Feathers v. Detrick
| Decision Date | 13 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 16734,16734 |
| Citation | 175 W.Va. 628,336 S.E.2d 922 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Elmer FEATHERS v. Jerry DETRICK, Sheriff. |
Syllabus by the Court
1. "A person, after having been convicted of a crime committed within a state and not having served in full the sentence 2. Under the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ( W.Va.Code, 5-1-7 through W.Va.Code, 5-1-13), a demand for the extradition of one who has been convicted of a crime and sentenced and who, thereafter, is alleged to have broken the terms of his or her parole, must be supported by documents authenticated by the executive authority of the demanding state, including a copy of a judgment of conviction or a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person demanded has broken the terms of his or her parole. W.Va.Code, 5-1-7 [1937].
resulting therefrom, who when sought for to be subjected to the sentence of the court is found in another state, is a fugitive from justice within the meaning of the extradition clause of the United States Constitution, Article IV, Section 2." Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Sublett v. Adams, 145 W.Va. 354, 115 S.E.2d 158 (1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 933 [81 S.Ct. 1652, 6 L.Ed.2d 392] (1961)
3. The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ( W.Va.Code, 5-1-7 through W.Va.Code, 5-1-13), does not require, as a prerequisite to the extradition of an alleged parole violator, a judicial determination by the demanding state of probable cause to believe that the person demanded has broken the terms of his or her parole.
William D. Highland, Charleston, for appellant.
Charlie Brown, Atty. Gen., Dana D. Davis, Asst. Atty. Gen., Charleston, for appellee.
In this action, the appellant, Elmer Feathers, appeals from the final order of the Circuit Court of Mineral County, West Virginia. Pursuant to that order, entered on September 20, 1984, the circuit court denied the appellant relief in habeas corpus, following proceedings in which the appellant, who allegedly violated the conditions of his Indiana imposed parole, challenged his extradition to Indiana from West Virginia. The appellee is the Sheriff of Mineral County. The extradition having been stayed for purposes of this appeal, this Court has before it the petition for appeal, all matters of record and the briefs and argument of counsel.
The appellant was convicted in Indiana of criminal offenses in 1979 and 1980. He received a prison term in Indiana and was later released upon parole.
In November, 1983, the Indiana Parole Board, upon "due knowledge and information," declared the appellant to be a parole violator and "fugitive from justice." Thereafter, Harlan C. Hicks, an Indiana correctional officer and member of the Indiana Parole Board, issued with regard to the appellant a "Warrant for Retaking Paroled Offender." That warrant, dated May 21, 1984, provided in part:
Having reasonable cause to believe that Elmer Feathers--DOC 6926-P, a committed offender of the State of Indiana, conditionally released from the Indiana State Prison and under the supervision of the Department of Correction, has violated the conditions of his release agreement and has lapsed or is about to lapse into criminal ways, ... I hereby order that said committed offender be retaken and be detained in order that the committed offender be placed in the actual custody of the Department of Correction. 1
On June 15, 1984, the appellant was arrested in Mineral County upon the May, 1984 fugitive warrant. Thereafter, a warrant By habeas corpus petition, the appellant challenged his extradition to Indiana, and on September 14, 1984, a hearing upon the petition was held in circuit court. The appellant contended that, inasmuch as no judicial determination had been made in Indiana of probable cause to believe that the appellant was a parole violator, i.e., that he had "escaped" from parole, extradition to Indiana from West Virginia could not be ordered.
was issued by the Governor of West Virginia for the (continued) arrest of the appellant upon the fugitive warrant and for the extradition of the appellant to Indiana.
The circuit court concluded, however, that the question of whether the appellant had violated his parole was, rather than a judicial matter subject to probable cause standards, an administrative matter properly determinable by the Indiana Parole Board. As reflected in its order entered on September 20, 1984, the circuit court denied relief to the appellant. The circuit court stated: "[I]t is not required that any judicial determination of probable cause be made in the State of Indiana in order to authorize the extradition of a parolee."
Article IV, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States provides in part:
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
As the Supreme Court of the United States stated in Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978), that clause "was intended to enable each state to bring offenders to trial as swiftly as possible in the state where the alleged offense was committed." 439 U.S. at 287, 99 S.Ct. at 534, 58 L.Ed.2d at 526. Moreover, the court, in Doran, stated: "The purpose of the Clause was to preclude any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice of another state and thus 'balkanize' the administration of criminal justice among the several states." 439 U.S. at 287, 99 S.Ct. at 534, 58 L.Ed.2d at 526.
In furtherance of the considerations of U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 [cl. 2], West Virginia has adopted the "Uniform Criminal Extradition Act." ( W.Va.Code, 5-1-7 through W.Va.Code, 5-1-13). As reflected in W.Va.Code, 5-1-7(b) [1937], the Governor of West Virginia has a duty, generally, "to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony, or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this State...." Subsection (c) of W.Va.Code, 5-1-7 [1937], provides, in part:
No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the governor unless in writing alleging ... that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, and that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found, or by information supported by affidavit, in the state having jurisdiction of the crime, or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate or justice there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon; or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole. The indictment, information, or affidavit made before the magistrate or justice must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state; and the copy of indictment, information, affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenticated by the executive The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act was discussed in Doran, supra. In Doran, the petitioner challenged his extradition from Michigan to Arizona (in which states the Act had been adopted). The petitioner was charged in Arizona with theft, and the Arizona governor issued a requisition to Michigan for the petitioner's extradition. The record indicated that a "judicial determination" had been made in Arizona of probable cause to believe that a theft had been committed and that the theft had been committed by the petitioner. The Michigan governor granted extradition. However, the Supreme Court of Michigan determined that the extradition documents from Arizona failed to set forth "sufficient facts" to establish probable cause concerning the theft. Consequently, the Michigan court granted the petitioner relief in habeas corpus.
authority making the demand. (emphasis added)
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Doran, reversed and held that "when a neutral judicial officer of the demanding state [Arizona] has determined that probable cause exists, the courts of the asylum state [Michigan] are without power to review the determination." 439 U.S. at 290, 99 S.Ct. at 536, 58 L.Ed.2d at 528. 2 In particular, the Supreme Court of the United States held:
Once the governor [of the asylum state] has granted extradition, a court considering release on habeas corpus can do no more than decide (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order; (b) whether the petitioner has been charged with a crime in the demanding state; (c) whether the petitioner is the person named in the request for extradition; and (d) whether the petitioner is a fugitive.
439 U.S. at 289, 99 S.Ct. at 535, 58 L.Ed.2d at 527. See also syl. pt. 1, Cronauer v The phrase "fugitive from justice," found in Doran and associated with U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2 [cl. 2], was discussed by this Court in State ex rel. Sublett v. Adams, 145 W.Va. 354, 115 S.E.2d 158 (1960); cert. denied, 366 U.S. 933, 81 S.Ct. 1652, 6 L.Ed.2d 392 (1961), a case involving the extradition from Ohio to West Virginia of a defendant convicted and sentenced in West Virginia upon the crime of forgery. Syllabus point 1 of Sublett is relevant to the action before this Court:
State, 174 W.Va. 91, 322 S.E.2d 862 (1984); syl. pt. 2, State ex rel. Mitchell v. Allen, 155 W.Va. 530, 185 S.E.2d 355 (1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 946, 92 S.Ct. 2048, 32 L.Ed.2d 333 (1972)
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