Fca U.S. LLC v. Fca United States, LLC (In re)

• Decision Date: 18 March 2020
• Docket Number: Case Number 16-md-02744, Case Number 19-10046,MDL No. 2744
• Citation: 446 F.Supp.3d 218
• Parties: IN RE: FCA US LLC MONOSTABLE ELECTRONIC GEARSHIFT LITIGATION Sarah Lalli, Plaintiff, v. FCA US, LLC, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

446 F.Supp.3d 218

IN RE: FCA US LLC MONOSTABLE ELECTRONIC GEARSHIFT LITIGATIONSarah Lalli, Plaintiff,

v.FCA US, LLC, Defendant.

MDL No. 2744

Case Number 16-md-02744, Case Number 19-10046

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Southern Division.

Signed March 18, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

DAVID M. LAWSON, United States District Judge

Sarah Lalli, a citizen of Florida, filed this action in this district against FCA US, LLC (Chrysler) on January 7, 2019, seeking damages for the diminished value of a 2014 Jeep Grand Cherokee equipped with a monostable shifter. She pleaded claims on behalf of herself and a proposed class of Florida buyers of the class vehicles for violations of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA), Fla. Stat. § 501.201 et seq. , fraudulent concealment, breach of express warranty (under Florida law and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act), and unjust enrichment. The case has been joined in this MDL proceeding as a tag-along action by the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation.

Chrysler responded with a motion to dismiss all of the claims, arguing several legal theories. For the reasons stated below, the motion will be granted in part and denied in part.

I.

Lalli purchased her Grand Cherokee as a new vehicle from a Chrysler dealer in Vero Beach, Florida on December 17, 2014. It was equipped with a monostable shifter. She does not contend that she suffered any injury caused by the vehicle's operation. She seeks only economic loss damages.

Lalli is not the first Florida plaintiff joined in these proceedings. The Court previously dismissed, by the consent of the parties, the claims of former Florida plaintiff Justine Andollo, which had been pleaded in Counts XVIII-XXI of the plaintiffs' second amended consolidated master complaint. Andollo's claims were dismissed because she disappeared and did not participate in discovery. Andollo pleaded the same causes of action described above on behalf of a class of Florida plaintiffs. Her claims were incorporated into a complaint that joined as plaintiffs numerous other individuals from various states. The multi-state action including Andollo was filed in this district on April 28, 2017. Andollo v. FCA US, LLC , No. 17-11376, ECF No. 1, PageID.127-138. The claims pleaded on behalf of the Florida plaintiff and absent class members in that case were materially identical to those brought by Lalli in her separate action in 2019.

Chrysler argues that the FDUTPA claim is untimely and not subject to any tolling rules, (2) the fraudulent concealment claim is barred by Florida's economic loss doctrine, (3) the breach of express warranty claim cannot be maintained because the plaintiff does not allege that she conveyed any pre-suit notice of the warranty claim to the defendant, and (4) under Florida law an unjust enrichment claim based on the same factual premises as a breach of contract (warranty) claim must be dismissed as defectively pleaded. Lalli disputes each of these arguments.

II.

Chrysler's motion is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 547, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A "claim is facially plausible when a plaintiff ‘pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Matthew N. Fulton, D.D.S., P.C. v. Enclarity, Inc. , 907 F.3d 948, 951-52 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

When reviewing the motion, the Court "must ‘construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff[ ] [and] accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true.’ " Id. at 951 (quoting Hill v. Snyder , 878 F.3d 193, 203 (6th Cir. 2017) ). Consideration of a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is confined to the pleadings. Jones v. City of Cincinnati , 521 F.3d 555, 562 (6th Cir. 2008). Assessment of the facial sufficiency of the complaint ordinarily must be undertaken without resort to matters outside the pleadings.

Wysocki v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp. , 607 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir. 2010).

A. FDUTPA Claim

It is undisputed here that the plaintiff's FDUTPA claim was filed outside the applicable limitations period, which under the Florida statute is four years from the date of purchase of the allegedly defective product. Fla. Stat. § 95.11(3)(f). " Section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes (1996), covers ‘[a]n action founded on a statutory liability,’ which [applies to a] FDUTPA claim." South Motor Co. of Dade County v. Doktorczyk , 957 So. 2d 1215, 1216-17 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007).

The plaintiff cites cases recognizing the general rule that an amended pleading relates back to the original pleading even if it adds a new plaintiff, where the defendant was on notice of the claims and the new party asserts materially identical claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). But she has not cited any authority for the novel proposition that an entirely separate lawsuit can be rendered timely by "relation back" to pleadings filed by another plaintiff in a different case, where the original plaintiff's claims in the separate action were dismissed for want of prosecution. And federal courts have rejected the invitation to apply Rule 15 "by analogy" to the situation where an untimely claim is raised in the first instance in an entirely separate lawsuit, rather than in an amended pleading in a timely-commenced action involving other parties. " Rule 15 does not permit an amendment in one case to relate back to the filing of an earlier complaint in a separate action." Beem v. Ferguson , 713 F. App'x 974, 982 (11th Cir. 2018) (citing Dade County v. Rohr Industries, Inc. , 826 F.2d 983, 989 (11th Cir. 1987) ; Velez-Diaz v. United States , 507 F.3d 717, 719 (1st Cir. 2007) (" Rule 15(c), by its terms, applies to amended pleadings in the same action as an original, timely pleading; the pleading sought to be amended may not be a pleading filed in a different case.")); see also State Bank of Coloma v. Nat'l Flood Ins. Program , 851 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1988) ("[T]he plaintiffs never attempted to amend their complaint, as Rule 15(c) envisions. Instead, they simply filed a completely separate lawsuit against a party who was not previously named.").

Lalli also contends that the defendant should be equitably estopped from asserting its limitations defense due to is concealment of the defect. In her individual complaint, Lalli alleges that she and absent class members did not discover the alleged defect in the monostable shifter, and could not have discovered it with reasonable diligence, within the applicable limitations period. She then alleges two bases for tolling. First, she contends that the "delayed discovery rule" should be applied to excuse her untimely filing. However, Florida courts have held that the delayed discovery rule does not apply to claims under the FDUTPA. Brexendorf v. Bank of Am., N.A. , 319 F. Supp. 3d 1257, 1263 (M.D. Fla. 2018) ("Unlike fraud actions, the Delayed Discovery Doctrine does not apply to FDUTPA claims, even those founded on fraud.") (citing Marlborough Holdings Grp., Ltd. v. Azimut-Benetti, Spa, Platinum Yacht Collection No. Two, Inc. , 505 F. App'x 899, 906 (11th Cir. 2013) ("The delayed discovery rule [is] inapplicable to [ ] FDUTPA claims, as the FDUTPA is a statute and actions under it are ‘founded on a statutory liability.’ " (quoting Brown v. Nationscredit Fin. Servs. Corp. , 32 So. 3d 661, 662 n.1 (Dist. Ct. App. 2010) ("The statute of limitations for a FDUTPA claim is four years pursuant to section 95.11(3)(f), Florida Statutes, as it is based on a statutory liability.")))); see also Licul v. Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. , No. 13-61686, 2013 WL 6328734, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2013) ("As an initial matter, the delayed discovery rule is inapplicable to FDUTPA claims.").

Second, the plaintiff asserts that the limitations defense is precluded by equitable estoppel. But Florida courts have refused to recognize the propriety of equitable estoppel on facts such as those alleged here, where the plaintiff alleges that she had no knowledge of the defect within the limitations period, because "equitable estoppel presupposes that the plaintiff knew of the facts underlying the cause of action but delayed filing suit because of the defendant's conduct." Koski v. Carrier Corp. , 347 F. Supp. 3d 1185, 1193 (S.D. Fla. 2017) (emphasis added) (citing Black Diamond Properties, Inc. v. Haines , 69 So. 3d 1090, 1094 (Dist. Ct. App. 2011) ("The doctrine of equitable estoppel is inapposite given that Plaintiffs do not allege that they knew they had a cause of action, but failed to comply with the statute of limitations because they relied on fraudulent representations made by Defendants that led them to delay filing suit. To the contrary, Plaintiffs argued in the lower court proceedings that they did not comply with the statute of limitations because, until 2001, they did not recognize the basis for their false advertising claims."); Ryan v. Lobo De Gonzalez , 841 So. 2d 510, 518 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003) ).

Lalli finally argues that her untimely filing should be excused by the principle of class tolling recognized in American Pipe & Const. Co. v. Utah , 414 U.S. 538, 554, 94 S.Ct. 756, 38 L.Ed.2d 713 (1974), which held that "the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class who would have been parties had the suit been permitted to continue as a class action." That principle applies to Lalli's individual claims, but the Supreme Court recently held that American Pipe cannot be applied to...