Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co.
| Citation | 405 N.E.2d 264,16 O.O.3d 280,62 Ohio St.2d 245 |
| Decision Date | 28 May 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 79-752,79-752 |
| Parties | , 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 31,015, 16 O.O.3d 280 FEATZKA, Appellant, v. MILLCRAFT PAPER COMPANY, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Ohio |
Syllabus by the Court
The requirement in R.C. 4111.17(E) that actions initiated under R.C. 4111.17(D) for the recovery of sex-based wage differentials from the date of the commencement of the violation "shall be initiated within one year after the date of violation" limits the time in which actions can be brought from the last date of such discrimination, not the time period for which recovery is permitted.
Darlene A. Featzka, appellant herein, became a full-time employee of the Millcraft Paper Company, appellee herein, on January 3, 1975. Featzka claims she was a full-time employee until May 20, 1976, when she was placed on part-time status. She left her employment at Millcraft in October 1976.
On May 12, 1977, she initiated a complaint in the Court of Common Pleas of Lucas County against Millcraft alleging that her employer had discriminated against her from October 1975, until May 20, 1976, by paying a male employee a higher wage for equal work in violation of R.C. 4111.17. She made a second claim alleging a breach of contract.
R.C. 4111.17, * inter alia, prohibits wage discrimination based on sex. R.C. 4111.17(D) grants an employee a cause of action against an employer who violates the statute. R.C. 4111.17(E) limits this right, stating that "(a)ny action arising under this section shall be initiated within one year after the date of violation."
The trial court, on motion, entered summary judgment for Millcraft. It held that R.C. 4111.17(E) barred recovery for any differential wages prior to May 12, 1976, one year before the date on which the action was filed. This holding allowed recovery for only six days of wages which was well under the court's jurisdictional amount. The court also held that the contract, which was oral, was unenforceable because it was barred by the statute of frauds.
The Court of Appeals modified and affirmed this decision, holding that the dismissal of the wage discrimination claim was without prejudice because it was based on a lack of jurisdiction. The basis of the court's decision was Evans v. Western Electric Co. (1976), 50 Ohio App.2d 233, 362 N.E.2d 671, which holds, in part, that recovery under R.C. 4111.17 is to be limited under subsection (E) thereof to any wage differential occurring within the one-year period immediately prior to the initiation of an action thereunder.
The cause is now before this court upon the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Winchester, Douglas, Lydy & Mollenkamp, R. Jeffrey Lydy, Casey & Slaybod, Julia K. Casey and Sheldon M. Slaybod, Toledo, for appellant.
Thompson, Hine & Flory, T. Merritt Bumpass, Jr., and Keith A. Ashmus, Cleveland, for appellee.
The sole issue before this court is whether R.C. 4111.17(E) prohibits appellant's recovery of sex-based wage differentials occurring more than one year prior to the initiation of her action. Basically, we must decide if, in enacting R.C. 4111.17, the General Assembly intended each day of unequal treatment to constitute a separate and severable violation or whether each day is to be considered a part of a continuous violation. In order to construe a statute we must of course determine the legislative intent. As this court stated in the first paragraph of the syllabus in Henry v. Central Natl. Bank (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 242 N.E.2d 342, 345, " * * * (i)n determining that intention courts look to the language employed and to the purpose to be accomplished."
R.C. 4111.17(E), standing alone, is arguably an ambiguous provision. Consequently we must look to the language and purpose of R.C. 4111.17 to determine the meaning and effect of R.C. 4111.17(E).
R.C. 4111.17 is designed to eliminate wage discrimination based on sex, race, and other immutable characteristics. In order to accomplish this goal, the General Assembly, in R.C. 4111.17(D), gave employees a right to sue "to recover two times the amount of the difference between the wages actually received and the wages received by a person performing equal work for the employer, from the date of the commencement of the violation, and for costs, including attorney fees."
The legislature clearly intended, in granting this right of recovery, to provide incentives both for employees to call for the enforcement of the statute and for employers to eliminate the prohibited discrimination. A limitation of recoveries to any wage differentials occurring within a year prior to the commencement of an action would appear to be contrary to these remedial enforcement provisions and, in the absence of a clear expression of legislative intent, we cannot so read R.C. 4111.17(E).
Appellee argues that R.C. 4111.13(C) and (D) show a clear legislative intent to treat violations of R.C. 4111.17 as severable.
R.C. 4111.13 provides, in part:
Criminal penalties are assessed for violations of R.C. 4111.13 and 4111.17, pursuant to R.C. 4111.99.
Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed.) defines "offense" as "(a) felony or misdemeanor; a breach of the criminal laws." The General Assembly in R.C. 4111.17, rather than using the term "offense," used the term "violation." Black's Law Dictionary defines "violation" as a "breach of rights, duty, or law." In using the term "violation" rather than "offense" in R.C. 4111.17, the legislature clearly indicated that the severability of offenses provided for in R.C. 4111.13 was not to be applicable to civil actions brought under R.C. 4111.17.
Pursuant to R.C. 4111.17(D), the legislature did provide for recovery "from the date of the commencement of the violation." Use of the word "commencement" indicates a violation of a continuous nature, for the commencement of the violation would not be relevant if each day of violation were severable. By defining "recovery" in terms of commencement of the violation, the legislature clearly indicated its intent to permit recovery from the beginning of the prohibited discrimination until its termination.
Any other interpretation would lead to absurd and unreasonable results in at least two respects. First, if, as in the case at bar, the violation has ceased by the time the employee becomes aware of his rights under R.C. 4111.17, a limitation of recovery will discourage the desirable process of attempting to negotiate a settlement before an action is filed. Second, such an interpretation will encourage the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Adams, 2009 Ohio 6491 (Ohio App. 12/8/2009)
...intent in enacting the statute." State v. S.R. (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 590, 594, 589 N.E.2d 1319, citing Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 245, 247, 405 N.E.2d 264. To determine the legislature's intent, we must first look to the plain language of the statute itself. State ......
-
Ohio Podiatric Med. Ass'n v. Taylor
...394 (1999); Brooks v. Ohio State Univ., 111 Ohio App.3d 342, 349, 676 N.E.2d 162 (10th Dist.1996), citing Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co., 62 Ohio St.2d 245, 405 N.E.2d 264 (1980). In so doing, the court must first look to the plain language of the statute and the purpose to be accomplished.......
-
Burchfield, In re
...Bank (1968), 16 Ohio St.2d 16, 45 O.O.2d 262, 242 N.E.2d 342, paragraph one of the syllabus; Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co. (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 245, 247, 16 O.O.3d 280, 282, 405 N.E.2d 264, 266. However, courts do not have authority to ignore the plain and unambiguous language under the g......
-
Dindinger v. Allsteel, Inc., 13–1411.
...Supreme Court has applied the continuing violation doctrine to its state wage discrimination law. See Featzka v. Millcraft Paper Co., 62 Ohio St.2d 245, 405 N.E.2d 264, 266–67 (1980). Ohio law provides for recovery “ ‘from the date of the commencement of the violation.’ ” Id. at 266 (quotin......