Faus v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 28 November 1956
• Citation: 146 Cal.App.2d 370,303 P.2d 814
• Parties: L. C. FAUS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PACIFIC ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant. Civ. 21743.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 814

303 P.2d 814

146 Cal.App.2d 370

L. C. FAUS, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PACIFIC ELECTRIC RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Defendant and Appellant.

Civ. 21743.

District Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Nov. 28, 1956.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 27, 1956.

Hearing Denied Jan. 23, 1957.

E. D. Yeomans and Roger M. Sullivan, Los Angeles, for appellant.

Holbrook, Tarr, Carter & O'Neill, W. Summer Holbrook, Jr., and Francis H. O'Neill, Los Angeles, for respondent.

VALLEE, Justice.

Appeal by defendant from an adverse judgment in a suit to quiet title and for possession of realty which had been used by defendant as a portion of its right of way in the County of Los Angeles.

In 1897 Pedro Batz, the then owner, by grant deed conveyed a large parcel of land to Charles Emery. The deed included the property which is the subject of this suit. ¹

On August 28, 1901 Charles and Irene Emery by grant deed conveyed four parcels of the 'land' containing about 7.55 acres to Los Angeles and Pasadena Electric Railway Company, a corporation, 'for the uses and purposes and under the limitations hereinafter provided,' described as follows:

'1. A strip of land 60 feet in width [metes and bounds description].'

'2. A strip of land 60 feet in width [metes and bounds description].'

'3. A triangular piece of land [metes and bounds description].'

'4. A triangular piece of land [metes and bounds description].'

The deed contained the following pertinent provisions:

'And it is further understood, stipulated and agreed that this conveyance is made and delivered by the said grantors and received and accepted by the said grantees, upon, under and subject to the following conditions subsequent to be kept and performed by the party of the second part, is successors and assigns, that is to say: That the said main and branch lines of said electric railway shall be constructed, upon the lands hereby granted * * *; That after such construction said railway line shall be continuously operated * * *; That no part of said lands hereby conveyed shall be used * * * for any other than for the legitimate railroad purposes hereinabove set forth and provided; And upon the breach of any one of the aforesaid conditions subsequent the said parties of the first part, their heirs or assigns without paying any compensation for any buildings or other improvements or betterments that may then be upon said premises, and without making any compensation or incurring any liability for damages or losses of any kind growing out of such reentry, may reeter in and upon, and take possession of the said strips and parcels of land hereby granted, and the whole thereof, and each and every portion thereof, and have and enjoy the same forever as and of their former estate, and in all respects as if these presents had never been made or delivered, anything herein contained to the contrary thereof notwithstanding; And the party of the second part, its successors and assigns shall upon such breach immediately surrender possession of the said premises, and of each and every part thereof, and shall forfeit all rights thereto acquired hereunder.' ²

The four parcels were acquired by defendant from Los Angeles and Pacific Electric Railway Company prior to 1911.

On May 17, 1904 the Emerys by grant deed conveyed two parcels of land containing 2.21 acres to defendant 'for the use and purposes only and subject to the limitations hereinafter provided those certain pieces or parcels of land situate in said County of Los Angeles' described as follows:

'First: A strip of land of irregular width [metes and bounds description]. Together with the right to construct and maintain upon land adjoining the above described strip of land * * * side slopes.'

'Second: A strip of land of irregular width [metes and bounds description]. Together with the right to construct and maintain upon land adjoining the above described strip of land * * * side slopes.'

The deed states that the parties agreed the conveyance was made 'subject to the following conditions, subsequent to be kept and performed by the said party of the second part, its successors and assigns, that is to say: That said described land is to be used in conjunction with the said lands conveyed by said deed to the Los Angeles and Pacific Electric Railway Company as a right of way for the railroad tracks * * * and for no other purpose whatsoever, * * * That the railway tracks which now are or may hereafter be placed upon the land hereby conveyed * * * shall be used only for the purposes of through travel. * * *' This deed contained a provision similar to that in the 1901 deed with respect to the right of re-entry. ³

Mrs. Emery died in 1907. No claim is made that she had any right in the subject property. Mr. Emery died in 1915. His estate was probated in the superior court of San Benito County. On September 5, 1916 that court by its final decree of distribution appointed Lucien Oudin testamentary trustee of and distributed the entire estate to him in trust with directions to sell all real property situated in California.

On December 21, 1921 Oudin, as trustee, by grant deed conveyed to F. M. Prescott substantially all the land originally acquired by Emery from Batz and including within its boundaries the subject property, together with a large parcel not acquired from Batz, with this exception:

'Excepting however, from the parcel above described [substantially all of the land originally acquired by Emery from Batz in 1897] the following, to-wit: * * *

'Fourth. Those certain pieces or parcels of the southeast quarter of section eight (8) and of the northeast quarter of the northwest quarter of section seventeen (17) township 1 south range 12 west S.B.B. and M. conveyed to Pacific Electric Railway Company, a corporation, or its predecessor, for a right of way and for depot purposes, said parcels being particularly described in deeds dated May 17, 1904, recorded in Book 2100 at page 248 of Deeds and dated August 28, 1901, recorded in Book 1490 of Deeds at page 173 records of Los Angeles County.'

On January 9, 1922 Prescott by grant deed conveyed the property described in his deed from Oudin to Title Insurance & Trust Company. This deed contained the same exception as in the deed from Oudin to Prescott.

On September 20, 1922 Title Insurance & Trust Company released and quitclaimed to defendant all its right, title and interest in the property described in the Emery deeds of 1901 and 1904.

In September 1951 defendant, with the permission of the Public Utilities Commission, ceased operating railroad lines on the property conveyed by the deeds of 1901 and 1904, and removed all its rails.

Oudin died and Waller Taylor II was appointed trustee of the Emery testamentary trust in his place. On December 29, 1953 Taylor executed a quitclaim deed of the subject property to plaintiff. Plaintiff brought this suit to quiet title and for possession of the property, claiming under the re-entry clauses in the deeds of 1901 and 1904. The judgment decreed plaintiff is the owner in fee simple and entitled to possession of the property from and after the abandonment of the property by defendant in 1951, excepting certain portions acquired in 1947 by Alhambra for street-widening purposes by eminent domain proceedings and subject to certain public easements which had been executed and recorded by defendant as conditional grantee of the property prior to its abandonment of the property on September 30, 1951. Defendant appeals.

Defendant's first contention is that the deed from Taylor to plaintiff did not convey the reversionary rights. It is argued that whether the fee or an easement was conveyed by the deeds of 1901 and 1904, the reversionary rights were conveyed with the surrounding property by the deed from Oudin to Prescott and they were subsequent released to defendant by Prescott's successor, Title Insurance & Trust Company. Defendants urged below that the Oudin-Prescott deed is indefinite and uncertain in that it cannot be ascertained therefrom whether the reversionary rights were conveyed thereby. They further contended it was the intention of Oudin to convey such rights. In support of their contention they relied on a provision in Mr. Emery's will directing the testamentary trustee 'to sell all of my real property situated in the State of California,' and a report made by Oudin to the superior court of San Benito County that he had sold 'all said real property in California' except a parcel in Santa Barbara County. The court found that defendant is not the owner or entitled to the possession of the land conveyed by the 1901 and 1904 deeds, thereby impliedly finding that the Oudin-Prescott deed did not convey the reversionary rights.

Defendant says we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the Oudin-Prescott deed. The same contention with respect to a trial court's construction of a written contract was made in Overton v. Vita-Food Corp., 94 Cal.App.2d 367, at page 370, 210 P.2d 757, at page 759, in which we said:

'Appellant first says that we are not bound by the trial court's construction of the contract and are called upon to determine its meaning as a matter of law. Counsel cite Moore v. Wood, 26 Cal.2d 621, 630, 160 P.2d 772, In re Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352, 131 P.2d 825, and Texas Co. v. Todd, 19 Cal.App.2d 174, 185, 64 P.2d 1180. This rule applies only where the trial court's decision was based solely on the terms of the written instrument. Union Nat. Bank of Pasadena v. Hunter, 93 Cal.App.2d [669, 673] 209 P.2d 621. This was the situation in the cases cited by counsel. The rule is otherwise where parol evidence is introduced in aid of interpretation of the contract and where the evidence is such that conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom. In such case the rule is that a reviewing court will accept or adhere to the interpretation of a contract adopted by the trial court...