Fay v. Allied Stores Corp., 32399
| Decision Date | 19 October 1953 |
| Docket Number | No. 32399,32399 |
| Citation | 262 P.2d 189,43 Wn.2d 512 |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
| Parties | FAY, v. ALLIED STORES CORP. |
Eggerman, Rosling & Williams, Joseph J. Lanza, Seattle, for appellant.
Kahin, Carmody & Horswill, Burton C. Waldo, Seattle, for respondent.
Plaintiff Theresa Fay recovered judgment in the superior court for King county against the defendant The Bon Marche (a department store in Seattle). Defendant has appealed. The questions raised are whether the judgment for the plaintiff (based upon the jury's verdict) should be set aside either (a) because it is unsupported by the evidence, or (b) because it is contrary to law.
Plaintiff's injuries were sustained in a fall, when she slipped on the first of two stairways inside the Pine street entrance of The Bon Marche. As disclosed by photographic evidence, the particular entrance consists of three adjoining sets of double doors at the level of Pine street. The doors open upon a landing at street level. Two steps lead down from the entrance landing to another landing, from which a second stairway descends onto the main floor of the store. The stairway on which plaintiff slipped is the one leading from the streetlevel or entrance landing to the intermediate landing. It is over 16 1/2 feet wide. There are no handrails on the sidewalls which flank the entrance of the stairway, nor at any intermediate point between the sidewalls.
On the day of the injury, there had been a heavy downpour of rain and the streets were slushy from a snow that had preceded the rain. According to plaintiff's version of the facts, mud and water, tracked in from the street, had collected on the steps leading from the first landing. Plaintiff, sixty-two years of age, had shopped at The Bon Marche on many previous occasions and on this day had entered the store by the middle door of the Pine street entrance. By her own statement on cross-examination, plaintiff did not look at the steps as she began to descend them. She proceeded down the steps leading from the first landing to the intermediate landing, slipped on the mud and water collected on the bottom step of the first landing, and fell. She sustained multiple fractures of the right ankle, which necessitated considerable care and attention. There is evidence in the record that she will continue to suffer from the effects of these injuries for some time, and that the injury is aggravated when she pursues her normal work as cook in the Waldo General Hospital, where she is required to stand on her feet for a good part of the day.
Plaintiff alleges her injuries were proximately caused by negligence on the part of defendant. The complaint urged four grounds of negligence. Three common law grounds of negligence set forth in the complaint were withdrawn during the course of the trial, and it is necessary to consider only the remaining fourth ground of negligence asserted by plaintiff: that § 606 of the Seattle building code (ordinance No. 72200, effective November 1, 1942) is applicable in the instant case. This ordinance requires that stairways over eighty-eight inches wide must be equipped with intermediate handrails. As previously stated, the stairway on which plaintiff was injured had no such intermediate handrail and was not equipped with handrails at the sidewalls.
Appellant urges two assignments of error: That the court erred (1) in not granting its motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for a directed verdict at the close of the entire case; and (2) in denying its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in entering judgment on the verdict in plaintiff's favor.
Appellant agrues at length that the ordinance does not apply retrospectively to buildings such as The Bon Marche, which were constructed prior to its passage. This question of retrospective application of the ordinance is squarely presented (a) by the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the evidence, or, alternatively, for a directed verdict, and (b) by appellant's assignments of error respecting the denial of the motions.
Appellant cites several of our decisions respecting the rule of interpretation that statutes, generally, will be given prospective effect. However, exceptions are made where retroactivity is expressed or clearly implied. Heilig v. Puyallup City Council, 7 Wash. 29, 34 P. 164. The question necessarily presented to us for decision is whether the ordinance contains a clear indication that it is to apply to buildings constructed prior to its enactment.
The section of the building code relied upon by respondent is § 606, which is found in Part VI, entitled 'Means of Egress.' It provides, in part, as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 601, the first section of Part VI of the code, is entitled 'General Egress Requirements.' The first paragraph of this section provides:
(Emphasis supplied.)
This latter section is set out, not to indicate the standard of care required of appellant with reference to the maintenance of handrails, but rather as a base of reference, clarifying the scope of § 606, and that it may be considered in pari materia with § 606. Thus, it will be seen that § 606 employs the language 'all stairways,' and § 601 employs the words 'all buildings.' Taken together the words embrace or mean all stairways of all buildings. If this is not sufficiently clear from the above two sections, reference may be made to § 102, which defines the scope of the entire ordinance as follows:
(Emphasis supplied.)
For the purpose of finding the intent of the city council, the important words of the ordinance are: 'all buildings,' as found in §§ 102 and 601, and 'all stairways,' as found in § 606 (), and the words, 'It * * * shall be binding upon all * * * persons having charge of the * * * maintenance, use, occupancy * * * of the structures * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)
We think the intent of the city council is clear and that § 606 applies in the instant case, and imposed a duty upon The Bon Marche as to the installation and maintenance of intermediate handrails in connection with the stairway. This opinion is impelled not only by the broad, all inclusive language employed, i. e., 'all stairways' and 'all buildings,' but from the stated object of the code and the guide for its construction that its 'provisions shall in every instance be held to...
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