Fazilat v. Feldstein

Decision Date27 May 2004
Citation180 N.J. 74,848 A.2d 761
PartiesFereshteh FAZILAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Nathan FELDSTEIN, deceased and Estate of Nathan Feldstein, Defendants-Respondents.
CourtNew Jersey Supreme Court

James A. Schragger, West Trenton, argued the cause for appellant (Schragger, Schragger & Lavine, attorneys).

Karen L. Steinbach argued the cause for respondents (Pellettieri, Rabstein and Altman, attorneys; Mr. Steinbach and John A. Hartmann, III, Princeton, on the briefs). Justice LONG delivered the opinion of the Court.

On this appeal, we have been asked to determine whether a plaintiff should be permitted to pursue an action for a declaration of paternity and child support against a decedent's fully distributed estate. Resolution of that issue requires us to analyze the interplay between the New Jersey Parentage Act, N.J.S.A. 9:17-38 to -59, and the Administration of Estates of Decedents and Others Act, N.J.S.A. 3B:1-1 to 3B:29-1 (Probate Code), in light of the public policy implications undergirding each. We hold that the paternity action may proceed but that the claim for child support is barred.

I

Because the case comes to us on appeal from a grant of a motion to dismiss, we view the facts presented in a light most favorable to the non-moving party to determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists for trial. Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 116 N.J. 739, 746, 563 A.2d 31 (1989). So viewed, the facts are as follows: In 1992, plaintiff Fereshteh Fazilat began an intimate relationship with defendant Nathan Feldstein, a married man. Sometime prior to 1995, Fazilat moved to New York City and was financially supported by Feldstein. In October 1995, Fazilat informed Feldstein that she was pregnant with his child. Feldstein looked forward to the child's birth and chose her name, Elisabeth. On June 19, 1996, Elisabeth was born. Feldstein was named as her father on the birth certificate.

In July and August 1996, Feldstein visited Elisabeth and bought her clothes, furniture, and toys. Feldstein informed Fazilat that he would not differentiate between Elisabeth and his other children. He expressed the desire to continue to support Elisabeth, but no formal paternity recognition or child support was ever established.

Feldstein died of pancreatic cancer on October 9, 1996. His will was probated on December 13, 1996. It treated all of his children equally by making no provision for any of them. Feldstein's entire estate passed to his wife under the will. The estate was closed and the final assets were distributed late in 1997.

In October 1996, after Fazilat learned Feldstein had died, she moved with Elisabeth to Canada. Twenty-one months after Feldstein's death, on July 2, 1998, Fazilat's New Jersey counsel contacted Edwin Leavitt-Gruberger, an attorney serving as Feldstein's estate's representative, seeking child support for Elisabeth. On July 17, 1998, Gruberger informed Fazilat that "[n]o provision was made for [Elisabeth], nor was it required." He added that those responsible for Feldstein's estate would "not consider any suggestion of any claim of paternity or support" for Elisabeth.

On September 9, 1998, Fazilat's Canadian attorney contacted Gruberger requesting that Feldstein's wife and three adult children volunteer to submit to DNA testing to determine paternity. Gruberger refused. On November 29, 1999, Fazilat filed a complaint for paternity and support against Feldstein's estate in the Ontario Court of Justice. After a hearing, the court dismissed the application on the ground that it had no authority to order support and no jurisdiction to issue a declaration of paternity.

Eleven months later, Fazilat filed a complaint in New Jersey against Feldstein and his estate (collectively, "the estate"). The estate moved to dismiss the complaint. The trial court granted the motion, noting that although Fazilat's claims survived Feldstein's death, her failure to file against his estate within the six months permitted by the Probate Code precluded monetary relief and that the issue of paternity was thus irrelevant.

The Appellate Division affirmed. In so doing, it acknowledged that although the Parentage Act permitted actions after the death of the alleged father, the instant matter was not remediable because claims against the assets of an estate must satisfy the period of limitations established under the Probate Code. The court also questioned whether Fazilat could receive any benefit from a declaration of paternity in light of the fact that Elisabeth already was receiving Social Security through Feldstein. We granted certification, 178 N.J. 375, 840 A.2d 260 (2003), and now affirm in part and reverse in part.

II

The parties renew the arguments advanced before the courts below. Fazilat essentially contends that her paternity claim was timely and should have been permitted to proceed because it involves more than finances and has psychological implications for Elisabeth. She further argues that a parent's obligation to support his minor child survives his death.

The estate counters that although the paternity claim was timely under the Parentage Act, it was outside the time allotted by the Probate Code. The estate characterizes Fazilat's claim as mainly a monetary one against a closed estate, the allowance of which would violate the public policy underpinnings of the Probate Code.

III

We turn first to Fazilat's claim regarding entitlement to support from the estate. The preliminary question presented by that claim is whether there is any authority whatsoever to hold an estate liable for a decedent's support obligations. The answer to that question is yes.

For example, citing N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (statute authorizing alimony and support orders), this Court has held that when equity demands it, a court may "enter a support order for minor children to survive their father's death...." Grotsky v. Grotsky, 58 N.J. 354, 361, 277 A.2d 535 (1971). More recently, we concluded that that statutory scheme suggests that courts have the authority to enter "reasonable and equitable support orders" directly against a parent's estate. Kiken v. Kiken, 149 N.J. 441, 453, 694 A.2d 557 (1997). Relying on N.J.S.A. 2A:34-25, which expressly terminates the duty to pay alimony on the death of an obligor, we noted that in the child support context no such provision exists. Id. at 451, 694 A.2d 557.

Likewise in Raynor v. Raynor, 319 N.J.Super. 591, 595, 726 A.2d 280 (App. Div.1999), the court held that the proceeds of a life insurance policy designating decedent's wife as a beneficiary could be considered in the evaluation of the estate's obligation to provide continuing support to the child. Similarly, in Koidl v. Schreiber, 214 N.J.Super. 513, 516-17, 520 A.2d 759 (App.Div.1986), the court held that although children may have no right to participate in their father's estate, they do have the right to petition the court to enforce a preexisting support order against the estate.

In DeCeglia v. Estate of Colletti, 265 N.J.Super. 128, 625 A.2d 590 (App.Div. 1993), the decedent had expressed a clear intent to create a will and to alter the beneficiary under his life insurance policy in order to provide for the plaintiff, his fiancée, and his soon-to-be-born child. Id. at 131-32, 625 A.2d 590. He died, however, one month before his daughter was born and prior to being able to draft a will and effectuate the change in his insurance policy. Id. at 132, 625 A.2d 590. The court concluded that under those circumstances equity called "`for [entry of] a support order ... to survive [the] father's death.'" Id. at 140, 625 A.2d 590 (quoting Grotsky, supra, 58 N.J. at 361, 277 A.2d 535).

In Black v. Walker, 295 N.J.Super. 244, 252, 684 A.2d 1011 (App.Div.1996), the decedent died after the trial court ordered him to contribute to his child's college expenses, but before an order was executed. The trial court entered the order against decedent's estate and the Appellate Division affirmed, likely because all but the ministerial act of executing the order had been carried out.

Here, the question is a more nuanced one: whether a decedent's obligation can be enforced against an estate that has been closed and fully distributed. It is in connection with that question that the reciprocal relationship between the Parentage Act and the Probate Act comes to the fore.

A.

The Parentage Act, which is modeled after the Uniform Parentage Act of 1973, was enacted "to establish the principle that regardless of the marital status of the parents, all children and parents have equal rights with respect to each other and to provide a procedure to establish parentage in disputed cases." Assembly Judiciary, Law, Public Safety and Defense Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 888, at 1 (Oct. 7, 1982). The New Jersey Parentage Act helps families deal with the problems posed by fathers who seek to avoid paying child support. In re Estate of Kolacy, 332 N.J.Super. 593, 603, 753 A.2d 1257 (Ch.Div.2000). The term "parent and child relationship" is defined as the "legal relationship existing between a child and the child's natural or adoptive parents, incident to which the law confers or imposes rights, privileges, duties, and obligations." N.J.S.A. 9:17-39. A claim brought under the Parentage Act may not be instituted more than five years after the claimant reaches the age of majority, thus providing a twenty-three year window to file. N.J.S.A. 9:17-45b. Such claims are not abated by the putative father's death and may be instituted or continued against the father's estate. N.J.S.A. 9:17-45c.

B.

The Probate Code has as its goal the State's long-standing interest in securing "the speedy settlement of decedent[s'] estate[s]." Robinson v. Hodge, 4 N.J. 397, 405, 73 A.2d 158 (1950). Indeed, it is well-established that the State's interest in finality and in the orderly disposition of estates justifies the application of...

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