Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Central Insurance Co.

Citation159 N.W.2d 268,280 Minn. 325
Decision Date24 May 1968
Docket NumberNo. 40883,40883
PartiesFAWCETT HOUSE, INC., Respondent, v. GREAT CENTRAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant.
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. An ambiguous exclusionary clause in a contract of insurance will be construed against the insurer.

2. Recovery under a policy of insurance which excluded 'any loss resulting from change in temperature or humidity' must be affirmed where the acts of vandals--a specifically covered risk--in shutting off plaintiff's heating system during freezing temperatures directly caused the condition which permitted the heating and plumbing system to freeze.

Jesse & Cosgrove, Minneapolis, for appellant.

Nolan, Alderman & Holden, and Richard H. Breen, Brainerd, for respondent.

Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and ROGOSHESKE, SHERAN, PETERSON, and FRANK T. GALLAGHER, JJ.

OPINION

ROGOSHESKE, Justice.

Defendant appeals from an order denying its motion for judgment n.o.v. or for a new trial and from the judgment.

In accordance with the jury's answers to questions submitted by special verdict, the trial court ordered judgment of $14,600 against defendant upon plaintiff's claim that the destruction of its heating and plumbing system as a result of a freeze-up and the accompanying damage to its premises (known as the Fawcett House) was covered by a casualty insurance policy underwritten by defendant. It is undisputed that the loss and damage resulted from the freeze-up which followed the acts of vandals who broke into and entered plaintiff's premises in Crow Wing County between January 8 and January 10, 1966, and, among other things, turned off the electric power which activated the heating system.

The single question presented on appeal is whether the casualty for which compensation is claimed was covered by the insurance contract. The basis of defendant's appeal is the assertion that the policy of insurance in plain and unambiguous language excludes the risk of loss such as occurred here by reason of paragraph 4 of a policy endorsement which, after providing coverage for 'direct loss by Vandalism and Malicious Mischief,' excludes from coverage losses--

'(d) from depreciation, delay, deterioration or loss of market; nor, unless specifically endorsed hereon, for any loss resulting from change in temperature or humidity.'

Defendant argues that the words 'any loss' ought to be interpreted literally so as to exclude the claim before us. We cannot agree. The operative words are 'resulting from change in temperature or humidity.' The fact that, after the vandals had turned off the heating plant, freezing temperatures caused a rupture of the heating and plumbing systems is neither clearly nor necessarily a loss 'resulting from change in temperature' within the usual and ordinary meaning of paragraph 4(d) 1 or within the comtemplated intent and purpose of the exclusionary provision. 2 Where the language of an exclusionary clause is ambiguous, any doubts as to its meaning must be resolved in favor of the insured and against the insurer who drafted the contract. Simon v. Milwaukee Auto. Mutual Ins. Co., 262 Minn. 378, 115 N.W.2d 40. We readily agree with the trial court that the clause is ambiguous, requiring construction. As stated in its memorandum:

'The court agrees that paragraph 4.(d...

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22 cases
  • State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Paulson
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • June 3, 1988
    ...Company, 171 N.J.Super. 188, 408 A.2d 448 (1979), cert. denied 84 N.J. 434, 420 A.2d 340 (1980); Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Central Insurance Company, 280 Minn. 325, 159 N.W.2d 268 (1968); Unobskey v. Continental Ins. Co., 147 Me. 249, 86 A.2d 160 (1952).4 Bartlett v. Continental Divide I......
  • Jussim v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co.
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    ...689, 377 P.2d 889 (1963); Frontis v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 156 Conn. 492, 499, 242 A.2d 749 (1968); Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 280 Minn. 325, 159 N.W.2d 268 (1968); Villella v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 106 Wash.2d 806, 725 P.2d 957 (1986). See also 18 G. Couch, Insura......
  • Hayley v. Allstate Ins. Co.
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    • Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US
    • September 1, 2004
    ...A.2d 1123 (D.C.App., 2001); Jussim v. Massachusetts Bay Ins. Co., 415 Mass. 24, 610 N.E.2d 954 (1993); Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Central Ins. Co., 280 Minn. 325, 159 N.W.2d 268 (1968); Toumayan v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 970 S.W.2d 822 (Mo.App.,1998); Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. U......
  • Aragona v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.
    • United States
    • Maryland Court of Appeals
    • November 3, 1977
    ...A. 481 (1936) (exclusion applied since fire, rather than collision, was proximate cause of loss); Fawcett House, Inc. v. Great Central Insurance Co., 280 Minn. 325, 159 N.W.2d 268 (1968) (direct cause of loss was vandalism, a covered risk, while the excluded cause acted only indirectly and ......
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