2015, Petitioner filed for habeas relief for a second time with the state district court, this time seeking to challenge the convictions in both of the criminal cases. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. J). Petitioner alleged, inter alia, that: (i) since July 2005, he has been the subject of mental torture by the CIA; (ii) the CIA conspired to have him imprisoned; (iii) he pled no contest to the assault and battery charges under duress because the CIA was inflicting torture on him; (iv) that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the assault and battery charges and that he did not actually commit those crimes, and his counsel should not have permitted him to plead no contest to thosecounts; (v) conflicting testimony presented at a preliminary hearing in the attempted trafficking case required that the trafficking charge be dismissed. (Id.).
The state district court noted that Petitioner's complaints largely did not state grounds for habeas relief. (Doc. 13-1, Ex. K at 3). It found that "Petitioner state[d] nothing rationally based indicating any malfeasance or ineffective on the part of his counsel beginning from the time when charges were brought through change of plea and sentencing." (Id.). Moreover, it would not permit Petitioner to withdraw his pleas in the two cases because it would greatly prejudice the State since over six years had elapsed from the time the case was filed. (Id.). For those reasons, the second state habeas petition was denied on May 8, 2015. (Id.). Petitioner filed the Petition for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 approximately one month later.
Petitioner claims that he is entitled to relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because he: (i) was denied due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the assault and battery case and attempted trafficking case; (ii) he received ineffective assistance of counsel; and (iii) he has been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment since being incarcerated. Respondents maintain that Petitioner has failed to set forth any viable claims for habeas relief, and ask that this Court deny the Petition and dismiss all of his claims with prejudice.
As a preliminary matter, the Court recommends finding Petitioner's assertion that Respondents filed an untimely answer is without merit. (Doc. 14).2 Because the Answerwas filed within the time frame allotted by the Court, (see Docs. 12, 13), Petitioner's assertion is flatly incorrect. See § 2254 Rule 5(a) () The Court therefore proceeds to the merits of Respondent's arguments.
This Court's ability to consider collateral attacks of state criminal proceedings is circumscribed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254, as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, district courts can "entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a).
If the petitioner's claims have been decided on the merits in state court proceedings, then the federal habeas court may only grant relief under two circumstances: (i) if the State court decision was "contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States"; or (ii) if the State court decision "resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
However, "[t]hese AEDPA principles require a state decision on the merits to which the federal courts can defer." Revilla v. Gibson, 283 F.3d 1203, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Therefore, "[i]f a claim was not resolved by the state courts on the merits and is not otherwise procedurally barred, our standard of review is moresearching . . . because § 2254(d)'s deferential standards of review do not apply . . . ." Thacker v. Workman, 678 F.3d 820, 829 (10th Cir. 2012).3
The Court reads Petitioner's due process claims as challenging: (1) the validity of his no contest pleas and (2) the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him.
"'If a defendant's guilty plea or no contest plea is not . . . voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void.'" Tovar Mendoza v. Hatch, 620 F.3d 1261, 1269 (10th Cir. 2010) (brackets omitted) (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 n. 5 (1969)). The test is "whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant." Id. (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985)).
Petitioner claims that "CIA agents tortured [him]/cause emotional distress until [he] plead [sic] no-contest." (Doc. 1 at 5). Petitioner makes repeated reference to a purported CIA conspiracy against him to support numerous claims, including his due process claim:
The CIA acted like and or their agents were rapeing [sic] my wife[.] [T]hey followed me around and made me fight sometimes 3 agents sometimes 4 times a day even with a broken hand they said I had to do this to get my wife back and get a job driving a car for them (transportation) pippa-CR [sic]. They tortured my [sic] by intentionally inflection [sic] emotional distress and I made a no...
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