FDIC v. Caia

Decision Date19 July 1993
Docket NumberNo. C-92-333-L.,C-92-333-L.
Citation830 F. Supp. 60
PartiesFDIC v. Robert CAIA, et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Steven A. Solomon, Backus, Meyer & Solomon, Manchester, NH, for plaintiff.

Robert A. Shaines, Shaines & McEachern, P.A., Portsmouth, NH, for defendants.

ORDER ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

LOUGHLIN, Senior District Judge.

Before the court is defendants' Motion for Reconsideration (doc. no. 26) in which defendants seek to have the court vacate an injunction, issued by the court on January 22, 1993, to the extent that it relates to moorings located in the waters adjacent to the Beacon Marina property described below. Following are the facts that are relevant to the acquisition and subsequent use of the moorings.

On or about October 7, 1988, the defendants Robert Caia, Ellen Caia, and Robert Caia as Trustee of the Cass Marina Trust entered into an exchange agreement with Twin State Development Associates ("Twin State") whereby a parcel of real estate known as Beacon Marina was transferred to Twin State in exchange for properties owned by Twin State that are not relevant to the disposition of this matter. Included in the exchange agreement is the grant of an easement to the defendants "for the passage of persons, vehicles trailers and marine equipment from Route 103 to and over the boat launching ramp for the purpose of accessing Lake Sunapee to launch and remove boats of all descriptions from Lake Sunapee." (Doc. no. 26, Motion for Reconsideration, Exhibit B, p. 2).

The exchange agreement is silent as to the existence or ownership of the moorings since the permit was issued after execution of the exchange agreement. (Doc. no. 26, Exhibit C). There is nothing in the record other than the letter sent by Attorney Michael Feeney on behalf of Beacon Marina, Inc. that establishes that Beacon Marina, Inc. has property rights that are a necessary prerequisite to the issuance of a mooring permit. Other property rights are listed in the Feeney letter however, the court will focus on the alleged easement interest.

When seeking reconsideration of a court's order, a movant undertakes a very substantial burden. In re Mortgage Investors Corp., 136 B.R. 592, 597 (Bankr.D.Mass. 1992).

A motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for raising issues or citing authorities a party could or should have presented prior to the court's ruling. A motion to reconsider is appropriate where the court has clearly misunderstood a party, has made a decision outside the issues presented by the parties, has made an error not of reasoning but apprehension, or where there has been a significant change in the law or the facts since the court's prior ruling.

In re Mortgage Investors, 136 B.R. at 597 (quoting In re Grand Builders, Inc., 122 B.R. 673, 675 (Bankr.W.D.Pa.1990) (citations omitted)). Unless manifest errors of fact or law can be shown, reconsideration of a court's order is inappropriate. Id. (citing In re Oak Brook Apartments, 126 B.R. 535, 536 (Bankr. S.D.Ohio 1991)).

Upon reconsideration, the court will stand by its original decision in finding that Bob's Beacon Marina, Inc. does not own any property rights in the easement. However, by looking to the law of easements as developed in the State of New Hampshire, the court is of the opinion that Bob's Beacon Marina, Inc. does have use rights of the servient estate within the limitations of the easement as granted.

There is no question that the interest granted in the exchange agreement is an appurtenant easement which "is a nonpossessory right to the use of another's land. It is an incorporeal right generally created for the purpose of benefiting the owner of the dominant estate ... as the possessor of such estate; it runs with the land, is incapable of existence separate and apart from the dominant tenement, and is inheritable." Quality Discount Market Corp. v. Laconia Planning Bd., 132 N.H. 734, 739, 571 A.2d 271 (1990). The conveyance of an easement is, in law, the grant of reasonable use. Chapman v. Newmarket Mfg. Co., 74 N.H. 424, 68 A. 868 (1908). Use of a right-of-way over the land of another must be reasonable and must take into consideration the contemplated uses and any changed circumstances. Donaghey v. Croteau, 119 N.H. 320, 324, 401 A.2d 1081 (1979). It is well settled that "`there is no presumed grant of a right to exercise an easement in an unnecessary and unreasonable manner.... The right of an easement owner and the right of the landowner are not absolute, irrelative, and uncontrolled, but are so limited, each by the other, that there may be a due and reasonable enjoyment of both.'" Chapman, 74 N.H. at 425, 68 A. 868 (quoting Olcott v. Thompson, 59 N.H. 154, 156 (1879)).

When looking to the language of the easement as granted, it is crystal clear that use of the easement for launching and removing boats which may ultimately be attached to the moorings is within the contemplated use of the easement and is furthermore, in the court's opinion, a reasonable use. Taking into consideration the limited number of moorings and the fact that the shorefront property is used as a marina, that use of the launching ramp as access to the moorings, absent evidence to the contrary, will not unduly burden the servient estate held by plaintiff.

The defendants are well within their rights, subject to certain limitations, to allow other persons or entities to use the launching ramp which is subject to the easement. See Donaghey, 119 N.H. at 324, 401 A.2d 1081. With regard to the limitations, defendants must limit the number of individuals using the right-of-way to a reasonable number and must take care to ensure that the amount of use does not exceed plaintiff's reasonable tolerance as owner of the servient estate. Id.

The basis for the court's present ruling which reverses its earlier ruling is founded upon a mistake of law that resulted by a misapplication of the word "shorefront property" to the applicable mooring statutes. This mistake was discovered after reviewing plaintiff's opposition to the motion for reconsideration.

The crux of this matter involves interpretation of N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 270:61 II(b). There are no New Hampshire cases that have interpreted this statute. Although a federal district court is bound by the construction given a state statute by the highest court of the state, when the statute has not been construed by the state courts, the federal district court has the power to interpret the statute for the first time. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc., 67 F.Supp. 780, 798 (D.C.Cal.1946); In re Frost, 111 B.R. 306, 310 (Bnkr.C.D.Cal.1990). In construing a state statute that has not been construed by the state's highest court, the federal court must interpret the statute as would the state's highest court if confronted with the same issue. Anderson v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 826 F.2d 777, 779 (8th Cir.1987); Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 519 F.Supp. 506, 511 (D.C.Del.1981); West v. Cole, 390 F.Supp. 91, 98, n. 4 (N.D.Miss.1975). When interpreting a state statute that has not been construed by the state courts, the federal court is to apply the same principles of statutory construction that would be used by the state courts. Thomas v. Reliance Ins. Co., 617 F.2d 122, 125 (5th Cir.1980); United States v. Guyette, 382 F.Supp. 1266, 1268 (E.D.Va. 1974).

In New Hampshire, statutory interpretation requires the court to "look first to the statutory language itself, In re John Kevin B., 129 N.H. 286, 288, 525 A.2d 281, 282-83 (1987), and to construe the law in a manner consistent with its plain meaning. Theresa S. v. Superintendent of Youth Dev. Center, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985)." Penrich, Inc. v. Sullivan, 136 N.H. 621, 623, 620 A.2d 1037 (1993). The plain meaning of the words used in a statute is determined from the common and approved usage of the language. State v. Johnson, 134 N.H. 570, 575-76, 595 A.2d 498 (1991). In determining the plain meaning, the court must look to the statute as a whole. In re Guardianship of Raymond E., 135 N.H. 688, 690, 609 A.2d 1220 (1992) (citing Petition of Jane Doe, 132 N.H. 270, 277, 564 A.2d 433 (1989)). A literal interpretation is not placed on a phrase when doing so removes it from the context of the whole. Johnson, 134 N.H. at 576, 595 A.2d 498 (citing State ex rel. Fortin v. Harris, 109 N.H. 394, 395, 253 A.2d 830 (1969)). Nevertheless, the court shall not modify the meaning of a statute that is plain on its face. Id. (citing Appeal of Cremin, 131 N.H. 480, 483, 554 A.2d 1298 (1989)). If the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, reference need not be made to the legislative history in order to further reveal the legislative intent behind the statute. Id. (citing Chroniak v. Golden Investment Corp., 133 N.H. 346, 351, 577 A.2d 1209 (1990)). If the language is found to be ambiguous, reference is made to the legislative history. Snyder v. New Hampshire Sav. Bank, 134 N.H. 32, 33, 592 A.2d 506 (1991).

In order to obtain a mooring permit, an individual must establish, among other requirements, that the individual has legal access over land to the mooring. N.H.Rev. Stat.Ann. § 270:61 II(b) (Equity Supp.1991). The phrase "legal access over land to the moorings" is not defined by the statute. Another relevant statutory provision prohibits the placement of more than one mooring adjacent to any shorefront property regardless whether individuals have legal access over the shorefront property unless a special exception is granted pursuant to N.H.Rev. Stat.Ann. § 270:65 or a mooring field or area is permitted pursuant to N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. §§ 270:67 or 270:68. N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. § 270:61 III (Equity Supp.1991).

Plaintiff initially states that moorings are permitted only in areas adjacent to shorefront property in which the permittee has legal access over land to the moorings. (Doc. no. 27, Objection to Motion for Reconsideration,...

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